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"Even in this precarious moment for American democracy, the institutions of American federalism-that is, state governments-remain almost universally lauded. For many, the present era of national partisan polarization makes local politics even more appealing. The truth about federalism in this polarized age, however, is a bit more concerning, as Grumbach details. As the state level has become an increasingly important site of public policies that affect Americans' lives, it is also accelerating the distressing trends of the current era, including plutocratic politics, racial inequality, and democratic backsliding. The book develops a theory of the interaction between federalism and polarization, debunking common myths and misunderstandings that underpin widespread support of state governments. Whereas the framers thought federalism would incentivize state governments to customize policy to local preferences, the state level is increasingly dominated by national groups who exploit the low-information environments of amateur legislatures, inattentive local media, and identity-focused voters. Not only are well-resourced groups advantaged, but polarization diminishes the incentives for state governments to learn from the experiences of other policy laboratories. A state may risk their party's national reputation by emulating a successful policy from a state controlled by the opposing party. Taken together, this theory of polarized federalism suggests that polarization disrupts the oft-lauded features of federalism so common to theories of American governance"--

As national political fights are waged at the state level, democracy itself pays the priceOver the past generation, the Democratic and Republican parties have each become nationally coordinated political teams. American political institutions, on the other hand, remain highly decentralized. Laboratories against Democracy shows how national political conflicts are increasingly flowing through the subnational institutions of state politics—with profound consequences for public policy and American democracy.Jacob Grumbach argues that as Congress has become more gridlocked, national partisan and activist groups have shifted their sights to the state level, nationalizing state politics in the process and transforming state governments into the engines of American policymaking. He shows how this has had the ironic consequence of making policy more varied across the states as red and blue party coalitions implement increasingly distinct agendas in areas like health care, reproductive rights, and climate change. The consequences don't stop there, however. Drawing on a wealth of new data on state policy, public opinion, money in politics, and democratic performance, Grumbach traces how national groups are using state governmental authority to suppress the vote, gerrymander districts, and erode the very foundations of democracy itself.Required reading for this precarious moment in our politics, Laboratories against Democracy reveals how the pursuit of national partisan agendas at the state level has intensified the challenges facing American democracy, and asks whether today's state governments are mitigating the political crises of our time—or accelerating them

The Trump presidency generated concern about democratic backsliding and renewed interest in measuring the national democratic performance of the United States. However, the US has a decentralized form of federalism that administers democratic institutions at the state level. Using 51 indicators of electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018, I develop a measure of subnational democratic performance, the State Democracy Index. I then test theories of democratic expansion and backsliding based in party competition, polarization, demographic change, and the group interests of national party coalitions. Difference-in-differences results suggest a minimal role for all factors except Republican control of state government, which dramatically reduces states' democratic performance during this period. This result calls into question theories focused on changes within states. The racial, geographic, and economic incentives of groups innationalparty coalitions may instead determine the health of democracy in the states.

Theories in campaign finance research suggest that interest group contributions moderate, and individual contributions polarize, state legislators. However, interest groups are comprised of individuals, and public opinion data suggest that group‐affiliated individual donors are more politically active and have especially extreme attitudes. This article investigates the relationship between group‐affiliated donors and legislative polarization in the U.S. states. In recent elections, individual contributors have grown more closely affiliated with activist organizations, such as environmental and anti‐abortion groups. Contributions from these group‐affiliated contributors predict legislative extremism at least as well as overall contributions from interest groups, individual donors, party committees, and party‐affiliated individuals. Using a novel data set of state legislative primary dates, results suggest that this relationship may be concentrated in the nomination process. Although the potential for endogeneity merits caution, the findings complicate theoretical firewalls between organizations and individuals in research on parties, interest groups, and campaign finance.

Political scientists often characterize state and local governments as marginal and highly constrained in policymaking. However, I suggest that in recent decades state governments have moved from the margins to the center of partisan battles over the direction of U.S. public policy. Across 16 issue areas, I investigate interstate policy variation, policy differences across states, and policy polarization, the changing relationship between party control of state government and policy outcomes. Since the 1970s, interstate variation has increased such that an individual's tax burden, right to obtain an abortion, and other relationships to government are increasingly determined by her state of residence. Policy polarization increases dramatically after 2000 in 14 of the 16 areas. I show that party control increasingly predicts socioeconomic outcomes in the polarized area of health care, but not in the nonpolarized area of criminal justice.

In the US, the failure of climate legislation and the implementation of EPA rules are the subject of intense scholarly and public debate. However, the debate has not investigated – and at times has further obfuscated – the preferences and expected tactics of industry stakeholders. Scholars of management and regulation argue that firms' profit motives can be aligned with socially beneficial outcomes, but they assume that firms prefer market-based regulation over the status quo. Correspondingly, corporate stakeholders have been portrayed as protagonists in campaigns for climate legislation. In a case study of the cap and trade fight during 2009 and 2010, I find that industry stakeholders primarily mobilized to maintain the status quo, but simultaneously joined the cap and trade coalition in order to favorably shape potentially inevitable climate legislation. The case underlines the importance of deeper investigation of business preferences and provides evidence for theories that prioritize power resources and the structural power of business.

Do legislators from upper-class backgrounds behave differently from those from humble beginnings? Scholars of representation have made progress understanding the effects of a legislator's social class on roll-call votes, but ideology is also understood to be shaped during adolescence. Using data from Nicholas Carnes' White-Collar Government, I find that upper-class members of Congress with working-class parents are significantly more liberal than upper-class members with upper-class parents. This trend is particular to the Democrats; Republican voting records do not significantly differ with respect to parental class. Findings are robust to potential confounders, including race, gender, and district characteristics.

Research highlights a growing divergence among U.S. states in their costs of voting, the partisan balance of their legislative districts, and the responsiveness of state policy to public opinion. Less is known, however, about a new and acute threat to democracy at the state level: policies that increase the states' vulnerability to election subversion. In this article, we investigate recent trends in state legislation that transfer election administration authority from independent to partisan actors, making it more likely that a losing presidential candidate could take office over the will of the electorate. We find that Republican control of state legislatures and the closeness of the 2020 presidential election are associated with these policies. Interestingly, these policies are mostly uncorrelated with gerrymandering and voter suppression policies that were enacted in the 2010s. We conclude with a discussion of how a recent Electoral Count Act reform in Congress partly mitigates the risk of election subversion.

The United States has a particularly decentralized form of federalism that provides important authority to multiple levels of government. This decentralization is typically seen as beneficial for democratic politics. But while federalism both constrains and enables democratic participation, we argue that it does so unevenly, and in ways that deepen inequalities in the processes of democracy. We propose four mechanisms by which the institutional decentralization of American federalism obstructs or reduces democratic accountability and equality: (1) inequality in venue selection, (2) information asymmetry, (3) an unequal exit threat, and (4) decentralized accountability. In contemporary American politics, these mechanisms both create and expand advantages for economic and political elites, while generating and deepening barriers to the full and equitable inclusion of less powerful groups in society, especially economically and racially marginalized Americans.

AbstractScholars and political observers point to declining labor unions, on the one hand, and rising white identity politics, on the other, as profound changes in American politics. However, there has been little attention given to the potential feedback between these forces. In this article, we investigate the role of union membership in shaping white racial attitudes. We draw upon research in history and American political development to generate a theory of interracial labor politics, in which union membership reduces racial resentment. Cross‐sectional analyses consistently show that white union members have lower racial resentment and greater support for policies that benefit African Americans. More importantly, our panel analysis suggests that gaining union membership between 2010 and 2016 reduced racial resentment among white workers. The findings highlight the important role of labor unions in mass politics and, more broadly, the importance of organizational membership for political attitudes and behavior.

Racial inequality in voter turnout is well-documented, but we know less about racial inequality in campaign contributions. Using new data on the racial identities of over 27 million donors, we find an unrepresentative contributor class. Black and Latino shares of contributions are smaller than their shares of the population, electorate, and elected offices. However, we argue that the presence of ethnoracial minority candidates mobilizes coethnic donors. Results from regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference designs suggest that the presence of ethnoracial minority candidates increases the share of minority contributions in US House elections. We find a reduction in white contributions to black Democrats, and to black and Latino Republicans, but little difference in overall fundraising competitiveness. Although we cannot definitively rule out alternative mechanisms that covary with candidate ethnorace, the results suggest that the nomination of minority candidates can increase the ethnoracial representativeness of campaign finance without costs to fundraising.