Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn 2015, seventeen European states joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as Founding Members. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, among the group, have the largest share of capital and votes, giving them significant voice in the Bank. The purpose of the European members in joining was mainly twofold: (i) to help increase financial flows available for investment infrastructure in Asia; and (ii) to help ensure that the new Bank would adhere to global financial, environmental and social standards, as established by the existing multilateral development banks (MDBs). It can be said that the Europeans have largely succeeded. Existing MDBs have served as models for the standards which the AIIB is institutionalizing. However, some European‐based civil society organizations are increasingly critical of the operations of the AIIB. Moreover, some developing countries may see the AIIB's standards as an unnecessary burden. It can therefore not be assumed that the AIIB will continue to expand its portfolio by merely complementing the existing MDBs.

China's Belt and Road Initiative has been presented as a "win-win" opportunity, as countries involved would benefit from connectivity projects of mutual interest. As such, it should facilitate and improve the relationship between the European Union (EU) and China, long defined as a "strategic partnership". Instead, this article argues that the BRI—as an order-shaping exercise—has put the partnership under strain, enlarging the gap between a "win-win" rhetoric and the reality of frictions and contestations. By analysing the official discourse in EU documents, and comparing them with the dynamics that the BRI has been generating, especially in Central Europe and in the Western Balkans, the author comes to the conclusion that the EU–China relationship does not pass the test of a "strategic partnership", as defined in the literature. Thus, in order to reduce the possibility of increasing misunderstandings and growing suspicion, and to prevent a "lose-lose" final outcome—a common destiny that the international community should avoid—the way forward for the EU and China is to explore and discuss effectively what type of operational principles could sustain the partnership. (China/GIGA)

The year 2015 marked the 25th anniversary of the publication of Robert Wade's seminal book Governing the Market (GTM). In his book, Wade elaborates an approach stressing the role of the state in economic development. As the consequences of the Great Recession are forcing many governments and the International Financial Institutions themselves to put into question their ideological stance on unfettered free markets, the anniversary marks the occasion to review the concept of the developmental state (DS) through Wade's GTM approach and re-assess its validity in the twenty-first-century global political economy. Are policy measures historically implemented by the DS still feasible (and desirable) in a globalized era dominated by global value chains? With an eye to the peculiar Chinese experience in the past decades, the paper argues that the key principles in GTM - as properly understood - are still useful as policy prescriptions, as they show how developing countries could successfully start their economic take-off. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

Since the beginning of the latest and most convincing phase of transition, Myanmar has emerged as the new possible frontier of economic development in Southeast Asia. Investors, political analysts, businessmen and NGOs alike have all rushed to the country in search of a new El Dorado. Are these hopes justified? Can Myanmar—one of the poorest countries in Asia—start a new phase of economic development which would not only benefit the owners of global capital, but also lift Myanmar's population from poverty? Drawing on the literature on the political economy of institutions and some field research, the paper assesses whether policy choices made by the new government are heading the country in a direction which could generate a 'new miracle' in East Asia. To this purpose, domestic institutional constraints and the system of patronage are examined. Looking beyond the democracy vs dictatorship debate, the paper finds that Myanmar could well start a new phase of economic growth, provided that the government builds a strong vertical and horizontal institutional capacity. However, a more open political environment, and the consequent multiplication of economic interests, could hijack the reform plan the government has adopted, unless these stakeholders are inserted into a coordinated framework revolving around a transformational project of national development.

This article argues that a peculiar pattern of dependent asymmetry – 'dual dependence', i.e. a combination of internal and external dependence – has come to characterize the structure of China-Myanmar relations since the late 1980s. The hypothesis we present is that shifts in this pattern of dependent asymmetry account for fluctuations in China-Myanmar relations between 2011 and 2021. We test this hypothesis against empirical evidence from what we identify as two shifts in the structure of bilateral relations: for each, we trace how structural changes were perceived in Naypyitaw and Beijing, and how such perceptions oriented an adjustment in their respective policies. Myanmar's reduced external dependence on China in 2011–2012 expanded the set of the potential courses of action available to Myanmar's decision-makers and reduced the set of those available to China; conversely, the opposite happened in 2017–2018, following Myanmar's return to full-fledged external dependence on China. The paper finally speculates that the military coup in 2021 could well represent a third shift in the structure of bilateral relations, further strengthening Myanmar's external dependence on China and constraining the military government's room of manoeuvre. (Pac Rev / GIGA)