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Human Pro-Social Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4729
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Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies
Deception is common in nature and humans are no exception. Modern societies have created institutions to control cheating, but many situations remain where only intrinsic honesty keeps people from cheating and violating rules. Psychological, sociological and economic theories suggest causal pathways to explain how the prevalence of rule violations in people's social environment, such as corruption, tax evasion or political fraud, can compromise individual intrinsic honesty. Here we present cross-societal experiments from 23 countries around the world that demonstrate a robust link between the prevalence of rule violations and intrinsic honesty. We developed an index of the 'prevalence of rule violations' (PRV) based on country-level data from the year 2003 of corruption, tax evasion and fraudulent politics. We measured intrinsic honesty in an anonymous die-rolling experiment. We conducted the experiments with 2,568 young participants (students) who, due to their young age in 2003, could not have influenced PRV in 2003. We find individual intrinsic honesty is stronger in the subject pools of low PRV countries than those of high PRV countries. The details of lying patterns support psychological theories of honesty. The results are consistent with theories of the cultural co-evolution of institutions and values, and show that weak institutions and cultural legacies that generate rule violations not only have direct adverse economic consequences, but might also impair individual intrinsic honesty that is crucial for the smooth functioning of society.
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Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people's behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others' behavior. Our framework is an experimental public goods game with a leader. We find that leaders strongly shape their followers' initial beliefs and contributions. In later rounds, followers put more weight on other followers' past behavior than on the leader's current action. This creates a path dependency the leader can hardly correct. We discuss the implications for understanding belief effects in naturally occurring situations.
BASE
Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4741
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Working paper
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2491
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Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2011
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The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2236
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Conforming with Peers in Honesty and Cooperation
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14961
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Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8580
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Working paper
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 3639
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Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6277
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Social Comparison and Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 4687
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Using the Strategy Method and Elicited Beliefs to Explain Group Size and Mpcr Effects in Public Good Experiments
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16605
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Disappointment Aversion and Social Comparisons in a Real-Effort Competition
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6489
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