Suchergebnisse

The collapse of communist rule in Central Europe (CE) and the third wave of democratization gave a significant impulse for development of theory of political sciences. Though the democratization process in CE is analyzed from various perspectives, key attention is paid for procedural aspects of regime transformation: institutional reforms, the creation of market economy, consolidation of democracy, CE integration to the European Union are the most attractive topics for researches of political sciences. Still there is a lack of theoretical approach towards systemic transformation that includes not only political or economical, but also cultural factors. Therefore it is worth to complement this gap of theoretical literature by focusing on aspects of the cultural transformation in the postcommunist region. The main purpose of the master dissertation is to analyze the dynamics of cultural transformation in four CE countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The results of research of cultural cleavages in CE countries shows that the cultural transformation in each country does not depend particulary on radical political and economical reforms. Culture developes according its own logic, and non of the theories is adequate to explain cultural transformation. Research shows that some cultural elements (trust, tolerance) are not in the phase of transformation at all: they are stagnant, not reactive to reforms. Therefore, the communist legacies have still strong roots in every society, and the possibilities of consolidation of democracy of CE region in nearest future are limited.

The collapse of communist rule in Central Europe (CE) and the third wave of democratization gave a significant impulse for development of theory of political sciences. Though the democratization process in CE is analyzed from various perspectives, key attention is paid for procedural aspects of regime transformation: institutional reforms, the creation of market economy, consolidation of democracy, CE integration to the European Union are the most attractive topics for researches of political sciences. Still there is a lack of theoretical approach towards systemic transformation that includes not only political or economical, but also cultural factors. Therefore it is worth to complement this gap of theoretical literature by focusing on aspects of the cultural transformation in the postcommunist region. The main purpose of the master dissertation is to analyze the dynamics of cultural transformation in four CE countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The results of research of cultural cleavages in CE countries shows that the cultural transformation in each country does not depend particulary on radical political and economical reforms. Culture developes according its own logic, and non of the theories is adequate to explain cultural transformation. Research shows that some cultural elements (trust, tolerance) are not in the phase of transformation at all: they are stagnant, not reactive to reforms. Therefore, the communist legacies have still strong roots in every society, and the possibilities of consolidation of democracy of CE region in nearest future are limited.

This article investigates the effects of social trust, both direct and mediated – via internal and external efficacy – on different forms of political participation in post-communist Lithuania. The relationship between social trust and participation features prominently in the social capital and civic culture literature, but little empirical evidence exists that supports it, especially in post-communist democracies. We use the Lithuanian National Elections Study 2012 to test our hypotheses and replicate our analysis with the European Social Survey waves of 2014 and 2016. Our results show that social trust increases turnout, because it is related to a sense of external efficacy, which in turn enhances the likelihood that people vote. There is, however, no association between social trust and being involved in other institutionalised politics, namely, working for a political party. Interestingly, we find a positive indirect effect for non-institutionalised political participation: social trust increases external efficacy, which in turn enhances protest behaviour. Overall, however, social trust does not lead to more protesting, because the former is at the same time positively related to political trust, which seems to decrease, rather than increase non-institutionalised participation. In sum, our findings demonstrate that explanations for political participation based on the core element of social capital – social trust – work out differently for different forms of political participation.

This article investigates the effects of social trust, both direct and mediated – via internal and external efficacy – on different forms of political participation in post-communist Lithuania. The relationship between social trust and participation features prominently in the social capital and civic culture literature, but little empirical evidence exists that supports it, especially in post-communist democracies. We use the Lithuanian National Elections Study 2012 to test our hypotheses and replicate our analysis with the European Social Survey waves of 2014 and 2016. Our results show that social trust increases turnout, because it is related to a sense of external efficacy, which in turn enhances the likelihood that people vote. There is, however, no association between social trust and being involved in other institutionalised politics, namely, working for a political party. Interestingly, we find a positive indirect effect for non-institutionalised political participation: social trust increases external efficacy, which in turn enhances protest behaviour. Overall, however, social trust does not lead to more protesting, because the former is at the same time positively related to political trust, which seems to decrease, rather than increase non-institutionalised participation. In sum, our findings demonstrate that explanations for political participation based on the core element of social capital – social trust – work out differently for different forms of political participation.

AbstractWhile debates about far-right populism often concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe, research on these parties predominantly focuses on Western countries. Addressing this remarkable gap, this article revisits the 'protest voting' explanation for electoral support for the far right. Using European Social Survey data (2002–16) from 22 countries, we show that political dissatisfaction is a stronger explanatory factor when far-right parties are in opposition, but is a less important determinant of electoral support when they are in government. Previous findings based on Western Europe – which similarly showed that the anti-elite hypothesis is less relevant when far-right parties join government coalitions – travel well to post-communist European countries. In Hungary and Poland, we even find that far-right voters have become less distrustful of national political institutions than the rest of the electorate. Our conclusion implies that anti-elite populism is context-dependent and has limited use for understanding successes of leaders such as Wilders, Salvini and Orbán.

AbstractThis article investigates three explanations for electoral support for the far right – 'cultural backlash', 'economic grievances' and 'protest voting' – in a novel way. Our main contribution is that we contrast far-right voters with voters of centre-right parties, traditional left-wing parties and abstainers. Equally innovative is the comparison between mature and post-communist democracies. Using European Social Survey data (2014–16), we conclude that anti-immigration attitudes are most important in distinguishing far-right voters from all other groups. Yet, these differences are significantly smaller in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, far-right voters are not the so-called socioeconomic 'losers of globalization': this is only true when compared with centre-right voters. Concerning protest voting, distrust of supranational governance particularly enhances far-right voting. Overall, our study concludes that more fine-grained distinctions pay off and avoid misleading generalizations about 'European far-right voters' often presented in public debates.