Suchergebnisse

The ideology and political practise of Solidarity and republican tradition The paper argues that – regardless of neo-Marxist inspirations – many views of Václav Havel, Adam Michnik, or Jacek Kuroń on civil society bear a surprising resemblance to political philosophy of Aristotle or Cicero. This, in turn, makes it possible to argue that Havel's concept of "anti-political politics" is not anti-political at all but to the contrary – political par excellence, if only one adopts a sourcing understanding of politics characteristic for classical republican tradition. Moreover, those republican traces are especially well-visible in both the structure and the way of operating of Polish Solidarity movement.

Equality seems to be an inseparable element of the American Creed and political vocabulary. As Abraham Lincoln explained in his Gettysburg Address it is a principle upon which the American nation was founded – through its founding document, the Declaration of Independence – and, at the same time, an ideal the realization of which the American nation is "dedicated" to. The main thesis of the paper is that both the unquestionable place of equality in the American Creed and the quasi‑constitutional status of the Declaration of Independence (treated as a preamble to the Constitution) are both myths. On the basis of the works of Willmoore Kendall and Melvin Bradford I will present the argumentation suggesting that Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, in fact, marks a radical redefinition of the "American experiment" which, with time, became an official and binding interpretation of the founding documents. Many decades later Lincoln's interpretation became an axiological and ideological basis for politicians and social activists and it still influences Americans' understanding of their political tradition.

One of the best‑known American founding myths is that of New Jerusalem – presenting an 'American experiment' in terms of building 'a city upon a hill.' This myth originated in New England and reflected Puritans' highly moralistic and, to a great extent, utopian disposition of thinking about political and social community. What is often forgotten is the fact that the southern colonies developed their own myth – that of New Troy – which differed substantially from its northern counterpart with respect to the basic convictions concerning the nature, as well as the role and functions, of political order. The present paper discusses and compares both founding myths, and goes further to argue that these myths reflect substantial differences in mentality between Americans living in the two regions, and resulted in the development of incompatible sets of political beliefs and aspirations. While the northern myth favored the disposition to judge an existing social and political order by moral standards and thus fostered constant reforms and changes, the southern myth strengthened the conservative attitude of accepting and defending traditional institutions and mores. These differences contributed to the rise of mutual misunderstanding and animosity, which, accompanied by political and economic factors, made reaching a consensus in 1860 extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The paper discusses some fundamental differences between Aristotelian and modern conceptions of the state. It focuses its attention on the early liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and contrasts the theory of state developed by them with the classical republican ideal described by Aristotle. As I will demonstrate main differences come down to (1) distinct ideas concerning the state's origins (and especially human motivations behind establishing the state), (2) divergent convictions about the role of the state and its ethical dimension; and finally (3) different beliefs concerning basic feelings and passions which sustain existence of political community. I argue that on the basis of Stagirite's philosophy it is possible to question whether civic association described by the precursors of liberal political thought is actually the state. In conclusion, I signalize the problem of serious limitations of contemporary liberal democracies (or even their internal contradictions) resulting from their attempt to follow an ideal of an ideologically neutral state.