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POLITICAL ECONOMICS -- Table of Contents -- Prologue -- 1.Introduction to Political Economics -- 1.1 The Political Economic approach -- 1.2 Political Institutions -- 1.2.1 Simple Majority Voting -- 1.2.2 Agenda Setting -- 1.2.3 Borda Voting -- 1.3 A simple Example: Indirect Utility Function, Single-Peaked Preferences and the Bliss Point -- 2. Electoral Models -- 2.1 The Median Voter Model -- 2.2 Probabilistic Voting Model -- 2.2.1 The candidates -- 2.2.2 The voters -- 2.2.3 The timing of the game -- 2.2.4 The "Swing" voter -- 2.2.5 The candidates' decisions -- 2.3 An Example of Simple Majority Voting and Probabilistic Voting -- 3. Lobbying -- 3.1 Public Policy: A Local Public Good -- 3.1.1 The Social Optimum -- 3.1.2 Complete Fiscal Federalism -- 3.1.3 Partial Fiscal Federalism -- 3.2 Lobbying -- 4. Facts, Data and Relevant Issues of the Welfare State -- 4.1 Economic Policies and the Role of Government -- 4.2 Size and Composition of the Welfare State -- 4.3 Labor Market Issues -- 4.4 The Economic Approach to Government Intervention -- 4.5 The Political-Economics Approach to Government Intervention -- 4.6 Citizens' Opinions on the Welfare State -- 5. Redistributive Transfers in the Welfare State -- 5.1 The Economic Model -- 5.2 The Redistributive System: Winners and Losers -- 5.3 The Political Decision -- 5.4 Discussion -- 6. Pensions -- 6.1 The Economic Environment of the Voting Models -- 6.2 Individual Preferences over Pension Systems -- 6.2.1 Dynamic inefficiency -- 6.2.2 Reduced time horizon -- 6.2.3 Within cohort redistribution -- 6.2.4 Crowding out -- 6.2.5 Altruism -- 6.3 Voting on Pension Systems -- 6.4 Population Aging and Pension Systems -- 7. Labor Market Policies -- 7.1 A Simple Political Economy Model -- 7.2 Labor Market Institutions -- 7.3 The Political Game -- 7.4 Discussion -- 8. Structural Reforms

Intro -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1 - Introduction -- 2 - Crucial Features of the Social Security Debate: A Cross-country Analysis -- 3 - Theories of Welfare State Expansion and Retrenchment -- 4 - Assessing the Political Sustainability of Social Security Systems: A Theoretical Framework -- 5 - The Future of the Social Security System in France -- 6 - The Future of the Social Security System in Germany -- 7 - Political Sustainability and Reforms in Italy -- 8 - Political Sustainability and the Silent Reform in Spain -- 9 - Political Sustainability in a Redistributive System: The United Kingdom -- 10 - Political Sustainability in a Redistributive System: The United States -- 11 - Demographics, Political Sustainability, and Reform Options: A Cross-country Comparison -- Technical Appendix -- Data Appendix -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Abstract
Coronavirus has been portrayed as the 'great equalizer'. None seems immune to the virus and to the economic consequences of the lockdown measures imposed to contain its diffusion. We exploit novel data from two real-time surveys to study the early impact on the labor market of the lockdown in Italy—one of the two countries, with China, hit hard and early. We find that low-educated workers, blue collars, and low-income service workers were more likely to have stopped working both 3-week and 6-week after the lockdown. Low-educated workers were less likely to work from home. Blue collars worked more from their regular workplace, but not from home. Low-income service workers were instead less likely to work from the regular workplace. For both blue collars and low-income service workers, the monthly labor income dropped already in March. Some positive adjustments took place between the 3rd and the 6th week from the lockdown: the share of idle workers dropped, as the proportion of individuals working at home and from their regular workplace increased. However, these adjustments benefited mostly highly educated workers and white collars. Overall, low-income individuals faced worse labor market outcomes and suffered higher psychological costs. (JEL codes: J21, I24, and H12)

Regions seeking more autonomy aim at making less (or no) fiscal transfers to central governments and at reaching more (or total) control on regional spending. However, decentralization may lead to joint central-regional responsibility that increases regulatory uncertainty regarding the bureaucratic and fiscal burdens on firms. Moreover, quests for independence create political uncertainty. To evaluate economic costs and benefits for firms from decentralization or independence, we analyze the Catalan-Spanish negotiation leading to the 2006 Catalan Statute and the more recent quest for independence. We use an event approach methodology to estimate the immediate stock market reaction to new events. Our results suggest that the stock market had a conservative reaction both to more decentralization and to independence. The approval of the Catalan Statute was associated with negative returns for Catalan firms, particularly in the tradable sector. These firms later benefitted from the partial reversal imposed by the Spanish Constitutional Court ruling. The large increase in the political uncertainty that emerged at the referendum day had a strong negative effect on all Catalan firms and on Spanish firms in the tradable sector. This uncertainty was partially reduced, when the Spanish Senate rejected the declaration of Catalan independence. Markets reacted positively, with Catalan, but also Spanish, firms in all sectors posting large gains that largely compensated the previous losses.

Major economic crises may promote structural reforms, by increasing the cost of the status quo, or hinder them, by inducing more demand for protection. The ideology and political partisanship of the ruling government may be crucial in determining the prevailing course of action. In good times, conservative parties are typically pro-reform. However, do these parties try to exploit periods of crisis to carry out their reforms? Do social-democratic parties support even greater social protection? To answer these questions, this paper uses indicators of structural reforms in the labor, product, and financial markets for 25 OECD countries over the 1975-2008 period. The empirical analysis confirms the ambiguous effect of crises: product markets are liberalized, but financial markets become more regulated. Partisan politics also matters, as right parties are associated with more pro-market reforms. Yet, crises modify partisan politics: right-wing parties refrain from promoting privatizations, and oppose the introduction of greater financial market regulations. By contrast, center parties liberalize and trim unemployment benefits generosity, while left parties privatize. Furthermore, weak, fractionalized governments, which are associated with more regulated product markets, are also more likely to liberalize during a crisis. Adapted from the source document.

Résumé Les pays de l' oecd jouissent d'un système complexe de programmes et de normes d'aide sociale qui fournit des transferts redistributifs intergénérationnels. Or, leur forme et leurs dimensions varient considérablement. Comment ces différents modèles réagiront-ils au processus de vieillissement ? Le vieillissement réduit le rendement des systèmes de retraite par répartition ( payg ), mais augmente le pouvoir politique des personnes âgées. L'effet global sur les décisions des responsables sera probablement l'augmentation des dépenses globales de pensions, malgré le fait que la pension de retraite per capita pourrait être réduite et que les travailleurs pourraient être obligés de prendre leur retraite plus tardivement. Il ne faut pas cependant négliger l'impact sur la réglementation d'État de l'économie. Une part de personnes âgées qui augmente, augmentera la pression sur les réformes du marché de produits, ce qui conduira à une baisse des prix, et donc à une augmentation du pouvoir d'achat de leurs transferts de pension. Le vieillissement n'a cependant aucun effet bénéfique sur les réformes du marché du travail. Celles-ci nous suggèrent que le système d'Europe du Sud, qui est basé sur une grosse dépense de pensions, ainsi qu'un marché du travail et un marché de produit rigides, convient moins bien au vieillissement de la population. JEL Code: H5, I3, I1

The introduction of (inequity adverse) fair agents in a simple redistributive voting game reduces the political relevance of the middle class & increases the equilibrium level of redistribution. Interestingly, some of the predictions in Meltzer & Richard [J. Polit. Econ. 89 (1981) 914-927] are affected: a rise in the income inequality between poor & middle class may not decrease redistribution, because of the additional support for redistribution provided by the fair agents. 1 Figure, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.