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This paper studies the determinant of the appropriate rate to fix transmission tolls. I develop a simple model that allows to decompose it in the sum of the risk-free rate and a risk premium. There are two general principles with vhich the rate should conform: (a) it should vary pari passu with the risk-free rate (b) it should compensate the transmission company for: (i) the "risk of regulatory opportunism"; (ii) the nondiversifiable risk imposed to the transmission company by the price-fixing rule; (iii) and also add a liquidity premium. Legislation presently discussed in congress, however, would grant a fixed 10% real rate to the transmission company. Approximating the risk-free rate by the rate paid by a 20-year b ond issued by the Central Bank (PRC) I use the model to estimate the level of risk that justifies a rate of exactly 10%. Finally, I propose a method to regulate transmission fees that would eliminate most revenue risk and would avoid a need to fix a regulated rate. ; Esta nota estudia los determinantes de la tasa apropiada para fijar peajes de transmisión. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo simple que permite descomponerla en una suma de la tasa libre de riesgo y el premio por riesgo. Los principios generales son dos: (a) la tasa debiera ser variable y variar pari passu con la tasa libre de riesgo: si la tasa libre de riesgo sube, debiera subir la tasa, y lo contrario si baja. (b) Se debería compensar al transmisor por (i) el "riesgo de oportunismo regulatorio"

Abstract
Consider a bottleneck monopoly whose access charge is regulated above marginal cost and produces an essential input used by an oligopoly of downstream firms. Should the monopolist be allowed to vertically integrate into the downstream market? Policy makers often argue that the vertically integrated subsidiary enjoys an undue advantage, because it receives access at marginal cost. We show that there is no undue advantage.With perfect competition downstream vertical integration is irrelevant because the subsidiary substitutes downstream output one-to-one and faces a per-unit opportunity cost equal to the access charge.With an oligopoly consumers and the bottleneck monopoly gain with vertical integration. By contrast, competitors lose oligopolistic rents. Social welfare increases, unless output is redistributed towards a very inefficient vertically integrated firm.

We present a model of coups in autocracies. Assuming that policy choices cannot be observed but are correlated with the short‐run performance of the economy we find that: (a) the threat of a coup disciplines autocrats; (b) coups are more likely in recessions; (c) increasing per capita income has an ambiguous effect on the probability of a coup. The implications of the model are consistent with the evidence. On average, one recession in the previous year increases the probability of a coup attempt by 47 percent. By contrast, the effect of the level of per capita income is weak.

En el análisis y la práctica de la política energética se suele suponer que la elasticidad de la demanda por energía eléctrica es irrelevante. Este trabajo muestra que durante episodios de escasez de energía una "pequeña" elasticidad basta para generar caídas "grandes" de la probabilidad de déficit y del costo del abastecimiento eléctrico. Esto se debe a que en la vecindad de la capacidad del sistema, la oferta de energía de corto plazo es cercana a vertical. Ilustramos nuestro punto cuantitativamente simulando la operación esperada del sistema eléctrico chileno durante los años de ajuste a la crisis causada por los cortes de gas argentinos, el periodo 2006-2010. Mostramos que el aumento de los precios causado por el retraso de las inversiones y los cortes de gas argentino, combinado con una "pequeña" elasticidad de la demanda mensual por energía (0.0548 en valor absoluto) eran suficientes para reducir mucho la probabilidad de déficit mensual y retornarla a niveles normales. Más aún, si se soslaya el efecto de los mayores precios en el consumo, el costo marginal se sobreestima en 32% y el costo de operación esperado en 41 por ciento.

En este artículo comparamos el costo de generar electricidad con carbón y con viento en el Sistema Interconectado Central de Chile (SIC). Hemos incluido el costo ambiental local y global, así como los respaldos térmicos necesarios para mantener la misma confiabilidad del suministro eléctrico. El costo medio de generar con carbón, que incluye externalidades ambientales por 17dólares/MWh, es de 78 dólares/MWh. El costo medio de generar con viento es considerablemente mayor, 136 dólares/MWh.

Abstract
We study the vertical integration and sabotage decisions of a regulated bottleneck monopoly that sells "access" to independent firms and may own a subsidiary downstream. We extend the literature in four directions by: (i) endogenizing vertical integration and linking it with the intensity of vertical economies or diseconomies à la Kaserman and Mayo (1991); (ii) systematically studying how vertical economies and diseconomies affect the intensity of sabotage; (iii) showing that the intensity of sabotage is determined by either a standard Lerner condition augmented by the direct cost of sabotage or a relation between the market share of the subsidiary and the elasticity of the derived demand for access; and (iv) systematically examining the welfare effect of vertical integration.