Il lavoro presenta modelli di Asset and Liability Management sviluppati attraverso l'analisi per scenario applicati a diversi aspetti della gestione finanziaria dei fondi pensione e considerando i nuovi vincoli di vigilanza basati sul rischio imposti dalle Autorità di Vigilanza. Tali aspetti sono la gestione del rischio di cambio, la massimizzazione dell'indicizzazione all'inflazione delle loro passività e la valutazione delle politiche di conditional indexation interpretate come embedded option.
PurposeThis paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to joint-stock banks.Design/methodology/approachBased on a comprehensive data set of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, this paper examines whether these board characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Z-index, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans.FindingsThe findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and education. Furthermore, this study finds that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and bank risk-taking, there is no evidence for board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks.ImplicationsThe findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, the results point to the need to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a moread hocperspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education's effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully monitored.Originality/valueThrough a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bank institutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature.
AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueDo cooperative banks suffer from board deficiencies less frequently and severely than joint‐stock banks? To answer this question, we analyze banks operating in Italy during the period 2006–2012 to examine whether the governing bodies of cooperative banks are less effective in carrying out their duties than those of joint‐stock banks. Deficiencies in the governing body are measured by sanctions imposed by the supervisory authority.Research Findings/InsightsFindings revealed that the boards of directors of cooperative banks were sanctioned more often than board of directors of joint‐stock banks. Furthermore, board turnover mediates the relationship between the cooperative status and board deficiencies.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study provides empirical evidence in support of the weakness of corporate governance in cooperative banks. Methodologically, our approach is novel in that we adopt a measure of board effectiveness/deficiency based on an independent third‐party perspective (supervisory authority) that is not biased by the different objective function of the two types of banks.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsThe findings have several policy and managerial implications. We contribute to the ongoing debate on the proposal for flexible regulation of corporate governance for cooperative banks and emphasize that policy‐makers and regulators should rethink the corporate governance structures of cooperative banks. In particular, the study reveals how board turnover should be carefully monitored to reduce board deficiencies at the bank level.
AbstractResearch Question/IssueDo enforcement actions impact banks' board composition? Based on a unique sample of sanctions imposed on Italian banks by the country's banking supervisory authority from 2009 to 2015, we investigate whether supervisory enforcement actions affect changes at the board level. Moreover, we examine whether changes at the board level after a sanction are effective in reducing the probability of further sanctions in the future.Research Findings/InsightsThe findings reveal that sanctioned banks change their board composition following a supervisory sanction. We further test whether these changes improve bank governance and find that, under certain conditions, they may reduce the probability that the board is sanctioned again. Robustness tests confirm the results.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThis study provides empirical evidence that supports the role of supervisory enforcement actions in inducing banks to adopt changes at the board level. Given that the relationship between supervisory sanctions and changes in board characteristics is still neglected, we contend that our results may increase the understanding of the effectiveness of enforcement actions in improving board characteristics.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsWe believe that our results have policy implications by making a clear and concrete contribution to the ongoing debate on the revision of the principles for enhancing corporate governance and banking supervision.
