Based on a wealth of original information and research, and containing contributions from internationally distinguished scholars, 'Making Sense of Suicide Missions' furthers our understanding of this chilling feature of the contemporary world in radically new and unexpected ways
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Im vorliegenden Aufsatz werden zentrale Fragestellungen des Phänomens des Vertrauens untersucht. Im ersten Abschnitt wird zunächst die allgemeine Behauptung relativiert, dass ein gewisser Grad an rationaler Kooperation in den zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen existieren sollte, wodurch die Unterscheidung zwischen Kooperation und Vertrauen verschwommen wird. Außerdem wird die Wichtigkeit von Überzeugungen, die sich auf andere beziehen und die zur Bedeutung der möglichen Kooperationsmotive beitragen, herausgestellt. Im zweiten Abschnitt definiert der Autor das Vertrauen und die allgemeinen Bedingungen, unter denen es für die Kooperation relevant wird. Im dritten Abschnitt wird schließlich diskutiert, in welchem Ausmaß Kooperation unabhängig von Vertrauen zustande kommen kann und inwieweit Vertrauen eher ein Ergebnis als eine Bedingung von Kooperation ist. Der Autor geht abschließend der Frage nach, ob es rationale Gründe gibt, zu vertrauen - oder genauer, ob es Gründe gibt, dem Vertrauen zu vertrauen, und - umgekehrt - dem Misstrauen zu misstrauen. (ICI2)
In this paper we present the design of a two-stage experiment which aims to measure trusting and trustworthiness in a representative sample of the British population. In the first part we discuss the shortcomings of the most common design of the 'trust-game' experiment in eliciting information about clear and cogent notions of trusting and trustworthiness, and in the second part we present an alternative design, which we call the 'framed binary trust game'. The basic design will be administered to a sample of 200 subjects who were formerly members of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). In the third part of the paper, we extend this design to allow the 'truster' to purchase some information about the 'trustee' so as to make the experiment a better representation of real-life trust decisions. We plan in a second stage to run the extended experiment on a larger sample of about 1000 subjects. -- trust ; trust game ; field experiments
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"Driving a taxi is a difficult job. Picking up a bad customer can leave the driver in a vulnerable position, and erring even once can prove fatal. To protect themselves, taxi drivers must quickly and accurately assess the trustworthiness of complete strangers. In Streetwise, Diego Gambetta and Heather Hamill take this predicament as a prototypical example of many trust decisions, where people must act on limited information and judge another person's trustworthiness based on signs that may or may not be honest indicators of that person's character or intent. Gambetta and Hamill analyze the behavior of cabbies in two cities where driving a taxi is especially perilous: New York City, where drivers have been the targets of frequent and violent robberies, and Belfast, Northern Ireland, a divided metropolis where drivers have been swept up in the region's sectarian violence." "Based on in-depth ethnographic research, Streetwise lets drivers describe in their own words how they seek to determine the threat posed by each potential passenger."--Jacket
Well-enforced norms create an opportunity for norm breakers to cooperate in ventures requiring trust. This is realized when norm breakers, by sharing evidence of their breaches, make themselves vulnerable to denunciation and therefore trustworthy. The sharing of compromising information (SCI) is a strategy employed by criminals, politicians, and other actors wary of their partners' trustworthiness in which the cost of ensuring compliance is offloaded on clueless norm enforcers. Here we introduce SCI as a sui generis cooperative strategy and test its functioning experimentally. In our experiment, subjects first acquire the label "dove" or "hawk" depending on how cooperative or uncooperative they are, respectively. Hawks acquire compromising information embodied in their label and can reveal it before an interaction with trust at stake. Unlike doves, hawks who reveal their label make themselves vulnerable to their partners, who can inflict a penalty on them after interaction. We find that even students in as artificial a setting as a computerized decision laboratory grasp the advantage of SCI and use it to cooperate. Our results corroborate the idea that compromising information can be conceived as a "hostage" that, when mutually exchanged, makes each party to the interaction vulnerable and therefore trustworthy in joint endeavours.
