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"Fatality quotas implemented in China's industrial sector are being used to promote work safety and therefore, reducing the number of work-related deaths. Given the controversial nature of this policy, Gao analyzes how the fatality quotas are functioning to aid the country in balancing economic growth and social stability. The book also examines significant implications caused of this policy's implementation in the local regions, and reveals how local officials attempt to handle these problems. This is the first book to systematically examine the role of death indicators in work safety improvement in contemporary China, revealing insight into Beijing's quota-oriented approach to policy-making"--

Abstract
Early twentieth-century China was awash in new forms of visual advertising, each revealing its own aspirations for the country's modernization. Along with print media advertising and yuefenpai (calendar posters), cigarette cards represented a new and widely viewed vehicle for both selling consumer goods and tacitly endorsing new roles and behaviours for women during a period of great cultural change. The manner in which women were depicted in these cigarette cards from the late Qing Era to 1937 has not been studied as yet. While cigarette cards were an imported medium, they were tailored to local tastes and addressed many of the most pressing cultural and social changes for women during this period. Images of women in Chinese cigarette cards charted evolving fashion trends, hinted at new sexual mores, challenged regressive old beauty ideals such as foot and breast binding, and promoted physical activity as a means of mobilizing women for national service as war with Japan loomed on the horizon. Cigarette cards disappeared from China as a result of paper shortages during the war and were no longer seen as appropriate under communist rule, but they provide valuable insight into Chinese women's history in the first four decades of the twentieth century.

AbstractThe deliberate distortion of the work accomplishments of local governments is a growing concern for China's leaders in the reform era. How do they tackle this problem and gather reliable data? This study argues that the CCP has developed bypassing strategies to remedy the deficiencies of the statistical system which is vulnerable to artificial data distortion. By employing these strategies, authorities requiring authentic information can directly access the raw data, thereby bypassing lower-level officials who have incentives to distort performance information in the level-by-level reporting process. This study shows that the adoption of bypassing strategies enhances the capacity of the party-state to gather local intelligence. Although the strategies are limited in their ability to ensure the quality of certain types of data, their use should improve the quality of key information on the performance of local governments in the long term.

The deliberate distortion of the work accomplishments of local governments is a growing concern for China's leaders in the reform era. How do they tackle this problem and gather reliable data? This study argues that the CCP has developed bypassing strategies to remedy the deficiencies of the statistical system which is vulnerable to artificial data distortion. By employing these strategies, authorities requiring authentic information can directly access the raw data, thereby bypassing lower-level officials who have incentives to distort performance information in the level-by-level reporting process. This study shows that the adoption of bypassing strategies enhances the capacity of the party-state to gather local intelligence. Although the strategies are limited in their ability to ensure the quality of certain types of data, their use should improve the quality of key information on the performance of local governments in the long term. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractThe implementation of China's reform era target-based cadre evaluation system has instigated various types of gaming behaviour on the part of local officials. How do these gaming strategies differ from each other? Why do local officials sacrifice the public interest for target fulfilment in some cases but not in others? This article argues that gaming is not monolithic and should not be treated as such. It develops a typology that distinguishes between pernicious and benign gaming, and looks into the symptoms and motives of pernicious gaming in particular. It finds that the distinct design of the measurement system – the combination of result-oriented targets imposed from above and high-powered incentives for target fulfilment – induces pernicious gaming. In addition, the system's implementation practically compels local officials to misrepresent their performance, even though they are aware of the negative impact of such behaviour on the public interest. This study shows that to understand the strategies, motivations and implications of gaming better, a more nuanced approach is needed.

SummaryDuring the past decade, there has been an explosion in the literature on performance‐oriented reforms around the globe. What are the major topics discussed in this literature? What can scholars and practitioners learn from it? This study provides an overview of the major themes, strategies, challenges, and outcomes of performance measurement and management reforms by reviewing the literature produced during this period. It shows that useful strategies and tools have been developed for public sector organizational performance improvement. Apart from continuing efforts to examine the role of measurement per se, there has been a shift in focus from performance measurement to performance management in this literature. Nevertheless, research evidence from both developed and developing countries shows that most reforms achieve only mixed results, with both costs and gains and with daunting challenges, such as gaming, remaining. The paper concludes by discussing issues that deserve attention from future research. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Performance measurement is not only a technical tool but also a product of politics. Therefore, examining the politics behind the implementation of performance measurement systems will yield important insights into the purposes, designs, and outcomes of those systems. This study investigates how the political function of China's performance measurement system affects it technical rationality. Drawing evidence mainly from the policy area of social stability maintenance, this article argues that these systems are in a paradoxical situation in China. On the one hand, the techniques of performance measurement are greatly improved when there is a political need to implement such systems in local governments. On the other hand, the very fact that they have a political function interferes with their functioning in a rational, effective manner. The article concludes by suggesting that one must examine both the political rationality and technical rationality underlying government performance measurement systems so as to understand their values and limitations. In the case of China, the most important function of performance measurement is to ensure local policy compliance. Although such a design causes problems in practice—most notably, pernicious gaming behavior that seriously harms public interests—the cost of implementation does not invalidate its benefits in governing China's vast localities.