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Social science research is transitioning from working with "designated data," collected through experiments and surveys, to working with "organic data," including administrative data not collected for research purposes, and other data such as those collected from online social networks and large-scale sensor networks. The shift to organic data requires significant innovations in research methodologies. This article reviews the complexities and diversity of organic data and the special efforts that must be undertaken to make those data findable and usable by researchers. In some cases, advanced formal privacy techniques such as differential privacy and secure multiparty computation are needed to work with organic data in a manner that is ethically and logistically permissible, and effort is also required to make studies involving organic data transparent and replicable. These considerations make clear that moving forward, social scientists and information and communications technology (ICT) professionals must work closely to develop appropriate technical controls and ethical frameworks that minimize the risks of research to participants and to society at large.

Having decided to focus attention on the "weak link" of human fallibility, a growing number of security researchers are discovering the US Government's regulations that govern human subject research. This paper discusses those regulations, their application to research on security and usability, and presents strategies for negotiating the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval process. It argues that a strict interpretation of regulations has the potential to stymie security research.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1331287.1331294 ; A computer used by Al Qaeda ends up in the hands of a Wall Street Journal reporter. A laptop drom Iran is discoverd that contains details of that country's nuclear weapons program. Photographs and videos are downloaded from terrorist websites. As evidenced by these and countless other cases, digital documents and storage devices hold the key to many ongoing military and criminal investigations.This sort of advanced analysis is the stuff of DOMEX, the little known intelligence practice of document and media exploitation. The Domex challenge is to turn digital bits into actionable intelligence.

International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-14 ; A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during their development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. In addition, use of cyberweapons can be distinguished from the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known well in advance, and we can monitor those targets. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they depend on flaws in software, and flaws can get fixed; cyberweapons therefore require considerable testing, preferably against live targets, and this testing may be observable. So international "cyberarms agreements" could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements can also encourage cyberweapons use to be more responsible by stipulating attribution and reversibility. We conclude with a discussion of the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent increasing interest of the United States government in such agreements. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

A cyberweapon can be as dangerous as any weapon. Fortunately, recent technology now provides some tools for cyberweapons control. Digital forensics can be done on computers seized during or after hostilities. Cyberweapons differ significantly from other software, especially during development, and recent advances in summarizing the contents of storage media can locate possible cyberweapons quickly. Use of cyberweapons can be distinguished in the usual malicious Internet traffic by being aimed at targets associated with political, social, and cultural issues that are often known in advance, and those targets can then be monitored. Cyberweapons are relatively unreliable compared to other kinds of weapons because they are susceptible to flaws in software; therefore, cyberweapons require considerable testing, preferably against live targets. Thus, international "cyberarms agreements" could provide for forensics on cyberweapons and usage monitoring. Agreements also encourage more responsible cyberweapons use by stipulating attribution and reversibility. The authors discuss the kinds of international agreements that are desirable, and examine the recent interest of the U.S. government in such agreements.

This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, July 2011. ; Cyberweapons are difficult weapons to control and police. Nonetheless, technology is becoming available that can help. We propose here the underlying technology necessary to support cyberarms agreements. Cyberweapons usage can be distinguished from other malicious Internet traffic in that they are aimed precisely at targets which we can often predict in advance and can monitor. Unlike cybercriminals, cyberweapons use will have political goals, and thus attackers will likely not try hard to conceal themselves. Furthermore, cyberweapons are temperamental weapons that depend on flaws in software, and flaws can get fixed. This means that cyberweapons testing will be seen before a serious attack. As well, we may be able to find evidence of cyberweapons on computers seized during or after hostilities since cyberweapons have important differences from other software and are difficult to conceal on their development platforms. Recent advances in quick methods for assessing the contents of a disk drive can be used to rule out irrelevant data quickly. We also discuss methods for making cyberweapons more responsible by attribution and reversibility, and we discuss the kinds of international agreements we need to control them. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.