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A persistent question in the study of American federalism is if the states actually serve as "laboratories of democracy" for the country as a whole. I argue that political attention to policy areas can diffuse upwards, from state legislatures to Congress. National and state legislators share a party brand and can learn from policy debates in other levels. In particular, we should expect to see the diffusion of messaging legislation, or bills that were introduced without the intention of becoming law, after members of Congress observe their political effects in the states. Using an original dataset of introduced bills in all 50 state legislatures in 22 policy areas since 1991 drawn from LexisNexis, I show a positive association between changes in the number of state legislative bills introduced in 12 policy areas and the number of Congressional bills introduced in the next session, which is taken as evidence of "bottom-up" diffusion. This relationship is more prevalent between Republican state legislators and members of Congress, within state delegations, and in issue areas where the interest group community lobbies before both the states and national government. To the extent that states are laboratories for the nation, they may be political laboratories.

AbstactThe lobbying activity of interest groups has been overlooked as a contributing factor to legislative party polarization in the United States. Using bill-level data from Congress and three state legislatures, I show floor votes on bills lobbied by more non-profit interest groups are more polarized by party. The state legislative data demonstrate the robustness of the relationship between lobbying and polarization, showing it is not an artifact of party agenda control, salience, or bill content. Increased lobbying from these groups in recent years helps explain high levels of partisan polarization in Congress and an uneven pattern across the state legislatures.

Why are some states polarized and others not? This article argues that state legislators are provided with more information by lobbyists and the media about national policies, or state-level bills that are prominent in the national political discourse. Compared with state-specific issues, this additional information encourages legislators to vote along party lines to secure reelection or prepare for a run for higher office. It identifies national policies using lobbying registrations in state legislatures and Congress to show there is more party difference on roll-call votes on national policies in 25 states over 2011 to 2014. It also argues that the notoriety of national issues may encourage party leaders to put these bills on the agenda to build their party brand, or for individual legislators to raise their profiles. It finds that states with more national agendas have more polarized sessions.

AbstractIn 2000, Virginia became the last state in the nation to add party labels to its ballots for state-level races. This article assesses the impact of this reform on citizen participation and the partisan behavior of down-ballot voters using precinct-level election returns. It finds that after the application of labels, roll-off in contested, down-ballot races dropped by about a percentage point, a reduction of approximately 15%. Roll-off dropped more in precincts with a larger share of African Americans. Also, the association between Republican vote shares in the Lt. Governor and state legislative races and presidential vote share in the 2000 general election became stronger in the presence of party labels. This result suggests that the labels made voters behave more as national partisans in state-level contests.

Most people would agree that political parties are one of the most important components of national politics. But this is not the case in local politics, where candidates tend to run as individuals without party affiliation in races that many voters fail to participate in. Alex Garlick argues that adding party labels to candidates may be beneficial for these down-ticket races, as knowing candidates' party affiliations will help inform voters' decisions, and increase their likelihood of voting.

AbstractBicameralism is a nearly universal feature of American legislatures, yet its functional impact on legislative outcomes is uncertain. Proponents have claimed that bicameralism would produce better outcomes than unicameralism, as adding a deliberative element prevents the passage of faulty legislation. For bicameralism to work in this fashion, we argue lawmakers must have enough time and resources to meaningfully evaluate legislation produced by the other chamber. We find such behavior is most likely to take place in professionalized state legislatures, evidenced by a lower concurrence rate in the second chamber for bills passed by the first chamber. In state legislatures with less policy capacity, by contrast, the chambers act in a more parallel fashion, dividing the agenda and largely endorsing the other chamber's legislation.