Suchergebnisse

Asia's brutal colonial and wartime his- tory has left wounds that continue to shape the region's politics and interna- tional relations. Traditional approaches to international relations say little about how to overcome lingering ani- mosity and to replace it with trust and harmonious relations. Time alone is never a solution. Nor, as Japan has dis- covered repeatedly, are apologies enough. Even need, as that between de- veloping China and economically and technologically advanced Japan, is in- sufficient. The contributors to this vol- ume demonstrate that the path to reconciliation is different for each country, requiring unique blends of a wide range of political and social ingre- dients, many of which are in short supply.

Deliberations on the possible use of force have usually failed to provide U.S. leaders with the information and advice necessary to make informed decisions. How can this be improved?

Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by U.S. leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record those of Munich and Vietnam may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, several analogies not considered by Record Pearl Harbor, for example may have been far more salient during certain crises than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence and impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.

A review essay on a book by Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Instit Press, 2002). Using a recent book by Jeffrey Record as a point of departure, this essay considers the role of historical analogies in decisions by US leaders to use force during the Cold War. The analogies considered by Record -- those of Munich & Vietnam -- may have had a bearing on some decisions, but it is often difficult to assess their relative weight compared to other critical variables. Moreover, several analogies not considered by Record -- Pearl Harbor, for example -- may have been far more salient during certain crises than the analogies he examines. In any case, we need a more systematic analysis of historical analogies than Record provides if we are to gauge the real influence & impact of historical analogies on the Cold War.