Suchergebnisse

The instigation for this book was the author's doubt that the political and military confrontation in Central Europe would remain stable in a serious crisis. Uncertainty of success may deter Soviet risk-taking forty-nine years out of fifty but not in that fiftieth year if Soviet leaders should face an apparent threat to their continued hegemony in

A second round of conventional arms-control negotiations should aim toward solidifying, prolonging, and increasing stability rather than simply toward making more reductions for their own sake. Additional, proportional reductions would actually be destabilizing because they would deprive NATO of the minimum force-to-space ratio necessary to defend against a possible renewed threat and would also feed the fears of those in Eastern Europe who see or profess to see a danger of invasion from the West. The goals of arms-control policy should be to devise force structures and workable operational plans that deter attack by promising effective defense, fortify populations (especially in Western Europe) against coercion, and do not appear threatening to other countries. A defense might consist of several thousand small, mobile teams of regulars or highly ready reserves to exploit the defensive advantages of European terrain and contemporary weapons; sufficient firepower, either conventional or possibly nuclear, to make the defense effective; and one or more operational reserves of heavy mechanized units strong enough to cope with breakthroughs but too small for a general strategic offensive. Such a defensive posture would be stabilizing if adopted by either coalition, more so if adopted by both.

Abandoning nuclear weapons as deterrents to Soviet aggression in Europe requires NATO conventional forces which can stop a blitzkrieg and place the onus of resorting to nuclear war on the Russians. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority and the need to defend all of West Germany limit NATO's strategic options. Thus the Alliance must practice stringent economy of force to bar a quick, decisive Pact victory with conventional forces alone. However, the terrain offers possibilities for turning the battle area into a killing ground for invaders' tanks. Thousands of small, mobile tank-killer teams could strike and displace to strike again, imposing casualties and heavy supply consumption continually on Pact forces throughout a deep zone. Such an area defense would also require armored reserves for counterattacks. Faced with dim chances of a cheap victory, Pact leaders would face the discouraging prospect that a failed attempt could escalate to nuclear war.

NATO's need for conventional forces capable of deterring a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact nations.