Suchergebnisse

In recent decades, a significant number of developing countries have implemented fiscal incentives programs for the tourism industry as part of their regional development policies. The main objective of these programs is to increase local investment and employment, as tourism activities are labor intensive. Little evidence is available, however, to assess the effect of these policies on job creation. This paper analyzes a fiscal incentives program that the Brazilian federal government introduced in 2002 to develop the tourism industry in the undeveloped region of Northeast Brazil. It provides evidence that income tax credits had a significant positive effect on job creation. We find that local employment in the tourism industry was on average 34 percent higher in those municipalities that benefited from the program.

In recent decades, a significant number of developing countries have implemented fiscal incentives programs for the tourism industry as part of their regional development policies. The main objective of these programs is to increase local investment and employment, as tourism activities are labor intensive. However, little evidence is available to assess the effect of these policies on job creation in emerging markets. In this paper, we analyze a program of fiscal incentives introduced by the Brazilian federal government in the SUDENE area in 2002 and in which tourism firms were eligible to participate. Through a difference-in-difference estimation, we compare before and after 2002 the change in the logarithm of local employment in the SUDENE municipalities (the treatment group) to the change in the same outcome in a group of municipalities that were not affected by the program (the control group). Our empirical analysis provides robust evidence that the fiscal incentives led to a substantial increase in tourism employment in the SUDENE region. In particular, we find that local employment in the tourism industry was on average 34 percent higher in the treatment group. This result does not seem to be affected by either displacement effect or job destruction in those neighboring municipalities that had not benefited from the same tax incentives. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper investigates the effects of political (mis)alignment on public service delivery when mandates are shared between state and local governments. We analyze sewage treatment policies in the state of São Paulo, Brazil. Relying on difference-in-differences estimations, we establish a causal relationship between political alignment and higher sewage treatment provision. Conceptually, we find that, with uncertain local commitment and weakly enforceable local obligations, shared mandates lead to a moral hazard issue implying service under-provision. Our results show that political alignment attenuates such moral hazard effects.

This paper investigates the effects of political (mis)alignment on public service deliverywhen mandates are shared between state and local governments. We analyze sewage treatmentpolicies in the State of São Paulo, Brazil. Based on a regression discontinuity design, we establisha causal relationship between political alignment and higher sewage treatment provision.Conceptually, we find that, with uncertain local commitment and weakly enforceable localobligations, shared mandates lead to a moral hazard issue implying service under-provision.When political alignment is an option, our results show that it attenuates such moral hazardeffects. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published