Suchergebnisse

Thank you very much Professor Padideh Ala'i for that very kind introduction. I would also like to thank you Dean Camille A. Nelson of the Washington College of Law and the Society for this really special honor of inviting me to give the Grotius Lecture this year. I also thank the President of the Society, Catherine Amirfar, for her leadership and stewardship. My thanks too to my friend, Fleur Johns, for accepting to be the discussant for this lecture. Like you, I look forward to her response very much.

On May 30, 2019, the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) entered into force for the twenty-four countries that had deposited their instruments of ratification. When the remaining thirty-one member states of the African Union ratify it, the AfCFTA will cover a market of 1.2 billion people and a gross domestic product (GDP) of $2.5 trillion. That would make it the world's largest trade agreement since the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Kenya became a primary destination for the prosecution of pirates captured off the coast of Somalia from late 2008 to late 2009. Yet none of the pirates being tried in Kenya as of April 2010 were captured by Kenyan armed forces but, rather, by non-Kenyan forces whose countries had signed agreements with Kenya for it to conduct such trials. In Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008, the United Nations Security Council had urged states and regional organizations to enter into such agreements. Kenya accordingly concluded agreements on prosecuting suspected pirates with the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and Denmark. According to media reports, and as Kenya recently acknowledged, two others were negotiated, with China and Canada. Only the EU-Kenya agreement has been published. The British foreign secretary told the House of Commons that Kenya did not want its agreement with the United Kingdom to be made public. Consequently, it may well be that a Kenyan preference for secrecy prevented the public release of information on the other agreements signed by Kenya.

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda). At <http://www.icj-cij.org>.International Court of Justice, December 19, 2005.In its December 19, 2005, judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo v. Uganda (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Uganda to have engaged in grave violations of the prohibition on the use of force and of its international humanitarian and human rights obligations during its occupation of Congelese territory. The Court also found that the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations for its treatment of Ugandan diplomats and also for the destruction of their diplomatic premises and the associated archives and records.The train of events leading to this case originated in May 1997 with President Laurent-Desire Kabila's deposition of Zairean dictator Mobutu-Ssese Seko. Having come to power with Ugandan and Rwandese military assistance, Kabila was unsuccessful in his effort to remove Ugandan and Rwandese troops from the DRC (paras. 48–50). The DRC alleged that in August 1998, Ugandan armed forces invaded (para. 29) and then captured and occupied Congolese towns and territory in defiance of Kabila's decision that Ugandan and Rwandese forces should leave the DRC (para. 29–31). Further, the DRC contended that Uganda recruited, funded, trained, equipped, and supplied armed Congolese groups opposed to the Kabila government (para. 32).