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Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 69, the latest release in this premier outlet for reviews of mature, high-impact research programs in social psychology, provides defining pieces of established research programs, reviewing and integrating thematically related findings by individual scholars or research groups. Topics discussed in Volume 69 include Countering Misinformation Through Psychological Inoculation, Coherence of Emotional Response Systems: Theory, Measurement, and Benefits, The Impact of the Environment on Behavior, Human Creativity: Functions, Mechanisms, and Social Conditioning, and Predicting Other People Shapes the Social Mind

The Advances in Experimental Social Psychology series is the premier outlet for reviews of mature, high-impact research programs in social psychology. Contributions to the series provide defining pieces of established research programs, reviewing and integrating thematically related findings by individual scholars or research groups. Topics discussed in Volume 68 include numeracy and decision-making, social psychological phenomena in everyday life, social evaluative threat, judgments of change, and action control

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: Moral inconsistency -- 1. Varieties of moral inconsistency -- 2. Inconsistency among our moral behaviors -- 2.1. Psychological license as a source of moral inconsistency -- 2.1.1. Behavioral history as a source of license -- 2.1.1.1. Moral self-licensing: When doing good frees people to do bad -- 2.1.1.2. Self-serving interpretations of one´s own behavioral history -- 2.1.1.3. Moral self-licensing without ``doing good´´ -- 2.1.1.4. Summary: Behavioral history as a source of license -- 2.1.2. Other people as a source of license -- 2.1.2.1. Individuals: Receiving ``vice advice´´ -- 2.1.2.2. Groups: The licensing effect of entitativity -- 2.1.2.3. Society: License from one-time political events -- 2.1.2.4. Summary: Other people as a source of license -- 2.2. Beyond license: Temptation as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3. Inconsistency among our moral judgments of others´ behavior -- 3.1. Motivation as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.2. Imagination as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.2.1. Imagination and moral judgments of dishonesty -- 3.2.2. Imagination and moral judgments of blame -- 3.2.3. Imagination and moral judgments of hypocrisy -- 3.2.4. Summary: Imagination as a source of moral inconsistency -- 3.3. Repetition as a source of moral inconsistency -- 4. Tolerating others´ moral inconsistency -- 4.1. When inconsistency is not so hypocritical -- 4.1.1. Order of practicing and preaching -- 4.1.2. Suffering for misdeeds -- 4.1.3. Ambiguity of wrongdoing -- 4.1.4. Culture -- 4.2. When does inconsistency count as hypocrisy? -- 4.2.1. The false-signaling theory -- 4.2.2. The moral-benefits theory -- 4.3. Summary: Tolerating others´ moral inconsistency -- 5. Discussion -- 5.1. Don´t people hate inconsistency?.

Intro -- Advances in Experimental Social Psychology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Chapter One: The relational logic of moral inference -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Background -- 2.1. Morality dominates person perception -- 2.2. Moral impression updating and the negativity bias -- 2.3. Cooperation and forgiveness in an uncertain world -- 2.4. Reconsidering the negativity bias -- 2.5. Summary -- 3. Computational principles of moral inference -- 3.1. Bayesian models of learning and inference -- 3.2. Investigating the computational mechanisms of moral inference -- 3.3. Beliefs about ``bad´´ agents are more uncertain and volatile than beliefs about ``good´´ agents -- 3.4. Moral inference and exposure to community violence -- 3.5. Moral inference in borderline personality disorder -- 3.6. Summary -- 4. Moral inference from moral principles -- 4.1. Moral inference from instrumental harm -- 4.2. Moral inference from impartial beneficence -- 4.3. Moral inference from moral principles is relationship-specific -- 4.4. Summary -- 5. Moral inference from ``non-moral´´ information -- 5.1. Moral inference from decisions about time -- 5.2. Moral inference from decisions about effort -- 5.3. Moral inference from decisions about ambiguity and risk -- 5.4. Moral inference from epistemic behaviors -- 5.5. Summary -- 6. Conclusions and future directions -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Chapter Two: Causes and consequences of coalitional cognition -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Causes -- 2.1. Moving away from categories toward coalitions -- 2.2. Inter-collective functional relations as cues to coalitions -- 2.3. Addressing some challenges for models of coalitional cognition -- 2.4. New insights from a coalitional perspective: Social group reference dependence -- 3. Consequences -- 3.1. Social preferences and values -- 3.2. Emotions.

Cognitive consistency as a basic principle of social information processing / Bertram Gawronski and Fritz Strack -- Mental representation -- Cognitive conflict and consciousness / Ezequiel Morsella, Pareezad Zarolia, and Adam Gazzaley -- A neuroscientific perspective on dissonance, guided by the action-based model / Eddie Harmon-Jones, Cindy Harmon-Jones, and David M. Amodio -- Parallel constraint satisfaction as a mechanism for cognitive consistency / Stephen J. Read and Dan Simon -- Fluency and fit -- Fluency of consistency : when thoughts fit nicely and flow smoothly / Piotr Winkielman, David E. Huber, Liam Kavanagh, and Norbert Schwarz -- Nonpropositional consistency / Sascha Topolinski -- Motivational fit / E. Tory Higgins -- Implicit social cognition -- Balanced identity theory : review of evidence for implicit consistency in social cognition / Dario Cvencek, Anthony G. Greenwald, and Andrew N. Meltzoff -- Implicit ambivalence / Richard E. Petty, Pablo Briñol, and India Johnson -- Discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes, prejudices, and self-esteem: a model of simultaneous accessibility / Christian H. Jordan, Christine Logel, Steven J. Spencer, and Mark P. Zanna -- Thinking and reasoning -- Mental models and consistency / Philip N. Johnson-Laird -- Cognitive consistency as means to an end : how subjective logic affords knowledge / Arie W. Kruglanski and Garriy Shteynberg -- Decision making and choice -- The dynamics of ambivalence : evaluative conflict in attitudes and decision making / Frenk van Harreveld, Iris K. Schneider, Hannah Nohlen, and Joop van der Pligt -- Self-produced decisional conflict due to incorrect metacognitions / Lottie Bullens, Jens Forster, Frenk van Harreveld, and Nira Liberman -- Regret, consistency, and choice : an opportunity : mitigation framework / Keith D. Markman and Denise R. Beike -- Consistency as a basis for behavioral interventions : using hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance to motivate behavior change / Jeff Stone -- Interpersonal processes -- Balance principles in attitude formation and change : the desire to maintain consistent cognitions about people / Eva Walther and Rebecca Weil -- Cognitive consistency in prejudice-related belief systems : integrating old-fashioned, modern, aversive, and implicit forms of prejudice / Bertram Gawronski, Paula M. Brochu, Rajees Sritharan, and Fritz Strack -- Stereotype confirmation and disconfirmation / Jeffrey W. Sherman, Thomas J. Allen, and Dario L. M. Sacchi -- Adhering to consistency principles in an unjust world : implications for sense-making, victim blaming, and justice judgments / Kees van den Bos and Marjolein Maas -- Interpersonal cognitive consistency and the sharing of cognition in groups / Ernest S. Park, R. Scott Tindale, and Verlin B. Hinsz -- Index

Zusammenfassung: Anhand einer Rekonstruktion des hypothesentestenden Forschungsprozesses in der experimentellen Psychologie wird die Unhaltbarkeit der wissenschaftstheoretischen Position des Falsifikationismus dargestellt. Als Gegenmodell wird der wissenschaftstheoretische Holismus vorgestellt, der a) eine Lösung deduktionslogischer Probleme des Falsifikationismus bietet, b) wissenschaftshistorische Phänomene (z. B. Paradigmata, wissenschaftliche Revolutionen) erklären kann und c) im Falsifikationismus nicht integrierbare, in der empirischen Psychologie jedoch allgemein akzeptierte methodologische Konventionen unmittelbar impliziert. Konsequenzen für Forschung und Lehre werden diskutiert.

Abstract: Research by Wegner et al. (1981) suggests that incriminating innuendo in questions can negatively affect attitudes and opinions. Two preregistered studies ( N = 506) provide a close replication of Study 1 of Wegner et al., additionally testing whether question-innuendo effects are moderated by partisanship. Replicating the original findings of Wegner et al., questions insinuating something negative about a target person reduced favorable impressions of the target. Counter to the novel hypotheses that effects of incriminating questions would be reduced for political-ingroup targets and enhanced for political-outgroup targets, question-innuendo effects did not differ across target groups. The findings suggest that merely asking a question about a false proposition can influence public opinion in the absence of incorrect assertions that could be deemed misinformation.

Although overt prejudice has declined in many societies over the past decades, new advancements in intergroup relations research have uncovered various kinds of subtle biases that continue to prevail despite increases in egalitarian values. Understanding the processes that may produce inconsistencies between spontaneous affective responses and self-reported explicit evaluations can provide deeper insights into conceptually different forms of prejudice, including both overt and subtle variants. In the present article, research on prejudice reduction is reviewed from the perspective of the associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model, which considers evaluations through the processes of associative activation and propositional validation. The APE model's potential for integrating different conceptualizations of overt and subtle prejudice and the application of the model to prejudice reduction are discussed.

"Researchers often employ implicit measures as dependent variables to investigate processes of attitude formation and change. In such studies, experimentally induced differences are typically interpreted as reflecting change in automatic evaluations. We argue that experimentally induced effects on implicit measures may not always reflect genuine changes in evaluative responses, but can be driven by the mechanisms underlying the measurement procedure. In line with this assumption, the present research shows that these mechanisms can produce opposite effects of the same experimental manipulation for otherwise equivalent implicit measures. These results indicate that merely observing experimental effects on implicit measures does not allow direct inferences regarding changes in automatic evaluations. Instead, psychological interpretations of such effects hinge upon the mechanics of how a given measurement procedure responds to variations in the context. Implications for research using implicit measures are discussed." [author's abstract]

"This volume provides the first authoritative explication of metatheoretical principles in the construction and evaluation of social-psychological theories. Leading international authorities review the conceptual foundations of the field's most influential approaches, scrutinizing the range and limits of theories in various areas of inquiry. The chapters describe basic principles of logical inference, illustrate common fallacies in theoretical interpretations of empirical findings, and outline the unique contributions of different levels of analysis. An in-depth look at the philosophical foundations of theorizing in social psychology, the book will be of interest to any scholar or student interested in scientific explanations of social behavior."--

"This volume provides the first authoritative explication of metatheoretical principles in the construction and evaluation of social-psychological theories. Leading international authorities review the conceptual foundations of the field's most influential approaches, scrutinizing the range and limits of theories in various areas of inquiry. The chapters describe basic principles of logical inference, illustrate common fallacies in theoretical interpretations of empirical findings, and outline the unique contributions of different levels of analysis. An in-depth look at the philosophical foundations of theorizing in social psychology, the book will be of interest to any scholar or student interested in scientific explanations of social behavior."--

Virtually every question in social psychology is currently being shaped by the concepts and methods of implicit social cognition. This tightly edited volume provides the first comprehensive overview of the field. Foremost authorities synthesize the latest findings on how automatic, implicit, and unconscious cognitive processes influence social judgments and behavior. Cutting-edge theories and data are presented in such crucial areas as attitudes, prejudice and stereotyping, self-esteem, self-concepts, close relationships, and morality. Describing state-of-the-art measurement procedures and res

Implicit measures have become very popular in virtually all areas of basic and applied psychology. However, there are empirical and theoretical arguments that might raise doubts about their usefulness in research on political attitudes. Based on a review of relevant evidence, we argue that implicit measures can be useful to identify distal sources of political preferences in domains where self-presentation may bias self-reports (e.g., influence of racial attitudes on voting decisions). In addition, implicit measures of proximal political attitudes can contribute to the prediction of future political decisions by virtue of their capability to predict biases in the processing of decision-relevant information (e.g., prediction of voting behavior of undecided voters). These conclusions are supported by research showing that implicit measures predict real-world political behavior over and above explicit measures. The reviewed findings suggest that implicit measures may serve as a useful supplement to improve the prediction of election outcomes. Open questions and potential directions for future research are discussed. Adapted from the source document.