Suchergebnisse

Dutch criminal law offers politicians no immunity for public office offences. Cabinet members and Members of Parliament stand trial for these offences in a single instance, before the Supreme Court. The decision to prosecute is made by either the Parliament or the Government. The prosecution is not handled by the Public Prosecution Service, but by the Procurator-General at the Supreme Court. These arrangements exclude the possibility that the Minister of Security and Justice influences the prosecution. This minister enjoys wide powers of instruction vis-à-vis the Public Prosecution Service, which are necessary to keep the application of the expediency principle within acceptable limits. These powers of instruction can also be directed at political opponents. The special arrangements therefore aim at striking a balance between making prosecutions a real possibility and shielding politicians from light-hearted prosecutions. The desired balance is not found, however, because serious legislative shortcomings render the procedural arrangements ineffective. Dutch politicians therefore have little to fear from prosecutions for public office offences.

Dutch criminal law does not provide for criminal liability for a political decision-maker who decides to build a bridge, if thereafter the project runs out of control or the bridge appears not to justify the funds spent on the project. This is most probably even the case if the decision-maker knew or suspected beforehand that there would be a budgetary overrun. Multiple offences, however, cover behaviour that could be related to the maladministration of such a project, such as embezzlement or forgery of documents. Nevertheless, there exists a public office offence of acting contrary to laws or regulations, which could be applied against government ministers or under-ministers. This offence is never used due to very protective procedural arrangements shielding national politicians from light-hearted prosecution. There is a different situation regarding corruption offences, which are defined very broadly. These offences do not require the civil servant to have acted in breach of a public duty, and there is no threshold as to the value of the gift or promise offered to him. Corruption offences also apply to acts committed before an appointment, if that appointment ensues. These offences are therefore among the main instruments for tackling misbehaviour in public office.

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021.

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021.

These introductory remarks deal with the reasons why the EPPO is perceived by some as a controversial body. These reasons are mirrored with the problem identification and the causes thereof. The size of EU fraud and related corruption and money laundering, both at the income and expenditure side, is quite significant. There is also a strong enforcement deficit in the Member States, especially in the case of complex transnational VAT and customs fraud cases. Three fields of action are potentially of interest for the EPPO: VAT, customs and smuggling, and fraud and corruption within the EU institutions. This leads to the analysis of what the potential added value of the EPPO could be, both from a technical fraud perspective as from a political legitimacy perspective. Finally, the introduction deals with the ongoing negotiations on the EPPO proposal, taking into account the mandate and rationale of Article 86 TFEU in the framework of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

The EPPO proposal introduces a new authority that will be competent to act on the joint territories of over twenty Member States. The EPPO structure as it is now is a highly decentralized model. Rules of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure have only been partially harmonized, even after the PIF directive and the Roadmap on defence rights will be fully implemented. The choice of the forum therefore affects the powers, safeguards and remedies of all the actors involved (EPPO, defendants, victims, state authorities). To which extent are/should these forum choices be guided by clear legal rules? Which remedies are available, and if so, for whom and at which level? This chapter deals with these issues and aims to provide an oversight and appraisal of the state of play. It analyses the proposed rules on choice of forum, including judicial review, and seeks inspiration from the Swiss system to propose some amendments.