Suchergebnisse

Hauptbeschreibung: Ziel der Arbeit war es, das Phänomen der gescheiterten Staaten, der so genannten Failed States einer völkerrechtlichen Gesamtbetrachtung zu unterziehen. Ausgehend von dem völkerrechtlichen Staatsbegriff, mussten hierzu im ersten Teil der Arbeit zunächst die Definitionsmerkmale sowie die Rechtspersönlichkeit des gescheiterten Staates untersucht werden, bevor in einem zweiten Teil die Rechtsfolgenseite sowie potentielle Reaktionsmöglichkeiten im Umgang mit Failed States erörtert werden konnten. Als Parameter für eine völkerrechtliche Definition ließ sich über die Abwesenheit e

AbstractInequality in arms, indeed, significant disparity between belligerents, has become a prominent feature of various contemporary armed conflicts. Such asymmetries, albeit not at all a new phenomenon in the field of warfare, no longer constitute a random occurrence of singular battles. As a structural characteristic of modern-day warfare asymmetric conflict structures have repercussions on the application of fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. How, for example, can the concept of military necessity, commonly understood to justify the degree of force necessary to secure military defeat of the enemy, be reconciled with a constellation in which one side in the conflict is from the outset bereft of any chance of winning the conflict militarily? Moreover, military imbalances of this scope evidently carry incentives for the inferior party to level out its inferiority by circumventing accepted rules of warfare. This article attempts tentatively to assess the repercussions this could have on the principle of reciprocity, especially the risk of the instigation of a destabilizing dynamic of negative reciprocity which ultimately could lead to a gradual intensification of a mutual disregard of international humanitarian law.

AbstractThis article analyses recurring misconceptions about the questioning of prisoners of war. The author takes a two fold approach, first considering matters relating to the identification of prisoners of war, namely contemporary issues such as the use of modern identification techniques, and then discussing interrogation procedures that go beyond the establishment of a prisoner's identity. In this context particular attention is given to the question whether and, if so, at which point in time a prisoner of war starts to benefit from fair trial rights, namely the right to remain silent, the right not to incriminate oneself and the corresponding right to be informed about these fair trial protections.

While the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine-learning algorithms in the context of armed conflicts has been subject to scholarly and political debate for at least the past half-decade, to date discussions have focused on the possible development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems. Going beyond this narrow perspective, the article draws attention to other military uses of AI that are conceivable or in fact already exist, for example for the purpose of detention, force protection, equipment maintenance, or reconnaissance. It critically examines these different applications from a legal and ethical perspective, exposing some of the challenges inherent in the technology such as algorithmic bias or predictability. On the basis of existing and emerging approaches to the regulation of 'civilian' AI, the article concludes by proposing a granular, tiered way to future regulation of military AI that proceeds from the criticality of each particular application.

Alors que le recours à l'intelligence artificielle et aux algorithmes d'apprentissage automatique dans le contexte des conflits armés a fait l'objet d'un débat entre spécialistes et au niveau politique durant au moins ces cinq dernières années, les discussions se sont concentrées jusqu'alors sur le développement et le déploiement possibles de systèmes d'armes létaux autonomes. Cet article va au-delà de cette perspective restrictive et attire l'attention sur d'autres usages militaires de l'intelligence artificielle qui sont concevables ou qui existent déjà, par exemple à des fins de détention, de protection des forces armées, d'entretien de l'équipement ou de reconnaissance. Il examine de manière critique ces différentes applications d'un point de vue légal et éthique, en exposant certains des défis inhérents à la technologie, tels que le biais algorithmique ou la prévisibilité. En se basant sur des approches existantes ou émergentes relatives à la réglementation de l'intelligence artificielle «civile», l'article propose pour conclure une approche graduelle de la future réglementation en matière d'intelligence artificielle, en partant du caractère critique de chaque application particulière.

Hoewel het gebruik van artificiële intelligentie (AI) en machine learning-algoritmen in de context van gewapende conflicten al gedurende minstens de laatste vijf jaar onderwerp is van wetenschappelijk en politiek debat, zijn de discussies tot nu toe vooral gericht geweest op de mogelijke ontwikkeling en inzet van dodelijke autonome wapensystemen. Het artikel gaat verder dan dit beperkte perspectief en vestigt de aandacht op andere militaire toepassingen van AI die denkbaar zijn of in feite al bestaan, bijvoorbeeld voor detentie, troepenbescherming, materieelonderhoud of verkenning. Deze verschillende toepassingen worden kritisch onderzocht vanuit een juridisch en ethisch perspectief, waarbij enkele uitdagingen worden blootgelegd die inherent zijn aan de technologie, zoals algoritmische vooringenomenheid of voorspelbaarheid. Op basis van bestaande en opkomende benaderingen van de reglementering van "civiele" AI, wordt in het artikel tot slot een stapsgewijze manier voorgesteld voor de toekomstige reglementering van militaire AI, die uitgaat van het kritische karakter van elke specifieke toepassing.

Mentre l'uso dell'intelligenza artificiale (AI) e degli algoritmi di apprendimento automatico nel contesto dei conflitti armati è stato oggetto di dibattito accademico e politico per almeno l'ultimo mezzo decennio, ad oggi le discussioni si sono concentrate sul possibile sviluppo e dispiegamento di sistemi d'arma autonomi letali. Superando questa limitata prospettiva, l'articolo richiama l'attenzione su altri usi militari dell'IA immaginari o che di fatto già esistono, per esempio a scopo di detenzione, protezione delle forze, manutenzione delle attrezzature o ricognizione. L'articolo esamina criticamente queste diverse applicazioni da una prospettiva legale ed etica, mettendo in luce alcune sfide insite nella tecnologia, come la distorsione algoritmica o la prevedibilità. Sulla base degli approcci esistenti ed emergenti alla regolamentazione dell'IA "civile", l'articolo conclude proponendo una precisa e graduale via per la futura regolamentazione dell'IA militare che consegue alla criticità di ogni particolare applicazione.

Si bien el empleo de inteligencia artificial (IA) y de algoritmos de aprendizaje automático en el contexto de los conflictos armados ha sido objeto de debate académico y político durante al menos la última media década, hasta la fecha las discusiones se han centrado en el posible desarrollo y despliegue de sistemas letales de armas autónomos. Más allá de esta perspectiva particular, el artículo llama la atención sobre otros usos militares de la IA que son concebibles o que de hecho, por ejemplo, ya existen con fines de detención, protección de la fuerza, mantenimiento de equipos o reconocimiento. Se examinan críticamente estas diferentes aplicaciones desde una perspectiva legal y ética, exponiendo algunos de los desafíos inherentes a la tecnología, como el sesgo algorítmico o la previsibilidad. Partiendo de la base de los enfoques ya existentes y emergentes para la regulación de la IA "civil", el artículo concluye proponiendo una alternativa granular y escalonada de cara a la futura regulación de la IA militar con fundamento en un análisis crítico de cada aplicación en particular.

Obwohl die Anwendung von künstlicher Intelligenz (KI) und von Algorithmen für maschinelles Lernen im Kontext bewaffneter Konflikte mindestens in den letzten fünf Jahren Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher und politischer Debatten gewesen ist, fokussierten die Diskussionen bisher auf die mögliche Entwicklung und den möglichen Einsatz letaler autonomer Waffensysteme. Über diesen Gesichtspunkt hinaus lenkt der Artikel die Aufmerksamkeit auf andere denkbare oder tatsächlich bereits existierende militärische Anwendungen der KI, zum Beispiel zum Zwecke der Haft, des Schutzes der eigenen Kräfte, der Ausrüstungswartung oder Aufklärung. Der Autor prüft diese verschiedenen Anwendungen kritisch aus gesetzlicher und ethischer Sicht, und legt dabei einige der Herausforderungen offen, die der Technologie inhärent sind, wie algorithmische Voreingenommenheit oder Voraussagbarkeit. Auf der Basis existierender und neu aufkommender Vorgehensweisen in Bezug auf die Reglementierung "ziviler" KI schlägt der Artikel zum Schluss eine stufenweise künftige Reglementierung militärischer KI vor, die von der Kritikalität jeder besonderen Anwendung ausgeht.

This article presents a novel way to conceptualize the protection of data in situations of armed conflict. Although the question of the targeting of data through adversarial military cyber operations and its implications for the qualification of such conduct under International Humanitarian Law has been on scholars' and states' radar for the last few years, there remain a number of misunderstandings as to how to think about the notion of "data." Based on a number of fictional scenarios, the article clarifies the pertinent terminology and makes some expedient distinctions between various types of data. It then analyzes how existing international humanitarian and international human rights law applies to cyber operations whose effects have an impact on data. The authors argue that given the persisting ambiguities of traditional concepts such as "object" and "attack" under international humanitarian law, the targeting of content data continues to fall into a legal grey zone, which potentially has wide-ranging ramifications both for the rights of individual civilians and the functioning of civilian societies during situations of conflict. At the same time, much legal uncertainty surrounds the application of human rights law to these contexts, and existing data protection frameworks explicitly exclude taking effect in relation to issues of security. Acknowledging these gaps, the article attempts to advance the debate by proposing a paradigm shift: Instead of taking existing rules on armed conflict and applying them to "data," we should contemplate applying the principles of data protection, data security, and privacy frameworks to military cyber operations in armed conflict.

The contribution analyses whether the un Drug Conventions still serve their original purpose, namely the furtherance of the health and welfare of mankind in the 21st century. To this end the contribution begins with an outline of how the un Drug Conventions aim to protect mankind's health and welfare. On this basis it is inquired whether un Drug Conventions are somehow irreversibly imbued with a zero-tolerance approach that undermines the health and welfare of vulnerable groups on both ends of the supply chain respectively. Thus, with respect to the supply side the question is pursued whether the un Drug Conventions provisions on crop cultivation imperil the livelihoods of rural communities. With regard to the demand side it is examined whether the un Drug Conventions forestall the adoption of more liberal, i.e. non-punitive and health-oriented approaches towards illicit drug users. In a next step, the analysis turns to a long-standing and currently particularly prevalent criticism according to which the international drug control regime puts disproportionate pressure on so-called drug producing and drug transit States, while turning a blind eye on the so-called drug consuming States. In concluding, the contribution turns to the question how the international drug control system could be enhanced to better meet its proper goals of protecting mankind's health and welfare.