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Massive population displacements are now regularly presented as one of the most dramatic possible consequences of climate change. Current forecasts and projections show that regions that would be affected by such population movements are low-lying islands, coastal and deltaic regions, as well as sub-Saharan Africa. Such estimates, however, are usually based on a 2◦C temperature rise. In the event of a 4◦C+ warming, not only is it likely that climate-induced population movements will be more considerable, but also their patterns could be significantly different, as people might react differently to temperature changes that would represent a threat to their very survival. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that a greater temperature change would affect not only the magnitude of the associated population movements, but also—and above all—the characteristics of these movements, and therefore the policy responses that can address them. The paper outlines the policy evolutions that climate-induced displacements in a 4◦C+ world would require. ; Peer reviewed

Estimates and predictions of people displaced by environmental changes have been highly instrumental in the ever-increasing attention given to environmental migration in the media. Yet no consensual estimate exists, let alone a commonly agreed methodology. As a result, predictions and estimates have become one of the most contentious issues in the debates on environmental migration. This article seeks to review the key estimates and predictions existing in the literature, as well as the methodologies they are built on, and the problems and caveats they are fraught with. The first part reviews the figures related to current estimates of people displaced by environmental changes, while a second part examines the predictions for future displacements. The next section synthesises the key methodological difficulties and a final section suggests some possible avenues for improvement. ; Peer reviewed

Massive population displacements are now regularly forecasted as one of the most dramatic possible consequences of climate change. Recent empirical studies, such as the EACH-FOR project (www.each-for.eu), have shown that environmental factors were increasingly important drivers of migration movements, both forced and voluntary. The dominant perspective on the issue, however, is rooted in environmental determinism: migration is conceived as a threat to human security, the only choice left when all other adaptation strategies have failed. Environmental 'refugees' are depicted as the expiatory victims of climate change, subjects of a humanitarian catastrophe in the making. Empirical studies, however, reveal a different picture, where migration becomes an adaptation strategy for those who are affected by the impacts of climate change. Yet mobility often remains a luxury, unavailable for those who cannot afford to migrate. Hence the most vulnerable are often stuck in places heavily impacted by climate change, unable to seek higher grounds and a better life. Building on case-studies conducted in Central Asia and Asia-Pacific within the framework of the EACH-FOR project, this paper refutes the dominant deterministic perspective and adopts a constructivist approach. It shows how policy responses to climate change impacts affect people's ability to migrate, and why these policy responses often matter more than the very impacts of climate change in their migration decision. Considering that migration can improve human security rather than hinder it, the paper makes the case for migration policies to be part of adaptation plans. In that regard, a key political challenge will be the restoration of the right to mobility for the most vulnerable, in order to enable their human security.

Most observers agree that equity is an essential condition for a new international agreement on climate change. However, equity is an equivocal concept, and different interpretations of equity clash with each other. Though equity concerns have been placed at the core of negotiations on mitigation efforts, they have been little addressed in the discussions on adaptation. As a result of this, the criteria that will be used to allocate the adaptation funding remain unclear and vague, which is detrimental for the negotiation process as a whole. This paper aims to offer a new perspective on this issue, departing from the traditional perspective inspired by retributive justice. With regard to adaptation, who owns what to whom? Two different possible answers can be provided to this question. The first answer derives from retributive justice, which is the perspective on justice most commonly referred to in Western countries. The concept of 'climate debt', put forward by campaigners for climate justice, derives from this perspective. A strict application of retributive justice to adaptation would imply that the countries with the greatest responsibility in global warming would transfer funds to compensate for the damages they have caused in countries that bear the least responsibility for these damages, and are the first and most affected. Yet this paper aims to show the practical problems that would arise from an application of retributive justice to adaptation, and makes the case for a perspective inspired by distributive justice. Unlike retributive justice, distributive justice is not concerned with the identification of responsibilities, but rather with the equalisation of resources and benefits, according to the needs and capacities of each party. The paper also seeks to identify the political and practical obstacles in the implementation of distributive justice, and suggests some options to overcome these obstacles.