74 Ergebnisse
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In: Water and environment journal, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 256-263
ISSN: 1747-6593
In: Springer eBook Collection
In: Environmental science and pollution research: ESPR, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 1144-1154
ISSN: 1614-7499
In: International journal of sustainable development & world ecology, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 231-239
ISSN: 1745-2627
In: International journal of sustainable development & world ecology, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 329-335
ISSN: 1745-2627
In: International journal of sustainable development & world ecology, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 37-50
ISSN: 1745-2627
In: International journal of sustainable development & world ecology, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 69-85
ISSN: 1745-2627
In: Environmental management: an international journal for decision makers, scientists, and environmental auditors, Band 31, Heft 6, S. 784-794
ISSN: 1432-1009
In: International journal of sustainable development & world ecology, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 333-340
ISSN: 1745-2627
In: International economics and economic policy, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 377-382
ISSN: 1612-4812
In: Waste management: international journal of integrated waste management, science and technology, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 716-724
ISSN: 1879-2456
In: Journal of Industrial Ecology, Band 13, Heft 6, S. 978-989
SSRN
In: Waste management: international journal of integrated waste management, science and technology, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 141-150
ISSN: 1879-2456
In: International journal of operations & production management, Band 25, Heft 5, S. 449-468
ISSN: 1758-6593
To improve low-carbon technology, the government has shifted its strategy from subsidizing low-carbon products (LCP) to low-carbon technology. To analyze the impact of government subsidies based on carbon emission reduction levels on different entities in the low-carbon supply chain (LCSC), game theory is used to model the provision of government subsidies to low-carbon enterprises and retailers. The main findings of the paper are that a government subsidy strategy based on carbon emission reduction levels can effectively drive low-carbon enterprises to further reduce the carbon emissions. The government's choice of subsidy has the same effect on the LCP retail price per unit, the sales volume, and the revenue of low-carbon products per unit. When the government subsidizes the retailer, the low-carbon product wholesale price per unit is the highest. That is, low-carbon enterprises use up part of the government subsidies by increasing the wholesale price of low-carbon products. The retail price of low-carbon products per unit is lower than the retail price of low-carbon products in the context of decentralized decision making, but the sales volume and revenue of low-carbon products are greater in the centralized decision-making. The cost–benefit-sharing contract could enable the decentralized decision model to achieve the same level of profit as the centralized decision model.
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