Since 2010, Fidesz has won four electoral victories in Hungary with a constitutional majority. In this paper, we argue that the main reason behind this overwhelming electoral success is the specific pattern of political integration that has evolved in recent years. The Hungarian case, as a consequence, may also act as a basis for a theoretical step forward in understanding the role of political integration in de-democratization processes. To understand the role of political integration, we explain how the Habermas-based political integration framework relates to the types of political culture, and then, with the help of representative data collection from 2018 and 2021, we define the integration groups and, using these, examine the party preferences and participation patterns that have developed in today's Hungary. The Orbán regime successfully generates diffuse mass support: this is embedded in multiple social groups, although none of the integration groups can be considered the sole or primary supporters of the system.
In this study, we examine the relationship between objective and subjective dimensions of social integration and the size and heterogeneity of an egocentric network using nationally representative databases from Hungary. We measure social integration with the level of trust and the level of public participation (objective dimension) and with individuals' self-evaluation of whether they are integrated (subjective dimension). Our results show that while the size and heterogeneity of the egocentric network are positively associated, the proportion of relatives among strong ties correlates negatively with objective indicators of social integration. The heterogeneity of weak ties is related positively to public participation. The correlation between the size and composition of egocentric networks and subjective integration is less clear: The proportion of relatives among strong ties seems to be unrelated to the external side of perceived social integration, while it is associated positively with the internal side of subjective integration. The number of strong ties seems to be positively correlated with both sides of subjective integration. These results suggest that higher levels of social integration cannot be achieved without concentrating on more than one of the network's dimensions. They also underline the need to pay more attention to network characteristics and social support not only regarding perceived social integration but also regarding objective indicators of social integration.
While it is well-known that democratic backsliding imposes a variety of challenges on civil society organisations, it is often assumed that it represses civil society. However, a closer look at the impact of democratic backsliding on civil society organisations reveals that even in countries where democratic backsliding is fairly advanced, the relationship between civil society and the state is more complex. Close cooperation and partnership between civil society organisations and the state are scarce in backsliding countries; the relationship between civil society organisations and the state might, however, range from hostility to varying forms and degrees of co-optation. Based on interviews with representatives of civil society organisations and the examination of the sector-specific social and political environment, we aim to explore the forms and factors that shape the relationship between civil society organisations and the state in Hungary. More specifically, we analyse the impact of the changing political opportunity structures on three important sectors of civil society organisations: human rights organisations, environmental organisations, and women's organisations. We argue that, to seize control over civil society the government applies sector-specific strategies, ranging from exclusion to co-optation. State strategies, in turn, spark different responses from civil society organisations.
While it is well-known that democratic backsliding imposes a variety of challenges on civil society organisations, it is often assumed that it represses civil society. However, a closer look at the impact of democratic backsliding on civil society organisations reveals that even in countries where democratic backsliding is fairly advanced, the relationship between civil society and the state is more complex. Close cooperation and partnership between civil society organisations and the state are scarce in backsliding countries; the relationship between civil society organisations and the state might, however, range from hostility to varying forms and degrees of co-optation. Based on interviews with representatives of civil society organisations and the examination of the sector-specific social and political environment, we aim to explore the forms and factors that shape the relationship between civil society organisations and the state in Hungary. More specifically, we analyse the impact of the changing political opportunity structures on three important sectors of civil society organisations: human rights organisations, environmental organisations, and women's organisations. We argue that, to seize control over civil society the government applies sector-specific strategies, ranging from exclusion to co-optation. State strategies, in turn, spark different responses from civil society organisations.
In the last decade, there has been a tendency for governments to impose tighter restrictions on civil society organizations, especially those promoting democracy and human rights. In this study, we examine how human rights organizations are responding to the increasingly hostile political environment in Hungary. The expanding limits on civil society organizations is usually discussed within a framework labelled as the closing space for civil society, which emphasizes the legislation and governmental actions directly attacking civil society organizations. Despite the impression that the restrictions threaten the existence of these organizations, a closer examination reveals that well-established organizations are capable of developing coping strategies to survive. To fully understand how these strategies are developed, we need to supplement this framework with the theory of political opportunity structures. This broader theoretical perspective examines the openness of decision-making processes for non-ruling actors and includes the role of perceptions in the examination of reactions to changes in the opportunity structure. As our study shows, perceptions about the social environment have a crucial role in understanding the strategies of human rights organizations. Examining the reactions of ten organizations, primarily using the method of organizational interviews, we show that rather than direct restrictions attacking civil society organizations, the major factor shaping their strategies is the closing of political opportunities. As a consequence of an almost total closure of decision-making mechanisms, they have been changing their activities from focusing on their roles as experts and working with state institutions to emphasizing social embeddedness, community building and raising awareness.
In recent years, many theoretical and empirical analyses about the changing regimes of Central and Eastern Europe have been written, pointing out the authoritarian tendencies and radicalization in the region. Hungary is a significant case in the changing landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The right-wing government rules the country with incontestable force, despising and disrespecting the norms of liberal democracies. Although the general impression is that the government has such a strong grip on power that resisting it is futile, in fact, it only enjoys only the support of 30 per cent of Hungarian citizens. Thus, it would be reasonable to expect the opposition to be able to effectively mobilize against the regime. In reality, no political opponent seems to stand a chance of defeating it. In order to explain why this is so, we focus on the way Orbán constantly creates images of 'the enemy' that keep alive an atmosphere of vigilance that blocks the efforts of critical actors to efficiently mobilize citizens. Since the political system in Hungary is highly centralized, the prime-minister's speeches epitomize the logic and ideology of the regime. Our aim is to understand the mechanism through which the dominant political actors frame the enemy in a system of images, thereby creating an environment where critical actors are stripped of the resources needed to mobilize against them.
In recent years, Europe has experienced a rise in politics based on antagonism, often discussed from the perspectives of populism and the mainstreaming of the ideologies of the radical right. In this study, we argue that there is a need for an interdisciplinary, theoretically broader and more empirically focused approach that fosters understanding of these developments. To explore the causal factors, we focus on the enemy images that are constructed and diffused by politicians, and their specific historical and structural contexts. The paper thus has two main components: First, we review what political theory, research on populism and on the extreme right and social psychology say about the functions of the use and development of enemy images. Second, we highlight the contextual factors that we consider make the success of a politics based on enemy images more likely in Central and Eastern Europe.