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This article reports the results of several field experiments designed to measure campaign effects in partisan contests. The findings suggest incumbent campaigns failed to increase incumbent vote share, whereas the challenger campaign was effective. To understand these and other results, the incumbent's optimal spending strategy was analyzed theoretically. The analysis reveals that if incumbents maximize their probability of victory rather than vote share, campaigns by typical incumbents are expected to produce only minimal improvement in incumbent vote share. The analysis also explains how returns to campaign spending vary with the competitiveness of the election, how incumbent spending can improve the incumbent's probability of victory yet have only minimal effect on incumbent vote share, and why rational spending plans might decrease the sponsor's expected vote. This article demonstrates the wide scope of application for field experiments and provides an example of how experimental findings can serve as a catalyst for generating theories.

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power. Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded. We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms. Adapted from the source document.

Survey data regularly show that assessments of current and expected future economic performance are more positive when a respondent's partisanship matches that of the president. To determine if this is a survey artifact or something deeper, we investigate whether partisanship is associated with behavioral differences in economic decisions. We construct a new data set of county-level quarterly taxable sales to examine the effect of partisanship on consumption. Consumption change following a presidential election is correlated with a county's partisan complexion, a result consistent with partisans acting outside the domain of politics in accordance with the opinions they express in surveys. These results support an expansive view of the role of partisanship in mass politics and help validate surveys as a method for studying political behavior.

Field experiments on voter mobilization enable researchers to test theoretical propositions while at the same time addressing practical questions that confront campaigns. This confluence of interests has led to increasing collaboration between researchers and campaign organizations, which in turn has produced a rapid accumulation of experiments on voting. This new evidence base makes possible translational works such asGet Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnoutthat synthesize the burgeoning research literature and convey its conclusions to campaign practitioners. However, as political groups develop their own in-house capacity to conduct experiments whose results remain proprietary and may be reported selectively, the accumulation of an unbiased, public knowledge base is threatened. We discuss these challenges and the ways in which research that focuses on practical concerns may nonetheless speak to enduring theoretical questions.

This essay uses the case of the "medical evidence gap" to illustrate how polarization and party competition can undermine efforts to solve a societal problem. Policy experts associated with both parties agree that the lack of hard evidence about what treatments work best for patients with different conditions is a significant health care problem, and that greater investments in "comparative effectiveness research" (CER) would enable patients, providers, and payers to make more informed decisions. Until recently, CER was a technocratic, third-tier issue. Over the past year, however, CER became highly politicized because it got caught up in the partisan struggle over universal health care reform. The story of how CER morphed into a symbol of crude rationing schemes and government interference with the doctor-patient relationship offers a cautionary lesson about the limits of pragmatic governance in an era of polarization.

This essay uses the case of the 'medical evidence gap' to illustrate how polarization and party competition can undermine efforts to solve a societal problem. Policy experts associated with both parties agree that the lack of hard evidence about what treatments work best for patients with different conditions is a significant health care problem, and that greater investments in 'comparative effectiveness research' (CER) would enable patients, providers, and payers to make more informed decisions. Until recently, CER was a technocratic, third-tier issue. Over the past year, however, CER became highly politicized because it got caught up in the partisan struggle over universal health care reform. The story of how CER morphed into a symbol of crude rationing schemes and government interference with the doctor-patient relationship offers a cautionary lesson about the limits of pragmatic governance in an era of polarization. Adapted from the source document.