Suchergebnisse

Indonesia is in a process of democratic regression. The government increasingly strives to confine civic spaces by using different instruments of digital repression such as surveillance, Internet shutdowns, lawfare, and online manipulation with the help of so-called buzzers. This is particularly alarming ahead of the concurrent parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for February 2024. The upcoming elections are crucial for the development of Indonesia's electoral democracy. Right-wing populist Prabowo Subianto, who is supported by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and leading in most surveys, could win the presidency in 2024 and then accelerate a slow process of democratic backsliding ongoing since the early 2010s. Social media contributes to the political discourse's manipulation, to society's polarisation, as well as to civil society's fragmentation. Its platforms are a threat to the government, but political elites have reacted by misusing them to their advantage. Jokowi, who is not allowed to run again because of a term limit, uses particularly lawfare to keep critics in check. Laws and regulations, originally designed to curb defamation and the spread of fake news, are systematically employed to intimidate and prosecute journalists, civil society activists, and academics and to instil fear among the broader public. Government actors as well as certain political, administrative, judicial, and business elites employ buzzers to delegitimate critics and to spread disinformation, for example by manufacturing certain narratives about politicians and policies.

The Indo-Pacific is a large and diverse region with multiple simmering conflicts. Growing geopolitical rivalries, militarisation, nuclear modernisation, and similar could lead to their escalation, with severe impacts also on Europe's economy and security. Upgrading existing Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) is needed to increase stability. Europe should use its albeit limited impact to assist. Simmering conflicts in the region range from territorial disputes between China, India, and Pakistan to territorially contested waters and islands in the South China Sea bearing further crisis-escalation risks. North Korea's aggressively pursued nuclear and ballistic missile programme threatens its neighbours and possibly the US. Rapid military advancement among the key countries active in the region, regarding nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems alike, will fundamentally challenge regional defence and deterrence postures. While the status quo and fragile regional stability have worked in the absence of overarching institutionalised security arrangements until now, the future is less certain. Manyfold regional and subregional institutions have performed well in the past in securing peace, among them ASEAN, the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and the Asia Regional Forum. New formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US or the Australia, UK, US pact are advancing security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Doubts remain, however, about whether they will be able to manage new risks in the face of geopolitical changes and new technological and military developments.

Bangladesh is on the precipice of another controversial national election, to be held on 7 January 2024. The last two elections, held in 2014 and 2018, were marred by allegations of electoral fraud but provided resounding victory for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's party. During her 14-year rule, Bangladesh has seen impressive economic growth, yet its democratic standards have declined steeply. Bangladesh is facing a political stalemate over the administration of the election. The government has rejected the opposition's demand for the reinstatement of the neutral caretaker government system that had overseen elections between 1991 and 2008. In response, the opposition is boycotting the polls. Hasina is also under considerable international pressure, especially from the United States, to ensure free, fair, and inclusive elections. However, the government appears determined to administer another one-sided election - which would consolidate Bangladesh's turn towards authoritarianism. Popular discontent related to the rising cost of living and economic mismanagement is providing momentum to anti-government sentiment domestically. Violent confrontations between opposition activists and ruling-party members, especially in the case of a rigged election, could destabilise the country in the post-election period.

The US–South Korea summit in April 2023 showed South Korea's willingness to further align with the US amid increasing US-China tensions. Statistical analyses show that the increased anti-Chinese sentiment of recent years strongly correlates with public support for alignment with the US. These findings have implications regarding the popularity of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's foreign policy. Polls such as Pew Global Attitudes data published in 2020 show that sentiment towards China has worsened since the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) incident of 2016 and COVID-19's onset in 2020. Political orientation played a role in explaining varied attitudes towards China after the THAAD crisis; however, this role decreased after COVID-19's onset in early 2020. Analysis of a poll published by Sinophone Borderlands in 2022 shows there is a strong association between negative public attitudes towards China and increased alignment with the US. These trends affect the Yoon administration's foreign policy, which has signalled its further alignment with the US amid rising US-China tensions. In December 2022, South Korea announced a new Indo-Pacific strategy that marks a stronger alignment with the US. The emphasis is on a commitment to a rules-based international order, while not completely excluding China. Given the high levels of anti-Chinese sentiment, it is likely that the Yoon administration will experience increased public support for its foreign policy. As a liberal democracy that is increasingly signalling its desire to play a more active role in supporting a rules-based international order, South Korea offers a lot of room for collaboration with Germany and the EU. With its emphasis on "de-risking" relations with China on the rise, the EU can further benefit from collaboration with South Korea in the areas of trade, security, and technology.

In contrast to the United States' unilateral China policy under President Donald Trump, the Joe Biden administration has renewed its ties with European and Asian allies. In its struggle with China for supremacy, the US strives to build a "united front" based on similar values. Although European countries share many values with the US, the China policies of the European Union and some of its member states substantially differ, not least due to diverging threat perceptions and economic interests.
Against all expectations, the Biden administration continued Trump's policy of containing China's development through tariffs, exports controls, investment blockades, and visa restrictions. With the US CHIPS and Science Act and new export controls, the US government seeks to slow down China's further technological rise.
Security issues have become more important in both the US and EU approach. European countries are, however, still reluctant to apply the same threat assessment for China as for Russia and to disengage from China.
Europe's dependency on China as a key market and production base is still high, and most EU member states are not yet prepared for an economic decoupling.
Although governments and research institutes in Europe have become more aware of the risks of science and technology cooperation with China, to discontinue it is not seen as an option.
Despite the US and EU attempting to coordinate their China policies, the new US export controls on semiconductors were criticised by many European companies as unilateral decisions.
The US and EU struggle to align their diverging interests on important topics such as the use of subsidies to support their economies. Therefore, the chances of them developing a unified China policy remain limited.
The relationship between the US and China has turned into a new Cold War in which the coexistence of different economic and political systems does not seem possible. For European countries, decoupling from China would undermine economic stability. Instead, the EU should further cooperate with China following an interest-led policy based on the principles of openness and rules-based multilateralism.

In recent months, the implementation of Germany's Indo-Pacific policy from September 2020 has started to take shape. With maritime security concerns as principal drivers, naval deployments have taken centre stage. Yet, as the voyage of the frigate Bayern exemplifies, the German approach - similar to other European policies - suffers from contradictions which are hidden under the "rules-based order" label.
Adopting terminology that originated in Australia and Japan, also the German "Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific" employ a variation of the rules-based order concept for describing what they seek to preserve.
Symbolically powerful naval deployments aimed at safeguarding the "freedom of navigation" through Southeast Asian waters have spearheaded the implementation of the Guidelines, while overshadowing their many other dimensions.
The conflation of legitimate concerns about Chinese expansion in the South China Sea with questionable projections of China's linear path to hegemonic power and concomitant courting of "like-minded" "value partners" altered the Guidelines' characteristically European emphasis on inclusivity, de-escalation, and the rule of international law.
The rules-based order has come to signify the common interest among a diverse group of powerful states in curbing Chinese influence. This complicates the question of which shared "values," "rules," and conceptions of "order" are at stake.
The increasingly wider usage of "rules-based order" has also led to policymakers glossing over the fact that they have themselves been part of, and are driving, the scramble for new spheres of influence.
German policymakers must admit that talking about the rules-based order raises more questions than answers. This is also a precondition for getting clear about whether they seek to help contain China. To play a stabilising role, they and other European governments must listen to what the many less-powerful actors in the Indo-Pacific have to say, and clearly articulate the specific rules, norms, and institutions they are seeking to promote to the benefit of all.

Norway's and Switzerland's recent hosting of the de facto Taliban regime representatives in early 2022 has overshadowed the risks to women and their rights in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. Unless international and European policymakers make significant policy interventions while engaging with the de facto Taliban regime, these risks will only escalate.
Women's exclusion in Afghanistan was aggravated after the US/Pakistani/Saudi-backed jihad against the Soviet invasion between 1979 and 1989, where cultural conservatism in rural parts merged with religious extremism.
Between 1979 and 2001, Afghanistan witnessed high levels of conflict and the rising prominence of ultraconservative religious clerics and leaders in the country's socio-political makeup. As a result, the first Taliban regime (1996-2001) imposed religion-inspired laws that placed strict restrictions on women in their public and private lives.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban regime was overthrown in October 2001 by the US-led coalition. During the two-decade US presence in the country, and with support from European partners, significant gains were made in providing more education and professional opportunities to women.
With the Taliban back in power, these gains now risk being rolled back, and international stakeholders are facing a catch-22. There remains a dilemma regarding whether Afghanistan should be seen from a humanitarian perspective (focusing on avoiding mass starvation) or from a security perspective (with the emphasis being on not engaging with a violent group such as the Taliban). Major policy decisions, therefore, need to be made soon.
To avoid an enormous humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan, some level of engagement with the Taliban is required. Switzerland has followed Norway's lead in informally engaging with the Taliban. Such initiatives can bring sustainable results only if engagement with the Taliban includes Afghan women. If Taliban delegations excluding women are accepted in engagements with European counterparts, the group will be further emboldened to persist with exclusionary policies at home.

China's attitude towards the War in Ukraine can be described as "pro-Russian neutrality." This awkward stance has gone against high hopes, particularly in Europe, that the war could be China's moment to improve its tarnished international image by condemning Russia's aggression. However, such hopes have been unrealistic, and they have also not been substantiated by policy measures expedient to incentivising China's support.
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China has all in all manoeuvred cautiously. While China has lent Moscow its rhetorical support, it has shied away from providing material assistance. This shows that the war has put Beijing in a difficult position, in which it seeks to balance diverging international interests and maintain control over a challenging domestic environment.
Ultimately, for China preserving its close ties with Russia takes precedence over not exacerbating its tense relations with the West. This is because the Kremlin is China's single-most important partner in its global strategic rivalry with the United States. From Beijing's viewpoint, this rivalry has only intensified further under the Joe Biden administration, which is why it has now become locked in as the key determinant of China's foreign policy.
As the war is dragging on and might produce a number of outcomes unfavourable to China's own aspirations, the country's leaders have an interest in de-escalation and a negotiated settlement. This does not mean that China would be willing - or well-placed - to act as a mediator. It does mean, however, that China could help nudge Russia towards ending the war.
In a world of escalating US-China rivalry, thinking the latter will abandon Russia over Ukraine is fanciful. But China is likewise interested in de-escalation. Therefore, China's leaders might still be swayed to play a more constructive role regarding bringing the war to an end. For that to happen, however, European decision makers would need to change course and try offering Beijing tangible inducements instead of solely delivering threats.

In India, privacy was declared a fundamental right a few years ago. Since 2013, however, the government has introduced a panoply of digital-surveillance measures, normalising the shift from targeted surveillance to mass surveillance. Attempts to integrate the public and private information of citizens without strong privacy laws and external oversight indicate India's worrying slide towards a rights-restrictive "surveillance democracy."
The emergent surveillance regime involves the state, technological companies, and people themselves, who may collaborate to monitor fellow citizens. While those surveilled are overexposed, the surveillants remain opaque. This increases the chances of rights violations, especially of the traditionally marginalised.
The functional scope of surveillance has increased with massive digitalisation. It is now part of governance, doubling up as an early-warning system against security threats and a behaviour-moderating system of social management and control.
New means of surveillance include artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled facial-recognition technology and drones that have been mainstreamed into public life without statutory basis or the consent of the surveilled. Digital surveillance is cost-effective for the state, while increasing harm to the public in cases of biased databases and technological errors.
COVID-19 has securitised the concept of public-health surveillance by conflating it with public order. This has increased the data burden on private citizens, who can be denied access to public provisions and places if they do not provide their personal information. Without proper safeguards, surveillance can become a tool of exclusion and repression.
The European Union can hold India, as well as tech companies, to its own strict privacy standards. Data-driven global interactions and digital dependencies necessitate this. To prevent AI products and dual-use surveillance technologies from being used by states against their own citizens, the EU can define and list high-risk ones, deny wide exemptions to states, and incentivise privacy-focused tech. This could help signal a growing global consensus against mass surveillance.

Donald Trumps Abschied aus dem Weißen Haus wurde in Taiwan mit Sorge aufgenommen. War seine konfrontative Haltung gegenüber China begrüßt worden, so befürchtete man auf Taiwan, dass sich unter Präsident Joe Biden die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Taiwan verschlechtern würden. In den ersten zehn Monaten seiner Amtszeit hat Biden jedoch wiederholt die anhaltende Unterstützung der USA signalisiert und sich zugleich für die Wahrung des Status quo in der Taiwan-Straße eingesetzt.
Im Rahmen von Trumps konfrontativer China-Politik erfuhren die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Taiwan sowohl symbolisch als auch in Bezug auf konkrete politische Maßnahmen eine deutliche Aufwertung. Daher betrachteten viele Taiwanerinnen und Taiwaner die Trump-Präsidentschaft positiv.
Im Gegensatz dazu wurde Biden anfangs als "weich" gegenüber China wahrgenommen. Nach Amtsantritt hat die Biden-Administration jedoch wiederholt ihre selbsterklärte "felsenfeste" Unterstützung für Taiwan gezeigt. Dazu gehören neben symbolischen Gesten auch verstärkte nicht offizielle Beziehungen und militärische Zusammenarbeit sowie Maßnahmen zur Internationalisierung der "Taiwan-Frage".
Als Reaktion darauf hat sich die öffentliche Meinung in Taiwan in den ersten zehn Monaten seiner Präsidentschaft deutlich zugunsten Bidens gewandelt. Gleichzeitig hat der chinesische Präsident Xi Jinping die Forderungen nach einer Vereinigung Taiwans mit dem Festland verstärkt, während die Volksbefreiungsarmee ihre militärischen Operationen intensiviert hat. Dies hat die taiwanische Ablehnung von Xis Ziel einer "friedlichen Vereinigung" unter Beijings Herrschaft weiter verstärkt.
Als Element der geostrategischen Rivalität der USA mit China wird Taiwan in Bidens Außenpolitik weiterhin eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Da sich die diametral entgegengesetzten Interessen der beteiligten Akteure in absehbarer Zeit kaum ändern werden, muss die "Taiwan-Frage" sorgfältig behandelt werden. Die Gefahr eines gewaltsamen Konflikts ist real. Folglich sollte eine ausgewogene Politik der USA und Europas darauf abzielen, den Status quo in der Taiwan-Straße zu wahren, indem sie sich klar gegen Versuche der Isolierung Taiwans ausspricht und gleichzeitig die "Ein-China"-Politik beibehält.

Ihr hundertjähriges Jubiläum feiert die KPCh in einem angespannten internationalen Umfeld. Die weltweiten Folgen der Corona-Pandemie, aber auch die wachsenden geopolitischen Rivalitäten haben der Parteiführung Anlass zu einer offensiven Neupositionierung gegeben. Die Signale, die die Partei nach innen und außen aussendet, sind dabei nicht immer deckungsgleich.
Zu ihrem Jubiläum feiert sich die Partei zu Hause als progressive Kraft, die die lange verfolgten nationalen Ziele moderaten Wohlstands und Beseitigung der Armut erreicht hat und auch im All neue Maßstäbe setzt. Die effektive Bewältigung der COVID-Pandemie nutzt sie zugleich nach außen, um sich als Gewinnerin im globalen Systemwettbewerb zu stilisieren.
Im Verlauf ihrer einhundertjährigen Geschichte prägten wechselnde Feindbilder die Selbstwahrnehmung der KPCh. Die Abgrenzung von äußeren und inneren Feinden untermauert sowohl ihren nationalen Führungsanspruch als auch ihre Zukunftsvisionen.
Der Amtsantritt von US-Präsident Biden hat die Wahrnehmung strategischer Rivalität auf allen Seiten verstärkt. Auf Bidens Charmeoffensive unter alten und neuen Allianzpartnern und den jüngsten G7-Gipfel reagiert die chinesische Seite mit einer Kombination aus konfrontativem und kooperativem Verhalten.
In diesem aufgeheizten internationalen Umfeld schickt sich die Parteispitze an, den USA ihren globalen Führungsanspruch streitig zu machen. Dies drückt sich unter anderem in einem eigenen Wertekanon aus, den die KPCh im Namen der "Menschheit" formuliert und mit dem sie sich subtil an die einsame Spitze "menschlicher Zivilisation" setzt.
Als Mitglieder der G7 sind Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und die EU gemeinsam gefordert, sich angesichts der wachsenden Rivalität mit China klug zu verhalten. Das langjährige Bemühen der EU um eine differenzierte Strategie gegenüber China ruft bei der KPCh, die sich auf nationalen Stolz beruft und Respekt einfordert, zunehmend pauschal abweisende Antworten hervor. Um zu vermeiden, dass die Volksrepublik sich in ihrer selbstgewählten Einsamkeit in der ihr zugeschriebenen Rolle des Rivalen versteift, müsste die Einbahnstraße wechselseitiger Sanktionen verlassen werden. Stattdessen könnte die EU das verbleibende Bekenntnis Chinas zum Multilateralismus für eine auch normativ offene Kommunikation nutzen.

A democratic revolt erupted in Thailand in summer 2020 against shrinking civic space due to persisting autocracy and COVID-19-related restrictions. At their peak, the youth-led demonstrations attracted almost 100,000 participants whose demands targeted Thailand's most sacred institution: the monarchy. The protests have fanned democratic aspirations in Southeast Asia, prompting many to celebrate the advent of a "Southeast Asian Spring." Before the pandemic, Thailand had already wrestled with a hybrid regime that represses civic space. The regime has weaponised draconian laws to stifle dissent, while unleashing disinformation campaigns to discredit the opposition.
With the COVID-19 outbreak, opportunities for mass mobilisation have arisen. Despite the regime's effective containment of the pandemic, its poor economic management and an absent monarch have fostered grievances conducive to mass protest.
From July to December 2020, diverse civic networks staged the largest and longest protests since the 2014 coup. Protesters drew on various tactical innovations to push back against regime repression and voice democratic demands, including monarchy reform. Thailand's protests have become a regional sensation by inspiring similar pro-democracy struggles in Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, and recently Myanmar. These protests largely responded to regime threats to civil society.
Despite this regional spillover precipitating democratic optimism, Southeast Asian autocratic regimes remain resilient. Whether regional democratisation can transpire partly depends on civil societies' strategic breakthroughs. As Thailand is a test case for pushback against a trend of shrinking civic space in Southeast Asia, European policymakers, aid agencies and political foundations can play a role in fostering a grassroots network of regional solidarity. They can work with emerging pan-Asian democratic alliances in order to strengthen necessary infrastructures and foster coordination across groups. For this support to be discreet, capacity-building activities that focus on knowledge exchange, networking, and collaboration could be less politically charged - thus avoiding regime allegation of "Western meddling."

In September 2021, the European Union (EU) presented its strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Several states and regional organisations have now embraced the "Indo-Pacific" as a concept to respond to geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics linked to China's rise. The "Indo-Pacific" lens fails, however, to properly capture the interests and perspectives of small powers in the Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific is not a coherent world region but a strategic space in which China and the United States, as well as other regional and extra-regional actors, compete for power and influence.
Small Pacific powers cannot avoid the strategic dynamics of the broader Indo-Pacific but seek to exert agency and autonomy. And they are concerned about a potential militarisation of the region.
Rather than simply viewing small Pacific powers through homogenising concepts such as "Indo-Pacific," or in the case of New Zealand (NZ) also "the Anglosphere," they need to be understood on their own terms instead.
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) have championed the "Blue Pacific" narrative to capture their collective identity and common interests. Environmental and human-security issues loom much larger for them than military ones do.
New Zealand has embraced the "Indo-Pacific" rubric but calls for an inclusive approach. It also continues to seek an "independent foreign policy" reflecting its own interests and values.
The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific names seven priority action areas, ranging from connectivity to security and defence. Not all areas are equally important for the EU's cooperation with PICs and NZ. Green transition and ocean governance should be prioritised in both instances, while human security regarding PICs and trade liberalisation in the case of NZ should also top the agenda.

President Donald Trump's departure from the White House was greeted with some concern in Taiwan. Having welcomed his confrontational stance towards China, many Taiwanese were concerned that US-Taiwan relations would worsen under President Joe Biden. The first 10 months in office, however, have seen the new administration repeatedly signal the US's continuing support while committing to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
As part of Trump's confrontational China policy, US-Taiwan relations saw a substantial upgrade under his leadership, both symbolically as well as in terms of concrete policies. This led many in Taiwan to view Trump as a true supporter.
In contrast, Biden was initially perceived as being "soft on China." Once in office, however, the Biden administration has continued to show its self-declared "rock solid" support for Taiwan. Alongside symbolic gestures, this includes increased non-official relations and military cooperation, as well as measures to internationalise the "Taiwan question."
In response, public opinion in Taiwan has considerably warmed towards Biden over the first 10 months of his presidency. At the same time, Chinese president Xi Jinping has intensified calls for Taiwan's unification with the mainland while the People's Liberation Army has ramped up military operations. This has further amplified Taiwanese rejection of Xi's goal of "peaceful unification" under Beijing's rule.
As an element of the US's geostrategic rivalry with China, Taiwan will continue to play an important role in Biden's foreign policy. Because the participating actors' diametrically opposed interests are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, the Taiwan question will have to be managed carefully. The threat of violent clashes is real. Consequently, a balanced US and European policy should aim at maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, clearly signalling opposition to attempts at isolating Taiwan while also upholding the "One-China" policy.