Suchergebnisse

Preface -- Contents -- Part I Contractual Democracy -- 1 Introduction to Part I -- 1.1 A Metaphor? -- 1.2 Political Contract: Definition -- 1.3 Does Any Campaign Promise Qualify as Contract Matter? -- 1.4 Punishment and Rewards -- 1.5 Renegotiation -- Negative Effects -- 1.6 Retrospect and New Developments -- 1.7 Background -- References -- 2 Retrospect -- Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts -- 2.1 Background -- 2.2 Introduction -- 2.3 Model and Assumptions -- 2.4 Elections -- 2.5 Competition for the Incentive Contracts -- 2.6 Competition Without Commitment -- 2.7 Asymmetric Information -- 2.8 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- 3 Vote-share Contracts Without Signaling of Competence -- 3.1 Background -- 3.2 Introduction -- 3.3 The Model -- 3.3.1 Agents -- 3.3.2 Policies -- 3.3.3 Utilities -- 3.3.4 Parameter Assumptions -- 3.3.5 The Overall Game -- 3.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept -- 3.4 Elections Alone -- 3.4.1 The Second Period -- 3.4.2 The First Period -- 3.5 Vote-share Contracts -- 3.5.1 Vote-shares as Political Contracts -- 3.5.2 The Second and First Period -- 3.5.3 Competition for Vote-share Contracts and Welfare -- 3.6 Extensions and Ramifications -- 3.6.1 Incumbency Advantages -- 3.6.2 Ramifications and Applications -- 3.7 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Vote Thresholds With Signaling of Competence -- 4.1 Background -- 4.2 Introduction -- 4.3 The Model -- 4.3.1 Agents -- 4.3.2 Policies -- 4.3.3 Utilities -- 4.3.4 Parameter Assumptions -- 4.3.5 The Overall Game -- 4.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept -- 4.4 Elections Alone -- 4.4.1 The Second Period -- 4.4.2 The First Period -- 4.5 Vote-share Thresholds -- 4.5.1 The First Period -- 4.5.2 Welfare Properties -- 4.5.3 Welfare Impact of Higher Vote Thresholds -- 4.5.4 Competition for Vote Thresholds -- 4.6 Extensions, Applications and Generalizations

Could democracy do better? This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author's successful book "Designing Democracy" from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies. "We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we have done it." This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms. Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USA In a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA.

We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective decisions on public goods may destabilize each other, even if there exist favorable conditions for matching on the one hand, and for global collective decisions on the other hand. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria with endogenous household formation and public choice.

We consider competitive markets for multiple commodities with endogenous formation of one- or two-person households. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partnerś commodity consumption and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two types of traits: observable characteristics and unobservable taste characteristics. Each individual gets utility from his/her own private consumption, from discrete actions such as job-choice, from the partnerś observable characteristics such as appearance and hobbies, from some of the partnerś consumption vectors, and from the partnerś action choices. We investigate competitive market outcomes with an endogenous household structure in which no individual and no man/woman-pair can deviate profitably. We find a set of sufficient conditions under which a stable matching equilibrium exists. We further establish the first welfare theorem for this economy.

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.

We present a simple neoclassical model to explore how an aggregate bank-capital requirement can be used as a macroeconomic policy tool and how this additional tool interacts with monetary policy. Aggregate bank-capital requirements should be adjusted when the economy is hit by cost-push shocks but should not respond to demand shocks. Moreover, an optimal institutional structure is characterized as follows: First, monetary policy is delegated to an independent and conservative central banker. Second, setting aggregate bank-capital requirements is separated from monetary policy.

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority.