Suchergebnisse

The state incentivizes investors to entrust capital to public corporations by granting shareholders enforceable rights over managers. However, these rights create legal "access points" through which social movements can make nonpecuniary claims on the corporation. I use original historical research on the Securities and Exchange Commission's administration of federal securities law to show that concern over nonpecuniary claims motivates the state to enact the role of "market protector." In this role, the commission insulates managers of corporations from shareholders' claims that it deems illegitimate because they are insufficiently profit-oriented. Thus the inverse of Polanyi's observation that society protects itself from markets is also true: the state creates market boundaries so that "always embedded" markets function more like autonomous, profit-oriented markets. Accordingly, the extent to which corporate democracy represents general, social interests or narrow, profit-oriented interests is largely a function of political contestation and state policy.

AbstractHow do economic and social position structure partisan affiliation? While neo-Durkheimian treatments of class and political behavior suggest the potential for extreme variability in the social bases of partisan affiliation, data limitations have largely restricted quantitative studies of this relationship to the postwar era. This temporal limitation restricts variation in observable social structure, thus limiting the ability of analysts to assess theoretical explanations. To address this gap, I introduce novel data on occupation and ethnicity for more than 20,000 Massachusetts state legislators in the nineteenth century. This allows me to find the "best fit" model for the social bases of party affiliation in four distinct periods in Massachusetts' political history. I show that the Massachusetts political system transitioned from a system of occupational cleavages to proto-class cleavages between the First Party System (1795–1826) and Second Party System (1835–54). The Civil War and Reconstruction Era (1855–77) was characterized by the emergence of an ethnic cleavage, but near-modern class divisions emerged as the strongest predictors of legislators' party affiliations for the remainder of the Third Party System (1878–93). Combined with historiographical accounts of the nineteenth century, these analyses suggest that the emergence of class politics requires intermediary organizations such as unions and professional associations, the liberalization of economic laws and regulation, and the increasingly unequal distribution of productive property.

When do regulatory innovations fail? I provide a novel organizations‐based answer to this question by developing an institutional‐reputational approach to regulatory politics. Regulators cannot hope to monitor the vast majority of market activities, so they must rely on the regulated to condition their behavior on the regulator's reputation: beliefs and expectations concerning the regulator's goals and capabilities. Regulators thus pursue daily activities while being mindful of how these activities will shape their reputation and thus their ability to achieve future goals. However, even long‐standing reputations are rendered fragile when rival actors use the organization's reputation to cross‐purposes. Thus, while reputation represents a major source of power, reputation also proves fragile when organizations face conflicting reputational demands. The fragility of reputations provides a novel explanation of an understudied phenomenon: failed regulatory revolutions. I develop this theory through the analysis of innovative Securities and Exchange Commission activity in disclosure law following the Watergate investigation.

AbstractEvictions are commonplace in the United States, and their negative consequences are broad and severe. However, research on evictions to date has focused primarily on urban areas, and thus has not addressed the impact evictions have on rural renters. This paper offers the first comprehensive analysis of evictions in rural communities, where the number of renters has been increasing in recent decades. We use Eviction Lab's national eviction database to study the approximately 220,000 evictions filed in rural counties each year. While the majority of rural evictions affect families with a white head of household (57 percent in 2010), eviction filing rates are four times higher among rural Black renters than among rural white renters. Eviction filing rates are highest in heavily Black counties in the rural southeast. While eviction filings are somewhat lower in rural majority‐Hispanic counties, these communities experience low‐quality informal housing and overcrowding. Eviction rates are also higher in rural counties with higher rent burdens and where more households include children.

AbstractOrganizational approaches can help to make sense of social phenomena, including inequality, politics, and culture. This is partly because large organizations exercise great power, both over employees and in their external environments. Revising Charles Perrow's classic account of the "society of organizations" in the 20th century, we argue that the organizational landscape has changed. There has been a dis‐embedding of individuals from organizations that contrasts with Perrow's idea of individuals being "absorbed" by organizations. Despite this hollowing out, there is a persistence of concentrated economic power or "concentration without centralization." Organizational power in this landscape is increasingly exercised at a distance, not only geographically but also in the sense of moving across organizational boundaries and through technologies of valuation. Three bodies of research exemplify different types of power at a distance. (a) Research on global production networks shows how power travels across geographic and network distances. (b) Research on financialization and its consequences shows how power is mediated by frames and metrics. (c) Emerging research on big data and Artificial Intelligence shows how power is encoded into seemingly neutral technologies and made to seem inevitable. This work helps to update the sociology of organizations and opens up new research questions.

Despite great concern over declining rates of survey cooperation, few polling organizations collect trend data on possible causes of its decline. We gather these data in order to examine the causes of declining survey cooperation, such as confidentiality and privacy concerns, the rise of telemarketers, popular understanding of survey accuracy, biases of polling organizations, and attitudes toward the societal benefits of survey research. Although the proportion of people who have participated in at least one survey has increased, knowledge of sampling procedures has not. Meanwhile, a wide variety of attitudes toward polling have grown more negative. In 2006, pollsters fell in measures of trust in occupational categories to levels similar to members of Congress and union leaders. Overall, there has been a markedly negative shift in attitudes toward public opinion researchers and polis across several dimensions between the mid-1990s and the first decade of the 2000s. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectiveWhile scholars treat neighborhoods as important contexts of inequality, few studies explore the social processes that create disparities in neighborhoods' political capacities. How does neighborhood social organization affect rates of political participation?MethodsWe combine surveys from the U.S. Census and Boston Neighborhood Survey (BNS), and administrative data from the City of Boston. Accounting for spatial dependence, we fit a series of regression models investigating the relationship between neighborhood social structure and four forms of political engagement: community meeting attendance, contacting local government for services, and voter turnout in a local and a national midterm election.ResultsWe find higher rates of political participation in more stable neighborhoods, and lower rates of participation in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of immigrants. The relationship between collective efficacy and rates of political participation is not statistically significant in our models. We find a positive association between concentrated disadvantage and city election turnout, but this association is nonlinear: beyond a certain threshold, increases in disadvantage are associated with decreasing rates of participation.ConclusionWe argue that neighborhoods are indeed political places, and residential stability, immigrant concentration, and—to a lesser extent—concentrated disadvantage are important factors affecting the civic capacity of urban communities.