Suchergebnisse

How and on what grounds do international organizations allocate aid to their member states? I answer this question in the context of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I find that political considerations affect the likelihood of receiving aid, as well as the amount of aid that countries receive. In particular, membership in the IAEA board of governors and the acceptance of tougher IAEA inspections increase the likelihood of IAEA assistance. These factors also increase the amounts of assistance, but only for countries with divergent policy preferences from those of the United States. In consequence, those states that receive IAEA assistance are not always those most in need of it. My findings track with theories that countries receive foreign aid in exchange for cooperation and concessions to donors.

What effect, if any, does democracy have on outcomes of counterinsurgency wars? Previous studies have provided inconclusive answers mainly because of the challenges involved in testing the question empirically: First, insurgencies are not accidental and the anticipated outcomes also affect whether they break out in the first place. Second, regimes are non-random and their determinants can also affect insurgency incidence and its outcomes. Moreover, different aspects of democracy can have opposite effects on the government's chances of winning. I address these challenges by conducting a critical test to distinguish between different causal mechanisms. I find that domestic institutions that are associated with public goods provision make insurgency onsets less likely. I also show that once we control for this selection effect, domestic political institutions do not influence insurgency outcomes. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

What effect, if any, does democracy have on outcomes of counterinsurgency wars? Previous studies have provided inconclusive answers mainly because of the challenges involved in testing the question empirically: First, insurgencies are not accidental and the anticipated outcomes also affect whether they break out in the first place. Second, regimes are non-random and their determinants can also affect insurgency incidence and its outcomes. Moreover, different aspects of democracy can have opposite effects on the government's chances of winning. I address these challenges by conducting a critical test to distinguish between different causal mechanisms. I find that domestic institutions that are associated with public goods provision make insurgency onsets less likely. I also show that once we control for this selection effect, domestic political institutions do not influence insurgency outcomes.