Suchergebnisse

AbstractNegotiations and conflicts do not evolve smoothly but are discontinuous involving transitions, break-, and turning points that change the flow of the negotiation. Given that these departures may be decisive in determining whether the involved parties come to a successful conclusion, several scholars have pointed out the importance of investigating whether impasse and settlement dyads exhibit different turning point profiles. To address this question, we extended Druckman's (J Confl Resolut 45:519–544, 2001) turning point model by integrating interlocking action–reaction sequences that initiate and (dis)confirm the departure from zero-sum bargaining. Furthermore, we consider social signals as previously not addressed class of events triggering the turning point. We propose and show that social signals act as precipitants to substantive change at the offer level and that how negotiators enact the action–reaction sequences discriminates between successful and unsuccessful dyads.