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"Places of risk" and "sites of modernity" refer not merely to physical locations, but also objects and institutions that stand at the center of contemporary debates on security and risk. These are social and political domains where energy and infrastructure are produced, where domestic security is pursued and maintained, and where citizens encounter the state in its punitive or monitory roles. Taking a wide view of the period from the 1970s to today, this volume brings together innovative, interdisciplinary case studies of sites of modernity that promise to provide security and safety, yet at the same time are deemed responsible for creating new risks. With a particular contemporary interest in the technocratic changes of security and risk control the contributors to Sites of Modernity - Places of Risk position the 1970s as a turning point in the path from industrial to post-industrial modernity"--

Der Aufstieg und Fall des jüdischen Unternehmers Julius Barmat in der Zwischenkriegszeit steht exemplarisch für die andauernden Debatten über Kapitalismus, Moral und Demokratie. Das Buch regt dazu an, den politischen Radikalismus neu zu überdenken und sich mit der heutigen Praxis des Kapitalismus und der Kapitalismuskritik auseinanderzusetzen. Wer war dieser Julius Barmat, der am Silvestertag 1924 im noblen Schwanenwerder bei Berlin verhaftet wurde? Ein begnadeter Unternehmer, der während der englischen Blockade maßgeblich zur Lebensmittelversorgung in Deutschland beitrug, dessen Industriekonzern aber im Zuge der Währungsstabilisierung scheiterte? Oder ein betrügerischer, korrupter, 'ostjüdischer' Kriegs- und Inflationsgewinnler? War er ein Agent des Kaiserreichs oder ein opportunistischer Sozialdemokrat und Förderer der Zweiten Internationale? Die Verhaftung dieses Mannes löste einen der brisantesten deutschen Finanzskandale aus, der nicht nur die Justizbehörden, die Medien und Radikale beschäftigte, sondern auch Literaten und Theaterregisseure. Martin H. Geyer ist Professor für Neuere Geschichte und Zeitgeschichte an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Seine Forschungsthemen sind die Geschichte der Zwischenkriegszeit, die Entstehung des modernen Belagerungs- und Ausnahmezustands und die Zeitgeschichte seit den 1970er und 1980er Jahren.

To argue that the future was (re-)invented in the 1970s and the 1980s might seem especially puzzling in light of arguments that the optimism associated with utilitarian, modernization, and socialist theories withered at the time amidst widespread debate over a variety of "crises." Nonetheless, it was in this peculiar constellation that ideas of the future became fundamentally renegotiated. "New risks" were juxtaposed with prevailing older ideas of social security that were predicated on individual and collective risk management. Focusing on West Germany, this article examines the various technical and political debates over "gaps" in terms of the finances, demographics, and trust in the system of social policy, which helped to put technical and political diagnoses of "new risks" squarely on the political agenda. This demographic argument is of particular interest, as it dramatized the unintended side effects of older social policy and created new, dystopian future scenarios of total systemic breakdown. At times, however, these discussions about managing the risks associated with Germany's demographic future verged on the utopian. New concepts of governmentality and biopolitics prevailed in this context. Moreover, pragmatic and sometimes technocratic concepts of new "governance" (and thus risk management) were proposed by social scientists and politicians as a means to address anxieties about the demographic future, and new models of risk-taking and risk-managing individuals also flourished at the time. With their descriptive but also prescriptive features, these theories contributed to ongoing academic efforts to explain the present and the future in terms of risk.

Sports have always been used to promote the nation state and the invention of national traditions with national symbols such as flags and national hymns playing an important role. This article looks at the peculiar situation of the post-war period when two Germanys established themselves also in the field of sports, yet cooperated in some athletic disciplines, and, most important of all, at the Olympic Games until 1968. This raised a great number of delicate political questions, particularly the politics of the nonrecognition of the GDR which strove hard to establish itself internationally by way of the international sports movement. Konrad Adenauer and the German Sports Organization clashed on this issue which brought to the fore the question of a German and an emerging West-German identity. In order to describe this negotiation of the nation state in the realm of sports, this article tries to make fruitful use of the term postnationalism in order to understand the ambiguities of identity of Germans towards their nation state. It also takes a brief look at the Olympic Games of 1972, which epitomizes more than anything else the peculiar postnationalism of the Federal Republic.

von Martin H. Geyer ; Rez.: ZBLG 63 (2000),2, S. 654-656 (Wilfried Rudloff); Central european history 33 (2000),3, S. 436-438 (Allan Mitchell); The journal of modern history 73 (2001),1, S. 204-206 (Deborah Cohen) ; Book review (H-Net) ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- 2013.52817

The regular participation of West German and East German athletic teams in sporting events, as well as the acceptance of East German leagues into major international sports organisations gave GDR leadership a perfect opportunity to present themselves as a single sovereign state. In this essay, the difficulties for West German foreign policy arising out of this situation are critically examined. West Germany's declaration in 1955 that common Olympic teams could represent the whole nation conflicted with the principles set forth by the Hallstein Doctrine. The author discusses how the fundamental premises of West German foreign policy were counteracted by international recognition of East German athletic teams and their sporting achievements. Furthermore, the question is raised why sports, as in no other comparable area, allowed for very close ties between West Germany and the GDR and why the Hallstein Doctrine more or less failed. Only after the construction of the wall, could the Hallstein doctrine, though very briefly, be effectively propagated. (Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte / FUB)