Suchergebnisse

Governments worldwide are intensifying efforts to address escalating flood risks exacerbated by climate change. Central to this endeavor is the implementation of institutional frameworks, such as public policies, aimed at mitigating, planning for, responding to, and recovering from flood events. However, the effectiveness of these institutions relies heavily on their practical application. This study delves into the institutional landscape of flood risk management (FRM) through a comprehensive case study in Sint Maarten, a Caribbean island. Specifically, we scrutinize the degree of institutional compliance, focusing on the alignment between formally advised policies (institutions-in-form) and their informal adoption in practice (institutions-in-use). Employing Institutional Network Analysis (INA), we explore discrepancies between these two dimensions across the various phases of FRM (response, recovery, mitigation, and preparation). Our findings reveal that institutional compliance varies significantly across the FRM phases, with mitigation presenting the most pronounced challenges. Notably, the discrepancies are more prevalent among those tasked with implementing the policies rather than the targeted property owners. Generally speaking, the transition of institutions from mere forms to actionable rules is often hindered by established or emerging practices diverging from prescribed directives.

AbstractForemost in dealing effectively with water conflicts is comprehensive analysis. The global surge in water conflicts, coupled with the imperfect success of solutions, initiatives, and policies, calls for a critical reevaluation of the paradigms that guide approaches to water conflicts. The approach taken—conflict management, resolution, or transformation—has a decisive impact on addressing water conflicts, from the initial analysis to the crafting of policies and their practical implementation. Iran is a prime example of this, with water conflicts increasing at various scales despite concerted mitigation efforts. This paper, through a qualitative content analysis of 159 peer‐reviewed papers collected via a systematic review, aims to delineate the prevailing approach to water conflict analysis within Iran's academic discourse, thereby partially shedding light on the shortcomings in both policy and practice. Water conflict resolution, and its respective models such as game theory and optimization–simulation, is the predominant approach in Iran's literature on water conflict analysis, thereby marginalizing attention dedicated to conflict management and transformation. This reflects an overarching focus on techno‐economic functions to deal with water conflicts, often overlooking the myriads of managerial and societal factors. The adoption of water conflict transformation can be vital to rectify these deficits in conflict analysis, potentially with subsequent impacts on policy and practice.

In their studies of collective exploitation of common-pool resources, Ostrom and other scholars have stressed the importance of sanctioning as an essential method for preventing overuse and, eventually, the collapse of commons. However, most of the available evidence is based on data covering a relatively small period in history, and thus does not inform us about the evolution of rules, including sanctions, over time. In this article, we demonstrate, based on historical sources covering several centuries, that sanctioning was not always the preferred way of preventing or dealing with free-riding in institutions for collective action, but that the legal context is decisive to understand why commoners in some countries were using more sanctions than those in others to regulate commoners' behavior. Commoners that could self-govern their resources used fewer sanctions, and when they did, it was mainly to avoid overuse of their most vulnerable resources. Moreover, graduated sanctioning seems to be less important than suggested in Ostrom's famous Design Principles, and was reserved primarily for immediate threats to the commons' resources. We also show the importance of other types of rules, such as differentiated rules, which have hardly been taken into account in literature to date.

In their studies of collective exploitation of common-pool resources, Ostrom and other scholars have stressed the importance of sanctioning as an essential method for preventing overuse and, eventually, the collapse of commons. However, most of the available evidence is based on data covering a relatively small period in history, and thus does not inform us about the evolution of rules, including sanctions, over time. In this article, we demonstrate, based on historical sources covering several centuries, that sanctioning was not always the preferred way of preventing or dealing with free-riding in institutions for collective action, but that the legal context is decisive to understand why commoners in some countries were using more sanctions than those in others to regulate commoners' behavior. Commoners that could self-govern their resources used fewer sanctions, and when they did, it was mainly to avoid overuse of their most vulnerable resources. Moreover, graduated sanctioning seems to be less important than suggested in Ostrom's famous Design Principles, and was reserved primarily for immediate threats to the commons' resources. We also show the importance of other types of rules, such as differentiated rules, which have hardly been taken into account in literature to date.

During the COVID-19 crisis there have been many difficult decisions governments and other decision makers had to make. E.g. do we go for a total lock down or keep schools open? How many people and which people should be tested? Although there are many good models from e.g. epidemiologists on the spread of the virus under certain conditions, these models do not directly translate into the interventions that can be taken by government. Neither can these models contribute to understand the economic and/or social consequences of the interventions. However, effective and sustainable solutions need to take into account this combination of factors. In this paper, we propose an agent-based social simulation tool, ASSOCC, that supports decision makers understand possible consequences of policy interventions, but exploring the combined social, health and economic consequences of these interventions. ; Correction available: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11023-021-09565-8 (WOS:000671651200001)

During the COVID-19 crisis there have been many difficult decisions governments and other decision makers had to make. E.g. do we go for a total lock down or keep schools open? How many people and which people should be tested? Although there are many good models from e.g. epidemiologists on the spread of the virus under certain conditions, these models do not directly translate into the interventions that can be taken by government. Neither can these models contribute to understand the economic and/or social consequences of the interventions. However, effective and sustainable solutions need to take into account this combination of factors. In this paper, we propose an agent-based social simulation tool, ASSOCC, that supports decision makers understand possible consequences of policy interventions, but exploring the combined social, health and economic consequences of these interventions.