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In: NBER working paper series 9849
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium
In: Journal of institutional economics, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 269-282
ISSN: 1744-1382
AbstractThis essay explores six sentences from Oliver Williamson – five providing context and the sixth the central topic. Decades ago, Williamson asserted that: (a) 'substantially the same factors' (1973: 316) create governance issues not only within organizations but also in interactions between organizations; and (b) relational contracting might be useful in addressing these issues in both domains (1979, Figure II). More recently – in an informal conversation in 2002 – he suggested a perspective on relational contracting that appears valuable in both of these domains: relational contracts as 'deals that start when you sign them'. The bulk of this essay explores past, present, and potential research on this perspective.
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ, Band 44, Heft 1, S. 145-157
ISSN: 1930-3815
In this essay I advance two related theses. First, economic theory predicts that organizations will be a mess but not a mystery. Second, classic case studies conducted by organizational sociologists support this prediction. Fully articulating and defending these theses will require a book, so my goal here is simply to render them plausible. I begin by pointing toward the relevant economic theory and sociological evidence, but I devote the bulk of the essay to a particular example: I develop a formal economic model inspired by a passage from Michel Crozier's The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. I conclude by discussing the potential roles of formal economic modeling in organizational research.
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ ; dedicated to advancing the understanding of administration through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis, Band 44, Heft 1, S. 145-157
ISSN: 0001-8392
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 5, Heft 4, Part 1, S. 413-429
ISSN: 1537-5307
In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 252-261
ISSN: 0042-5702
When economists have considered organizations, much attention has focused on the boundary of the firm, rather than its internal structures and processes. In contrast, this review sketches three approaches to the economic theory of internal organization—one substantially developed, another rapidly emerging, and a third on the horizon. The first approach (pricing) applies Pigou's prescription: If markets get prices wrong, then the economist's job is to fix the prices. The second approach (politics) considers environments where important actions inside organizations simply cannot be priced, so power and control become central. Finally, the third approach (path dependence) complements the first two by shifting attention from the between variance to the within. That is, rather than asking how organizations confronting different circumstances should choose different structures and processes, the focus here is on how path dependence can cause persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises.
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When economists have considered organizations, much attention has focused on the boundary of the firm, rather than its internal structures and processes. In contrast, this review sketches three approaches to the economic theory of internal organization—one substantially developed, another rapidly emerging, and a third on the horizon. The first approach (pricing) applies Pigou's prescription: If markets get prices wrong, then the economist's job is to fix the prices. The second approach (politics) considers environments where important actions inside organizations simply cannot be priced, so power and control become central. Finally, the third approach (path dependence) complements the first two by shifting attention from the between variance to the within. That is, rather than asking how organizations confronting different circumstances should choose different structures and processes, the focus here is on how path dependence can cause persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises. ; Sloan School of Management. Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations
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