Suchergebnisse

Introduction: Sonic history, or, Why music matters in International history / Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht -- Part I: Music, international relations and the absence of the state. The wicked Barrisons / David Monod. The International Society for Contemporary Music and its political context (Prague 1935) / Anne C. Shreffler -- Part II: Music, international history, and the state. Music and international relations in occupied Germany, 1945-49 / Toby Thacker. Instruments of diplomacy : writing music into the history of Cold War international relations / Danielle Fosler-Lussier. "To reach... into the hearts and minds of our friends" : America's symphonic tours and the Cold War / Jonathan Rosenberg. Music diplomacy in an emergency: Eisenhower's "secret weapon," Iceland, 1954-59 / Emily Abrams Ansari. Intimate histories of the musical Cold War : Fred Prieberg and Igor Blazhkov's unofficial diplomacy / Peter J. Schmelz. "Where I cannot roam, my song will take wing": Polish cultural promotion in Belarus, 1988 / Andrea F. Bohlman

Transatlantic cultural relations before World War I -- Music, magic, and emotions -- The houseguests : rooted cosmopolitans -- American hosts -- Love affairs : audiences and programs -- Musical patriotism and the fear of Europe -- Facing the music in World War I

Tough times are facing symphony orchestras these days. In a world of stagnating stocks, dwindling governmental budgets, and reluctant sponsors, trustees and managers struggle to maintain the musical caliber of their communities. Internationally renowned ensembles fight for dear survival. Curiously, at the same time, worldwide the political leverage of symphonies has risen continually during the past decade. Since 1999, Daniel Barenboim has been trying to soothe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the East West Divan Orchestra. In 2003, the Iraqi National Orchestra performed in Washington, DC, hoping to win the hearts of American audiences. In 2007, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez sent the Simon Bolivar Youth Orchestra on tour across Europe to spruce up the international image of his country. The United States is no exception in the surge of musical diplomacy. In early 2008, the U.S. State Department financed Lorin Maazel and the New York Philharmonic's tour to Pyongyang to play a potpourri of Wagner, Bizet, Dvorak, Bernstein, and Gershwin in an effort to move forward the stalemated talks on trade and atomic weapons. In this article, I seek to outline a conceptual framework for the interplay of power and cultural display by suggesting that symphony orchestras sent on tour by their governments serve, and continue to serve, to perform the nation. "Performing the nation," in this context, refers to ways of legitimizing the nation's political influence as well as the self-confidence to exert leadership abroad. To elaborate on this idea, below I outline the theory that has informed my thinking on this subject. Drawing on drama studies I show how a stage serves not only to show and entertain but to establish a relationship and a hierarchy, defined by the audience, performance, and the mediation and control of a leader. In a second step, I apply the theory to state-sponsored U.S. symphony orchestras, which I take to be a picture book example of the nexus between power politics and culture: retracing the development of orchestras since World War I and paying particular attention to Leonard Bernstein and the New York Philharmonic's world tour, in 1959, I argue that during the last one hundred years, these orchestras have changed from places of international encounter to stages of national self-representation. Adapted from the source document.

This analysis addresses the question of how different levels of culture were used in the Cold War by political & civil institutions to influence public opinion in Western Europe, &, more specifically, in Germany. It illuminates how what are commonly defined as 'cultural exports' or 'cultural propaganda' refer to a highly heterogeneous & complex group of governmental & nongovernmental agents, actions, & motivations. While governmental exports focused increasingly on highbrow products such as book & art exhibits, manifestations of popular culture were only admitted if they revealed a specific educational purpose. It can be argued that high culture provided the basis for much Cold War propaganda as much as the Cold War manipulated representations of high culture. Competing against communist claims that America had no high culture, US Cold War programs invoked previous instances of high cultural exchange, particularly with Germany. In doing so, they sealed & politicized a cultural partnership that had been in existence for almost 100 years. Adapted from the source document.