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We study the effect of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its aftermath on migration intentions of the Egyptian youth. We measure revolution intensity using the spacial variation in the number of deaths during the revolution from the Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution Wikithawra and combine it with data on migration intentions from the Harmonized Survey of Young People in Egypt (HSYPE). Difference-in-difference estimations show that the revolution significantly decreased the migration intentions of youth, especially young men. Single women did not change their migration intentions, mainly due to their financial dependence. Results also show that the youth living in informal slum areas experienced stronger effects. We describe two opposing channels: the insecurity channel, which positively affects migration intentions, and the optimism channel, which negatively affects migration intentions by inducing hope in a better Egyptian future. Youth in rural and slum areas were more sensitive to the optimism channel, due to their higher threshold of insecurity perception.

Emigrants are less likely to participate in elections in their home country. They are also self-selected in terms of education, gender, age, and political preferences, changing the structure of the origin population. High emigration rates can therefore have a systematic influence on election results. Using administrative migration and voting data, we show that counties in Poland that have experienced large emigration following the accession to the European Union in 2004 are characterised by larger vote shares for right-wing parties. We use instrumental variable estimations that exploit distance to the border and to airports to account for endogenous migration patterns. Results are robust to estimations using first differences. Results hold for elections of the national and EU parliament and for different areas within Poland. Surprisingly, we find no effects on incumbent parties. In addition, our results show increased voting for parties with pro-European positions. Analysing the mechanisms using survey data, we illustrate that emigrants (stayers) have less (more) trust in right-wing parties. The results have important policy implications for voting regulations.

Alongside a range of already well documented factors such as deindustrialization, technological progress and international trade, a series of recent empirical econometric studies show that immigration has contributed to the rise of extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Our study highlights, however, that there is no mechanical link between the rise of immigration and that of extreme right-wing parties. Exploiting French presidential elections from 1988 to 2017, we show that the positive impact of immigration on votes for extreme right-wing parties is driven by low-skilled immigration and immigration from non-European countries. Our results moreover show that high-skilled immigration from non-European countries has a negative impact on extreme right-wing parties. These findings suggest that the degree of economic and social integration of immigrants plays an important role in the formation of anti-immigrant sentiment. Fostering integration should therefore reduce negative attitudes toward immigrants and preserve national cohesion at a time when the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic could reinforce mistrust and xenophobia.

Die Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Covid-19-Pandemie haben zu einem Rückgang sowohl der regulären als auch der irregulären Migration und Tausenden gestrandeten Geflüchteten vor Europas Grenzen geführt. Migrant*innen und Geflüchtete in Deutschland stellt die Pandemie vor nicht zu vernachlässigende Herausforderungen: Der Anstieg der Arbeitslosigkeit trifft besonders Menschen mit ausländischer Staatsbürgerschaft, prekäre Arbeits- und Wohnverhältnisse erhöhen das Infektionsrisiko, Integrationsangebote fallen weg, und die Gefahr eines sich verstärkenden Rassismus steigt. Gleichzeitig hat die Krise die systemische Relevanz von Sektoren hervorgehoben, in denen viele Geflüchtete und Migrant*innen arbeiten, und zeigt somit die Schwachstellen der Asyl- und Integrationspolitik sowie den nötigen Handlungsbedarf auf.

Sowohl die Zahl der gestellten Asylanträge wie auch die Zahl der abgelehnten Asylanträge sind im Zeitraum von 2008 bis 2016 stark gestiegen. Dadurch ist das Asylverfahren überlastet, was zu langen Bearbeitungsdauern führt. Was geschieht, nachdem ein Asylantrag abgelehnt wurde und der Asylsuchende kein Aufenthalts- oder Bleiberecht erhält? Der Artikel bietet Einblicke in Duldungen, Abschiebeverfahren und die freiwillige Rückkehr.

Using representative household survey data, we study the short-term microeconomic effects of the Egyptian revolution on household behaviour in terms of education, health expenditure and savings. We construct a new measure of political instability by analysing the number of fatalities during political protests throughout the country. Difference-in-Differences estimations show that affected households increased spending on education, especially on their sons' higher education. This can be explained by a positive outlook towards the future, with better labour market prospects. At the same time, households decreased spending on health and increased savings, which can be interpreted as precautionary behaviour.

Migration to and within the European Union has led to a steadily rising number of foreign-born citizens living in EU member states. The naturalization of migrants therefore plays a prominent role in national integration policies. In this article we give an overview of key naturalization figures and facts in EU15 countries and Poland. We compare naturalization numbers and rates and describe the legal regulations for the acquisition of citizenship. We then discuss the controversial case of investor citizenship and conclude by providing evi-dence for the benefits of a facilitated access to citizenship.

Does the emigration of skilled individuals necessarily result in losses for source countries due to the brain drain? Combining industry-level patenting and migration data from 32 European countries, we show that emigration in fact positively contributes to innovation in source countries. We use changes in the labour mobility legislation within Europe as exogenous variation to establish causality. By analysing patent citation data, we further provide evidence that these positive effects are driven by knowledge flows that are triggered by emigrants. While skilled migrants are not inventing in their home country anymore, they contribute to cross-border knowledge and technology diffusion and thus help less advanced countries to catch up to the technology frontier.