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ABSTRACTSometimes rights conflict, as when the right to religion interferes with the right to equality. Often law does not prioritize rights, leaving judges to resolve conflicts among them based on their own intuitions and beliefs. This paper explores a new principle for resolving such cases: rule against the party that could have avoided the rights conflict more easily. This principle builds on "least cost avoidance," a theory of liability developed by scholars in law and economics. The main objective of this paper is to adapt least cost avoidance to questions of rights. The secondary objective it to demonstrate the potential of economics in constitutional law. Economics has illuminated and influenced many legal fields. To influence constitutional law, economists must address the questions of lawyers and judges, meaning questions about constitutional doctrine. This paper presents a modest step in that direction. KEYWORDS: justice, legal reform, legal norm, constitution,political system. RESUMENA veces, los derechos entran en conflicto, como cuando el derecho a la religión interfiere con el derecho a la igualdad. A menudo, la ley no prioriza los derechos, dejando que los jueces resuelvan los conflictos entre ellos basándose en sus propias intuiciones y creencias. Este artículo explora un nuevo principio para resolver estos casos: gobernar contra la parte que podría haber evitado el conflicto de derechos más fácilmente. Este principio se basa en "evitar el menor costo", una teoría de la responsabilidad desarrollada por académicos en derecho y economía. El principal objetivo de este documento es adaptar la evasión de menores costos a las cuestiones de derechos. El objetivo secundario es demostrar el potencial de la economía en el derecho constitucional. La economía ha iluminado e influido en muchos campos legales. Para influir en el derecho constitucional, los economistas deben abordar las cuestiones de abogados y jueces, es decir, cuestiones sobre la doctrina constitucional. Este artículo presenta un modesto paso en esa dirección. CÓDIGO JEL: F51, H11 ; Sometimes rights conflict, as when the right to religion interferes with the right to equality. Often law does not prioritize rights, leaving judges to resolve conflicts among them based on their own intuitions and beliefs. This paper explores a new principle for resolving such cases: rule against the party that could have avoided the rights conflict more easily. This principle builds on "least cost avoidance," a theory of liability developed by scholars in law and economics. The main objective of this paper is to adapt least cost avoidance to questions of rights. The secondary objective it to demonstrate the potential of economics in constitutional law. Economics has illuminated and influenced many legal fields. To influence constitutional law, economists must address the questions of lawyers and judges, meaning questions about constitutional doctrine. This paper presents a modest step in that direction. JEL CODE: F51, H11 ; Parfois, les droits sont en conflit, comme lorsque le droit à la religion interfère avec le droit à l'égalité. Souvent, la loi ne donne pas la priorité aux droits, laissant les juges résoudre les conflits entre eux sur la base de leurs propres intuitions et croyances. Cet article explore un nouveau principe pour résoudre de tels cas : trancher contre la partie qui aurait pu éviter plus facilement le conflit de droits. Ce principe s'appuie sur « l'évitement au moindre coût », une théorie de la responsabilité développée par des universitaires en droit et en économie. L'objectif principal de cet article est d'adapter l'évitement à moindre coût aux questions de droits. L'objectif secondaire est de démontrer le potentiel de l'économie en droit constitutionnel. L'économie a éclairé et influencé de nombreux domaines juridiques. Pour influencer le droit constitutionnel, les économistes doivent répondre aux questions des avocats et des juges, c'est-à-dire des questions sur la doctrine constitutionnelle. Cet article présente un modeste pas dans cette direction. CODE JEL: F51, H11 ; A volte i diritti entrano in conflitto, come quando il diritto alla religione interferisce con il diritto all'uguaglianza. Spesso la legge non dà priorità ai diritti, lasciando ai giudici la risoluzione dei conflitti tra loro in base alle proprie intuizioni e convinzioni. Questo articolo esplora un nuovo principio per risolvere tali casi: regola contro la parte che avrebbe potuto evitare più facilmente il conflitto di diritti. Questo principio si basa sull'"elusione dei costi minimi", una teoria della responsabilità sviluppata da studiosi di diritto ed economia. L'obiettivo principale di questo documento è adattare l'elusione dei costi minimi alle questioni dei diritti. L'obiettivo secondario è dimostrare le potenzialità dell'economia nel diritto costituzionale. L'economia ha illuminato e influenzato molti campi legali. Per influenzare il diritto costituzionale, gli economisti devono affrontare le questioni di avvocati e giudici, cioè questioni di dottrina costituzionale. Questo documento presenta un modesto passo in quella direzione. CODICE GEL: F51, H11

The main stream of formal and informal logic as well as more recent work in discourse analysis provides a way of understanding certain arguments that particularly lend themselves to rational analysis. I argue, however, that these, and allied modes of analysis, be seen as heuristic models and not as the only proper mode of argument. This article introduces three other modes of argumen tation that emphasize distinct aspects of human communication, but that, at the same time, must be considered for the full understanding of argumentation. These modes are (1) the emotional, which relates to the realm of feelings, (2) the visceral, which stems from the area of the physical, and (3) the kisceral, which covers the intuitive and non-sensory arenas. At its most extreme the view holds that arguments may be given (almost) wholly within one mode and not be at all susceptible to those methods of argument analysis previously used. A more cautious statement allows that any interactive argument will (possibly) contain elements from various modes, and that to attempt to reduce these all to the rational is prejudiced reductionism.

Recent attempts by British writers to give sociological accounts of inflationary processes suffer from the defect that they fail to distinguish clearly between factors which are inherent in all capitalist societies and those that are peculiar to British industrial development. Hence their discussions make it unclear whether the `British sickness', which includes high inflation, is likley to be prototypical of all capitalist societies. This paper begins by examining how `sociological' factors enter into economists' explanations of inflation and goes on to outline a distinctively sociological model of inflation. The model has four elements: the extent to which economistic values are held by different groups of income-receivers; the existence and strength of any normative system which might restrain the pursuit of such values; the structure of power between groups of income-receivers; and the structural capacity of the socioeconomic system to meet the demands placed on it. It is suggested that two different configurations of these variables are empirically more likely to occur. One being highly likely to promote inflationary tendencies, the other being likely to mitigate such pressures. Finally, it is argued that Britain's particular pattern of industrial development means that she corresponds to the first type, whereas other capitalist societies with different historical paths may correspond to the second type.