Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- CHAPTER 1 Modernization Theory and American Modernism -- CHAPTER 2 From the European Past to the American Present -- CHAPTER 3 The Harvard Department of Social Relations and the Intellectual Origins of Modernization Theory -- CHAPTER 4 The Rise of Modernization Theory in Political Science -- CHAPTER 5 Modernization Theory as a Foreign Policy Doctrine -- CHAPTER 6 The Collapse of Modernization Theory -- C H A P T E R 7 The Postmodern Turn and the Aftermath of Modernization Theory -- Notes -- Essay on Sources -- Index.
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The most widely discussed transnational governance reform initiative of the 1970s, the New International Economic Order (NIEO) called for fundamental legal, economic, and political transformations to international institutions and norms designed to redirect more of the benefits of transnational integration toward the developing nations of the Global South. This special issue of Humanity reconsiders the claims of the NIEO in light of recent debates about global governance, and suggests that the NIEO's proposals for an alternative global order continue to haunt the global geopolitical imaginary.
One of the most vibrant subfields of American intellectual history over the last fifteen years has been the history of the social sciences during the late twentieth century, a period when the size and quality of American social-scientific output grew explosively. Given that the major historiographic push to historicize this period of social science began in the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration by some Americans of Cold War victory, it was perhaps inevitable that the geopolitics of the Cold War emerged as a major tool for accounting for what was distinct about the social science and broader culture of the postwar period. After all, wasn't it obvious that what made the 1990s different from the decades that came before it was the fact that the Cold War was over? And wasn't it further obvious that the bipolar geopolitics and nuclear night terrors of the Cold War had deformed everything they touched, not least the work of American social scientists? One marker of this obviousness was the transformation of the term "Cold War" from a noun describing (perhaps already too vaguely) a particular sort of geopolitical struggle into an adjective that could explain all sorts of extra-geopolitical activity. By the turn of the century this adjectivalization of the Cold War had become something of a historiographic cliché, a blunt (if not lazy) way to historicize our immediate forebears. When John Lewis Gaddis chose to title his "rethink" of Cold War historyNow We Know, he didn't even need to addBetter.
By the early 1990s, the Great Powers had developed a de facto division of labor for international conflict, with the U.S. taking the lead for combat operations while its allies focused on peace-keeping duties. By eschewing responsibility for post-conflict peacekeeping and nation-building, the transformation of the American military under Secretary Rumsfeld has exacerbated U.S. dependency on foreign expertise in these crucial "soft" areas. The Bush administration's decision to go it alone in Iraq in 2003, followed by its calamitous mismanagement of the post-conflict situation in that country, has exposed this dependency, raising important questions about the future direction of American neo-imperial ambitions.
By the early 1990s, the Great Powers had developed a de facto division of labor for international conflict, with the US taking the lead for combat operations while its allies focused on peace-keeping duties. By eschewing responsibility for post-conflict peacekeeping & nation-building, the transformation of the American military under Secretary Rumsfeld has exacerbated US dependency on foreign expertise in these crucial "soft" areas. The Bush administration's decision to go it alone in Iraq in 2003, followed by its calamitous mismanagement of the post-conflict situation in that country, has exposed this dependency, raising important questions about the future direction of American neo-imperial ambitions. Adapted from the source document.
Gilman argues that the Republicans have transformed themselves into the first ideologically-defined American political party to achieve success, while the Democrats remain an old-fashioned non-ideological party serving group interests. These partisan differences are manifest in approaches to governing: Democrats prefer to bargain and compromise, while Republicans assume that a majority entitles them to full control over policy outcomes. To challenge the Republicans successfully, Democrats must abandon the old-style of governing as policy tacticians and adopt an ideological approach to governing in the classic European sense.
Gilman argues that the Republicans have transformed themselves into the first ideologically defined American political party to achieve success, while the Democrats remain an old-fashioned non-ideological party serving group interests. These partisan differences are manifest in approaches to governing: Democrats prefer to bargain & compromise, while Republicans assume that a majority entitles them to full control over policy outcomes. To challenge the Republicans successfully, Democrats must abandon the old-style of governing as policy tacticians & adopt an ideological approach to governing in the classic European sense. Adapted from the source document.
Argues that the Republicans are an ideologically defined party which allows for greater governing success, and the Democrats need to adopt an ideological approach instead of governing as policy tacticians; US.
