Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 68, S. 102000
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 68, S. 102000
This paper aims to study the effects of exposure to corruption on all the aspects of political participation. Focusing on Italian municipalities in the period 1999–2014, we generate a daily and local measure of exposure to corruption, screening newspaper articles of the main Italian press agency. We concentrate on local elections and, in an event-study analysis, we find three main results. First, corruption exposure affects citizens' participation in election by reducing voter turnout. Second, corruption impacts on politicians' participation: the number of candidates and electoral lists decreases after a scandal and candidates with political tenure are more likely to run. Finally, these changes affect local political outcomes as tenured politicians are more likely to be elected, while freshmen lose ground. These results suggest that exposure to corruption has general and negative effects on political participation, leading people to lose interest in politics. ; ISSN:0176-2680 ; ISSN:1873-5703
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The goal of this paper is to study the effects of introducing income redistribution at the municipal level, with the adoption of local tax progressivity. In particular, we analyse whether this complex fiscal tool modifies the incentives of local politicians to be strategic leading to higher tax manipulation, in the form of political budget cycle. We exploit an Italian reform of the local personal income tax (PIT), which was flat before the intervention, that allows mayors to introduce progressive schemes. First, we make use of the staggered timing of local elections to estimate a Difference-in-Differences model and we find that the reform consistently amplifies political budget cycle of local PIT. In terms of mechanism, progressivity allows mayors to target diverse income groups and to play different strategies: high income rates, indeed, are subject to larger manipulation than the moderate ones. Second, we exploit the fact that income concentration level is a valid predictor for the introduction of progressivity. The main results are confirmed in a Triple-Differences analysis. And finally, we show that manipulation is rewarding from an electoral point of view. These results reveal a negative side of decentralizing income redistribution as it may lead to consistent tax manipulation and large distortions in fiscal policy.
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7588
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In: Dondena Working Paper Series No: 130, 2019
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Working paper
The aim of this paper is to study the effect of local corruption on political participation which is mediated by the press. Focusing on Italy, we generate a daily measure of exposition to local corruption screening articles of main Italian press agency. Applying an event-study methodology on local elections, two results emerge. First, corruption exposition reduces citizens participation: voter turnout decreases but characteristics of elected politicians are not affected; second, politicians participation modifies: number of candidates lowers along with proportion of running freshmen. These results suggest that corruption exposition produces resignation rather than retaliation in terms of political participation.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6645
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Working paper
In: The journal of politics: JOP
ISSN: 1468-2508
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 11230
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 10655
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In: Economic policy, Band 37, Heft 111, S. 547-599
ISSN: 1468-0327
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study the electoral impact of crisis management policies. With this aim, we exploit a natural experiment during the COVID-19 pandemic in France to evaluate the effect of the lockdown on voting behaviour. In particular, the country has been divided in two areas, red and green, subject to a 'hard' and a 'soft' lockdown, respectively. To measure voting behaviour, before and after the policy, we rely on the 2020 French municipal elections: the first round took place before the introduction of the restrictions, while the second round was delayed after the end of the lockdown. We estimate a spatial regression-discontinuity-design model comparing electoral outcomes around the border of red and green areas both in the second round and between the two electoral rounds. The main results suggest that lockdown regulations significantly affected voting outcomes. First, in localities under a harder lockdown, the incumbent's vote share is higher. Second, voter turnout is larger where more stringent restrictions are adopted. These results suggest that lockdown policy mobilizes citizens and leads them to rally around the incumbent politicians.
We study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may reduce corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to small Italian municipalities. The DSP led to a decrease in both recorded corruption rates and corruption charges per euro spent. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures. The reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives as it emerges mostly in pre-electoral years and for re-eligible mayors. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local public good provision in the following years, finding a null effect in the short run. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constraints might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local welfare.
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