Deposit Insurance, Institutions, and Bank Interest Rates
In: Journal transition studies review: JTSR, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 77-92
ISSN: 1614-4015
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In: Journal transition studies review: JTSR, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 77-92
ISSN: 1614-4015
In: The Changing Geography of Banking and Finance, S. 215-232
In: Economic notes, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 81-107
ISSN: 1468-0300
This paper presents different specifications of a structural VAR model which are useful to identify monetary policy shocks and their macroeconomic effects for the Italian economy in the 1990s. The analysis is based on a detailed institutional description of the functioning of the domestic market for bank reserves. In this setting, we try to establish if monetary policy shocks are better identified using exchange rates or foreign exchange reserves as a conditioning variable for the small open economy framework. Our analysis confirms the view that the Bank of Italy has been targeting the rate on overnight interbank loans in the 1990s. This is coherent with either proposed modelling choices. Therefore, we interpret shocks to the overnight rate as purely exogenous monetary policy shocks and study how they impact the economy.(J.E.L.: E52, F41, F47).
In: Economic notes, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 21-38
ISSN: 1468-0300
Systemic risk is the risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, typically triggered by the default of one, or more, interconnected financial institutions. In this paper, we estimate the systemic risk contribution of Italian‐listed banks for the period 2000–2011. We follow a methodology first proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier and measure banks' contribution to systemic risk by ΔCoVaR, which measures the contribution of bank i to the financial system VaR when bank i is in a state of distress. We define 'the system' as the set of Italian‐listed banks in the sample. First, we find that the information contained in ΔCoVaR is different from that contained in the VaR. Therefore, regulators should take it into account in order to monitor the systemic risk posed by banks. Second, recent policy debate has focused on the danger posed by large banks and on the need to curb their size. We find that size is indeed the main predictor of a bank contribution to systemic risk. However, in the post‐Lehman period, leverage is also an important predictor of systemic risk. Consequently, any financial regulation designed only to curb banks' size could not completely eliminate systemic risk because it is exactly in crisis times that leverage becomes relevant. Hence, we conclude that ΔCoVaR is a very useful policy tool for regulators that can estimate which factors are more relevant in terms of contribution to systemic risk.