Suchergebnisse

Approximately 40% of eligible federal service contracts (and 50% of service contracts among DOD agencies) are performance-based acquisitions (PBAs). Despite the significant volume of federal contracts PBAs represent, little empirical research exists on PBA use or effectiveness. This study focuses on the dyadic contract between government and contractor to examine contract attributes of PBA and non-PBA contracts. The study aims to determine whether PBAs are linked to stronger performance on cost, schedule, and technical performance. Through the analysis, the study explores how contract attributes differ amongst PBA and non-PBA contracts and the factors that contribute to (or hinder) effective implementation of performance-based contracts. To address the studyメs objectives, contracts data derived from FPDS-NG is analyzed. Contracts are selected from 22 service areas and studied over a 15-year period (2000-2014). Multivariate techniques are used to compare PBA and non-PBA contracts from these service areas. Semi-structured interviews with federal acquisitions professionals and private contractors are also collected to add context to the findings from the multivariate analysis. The results of the exploratory analysis show that PBAs are associated with higher costs and longer contract lengths compared to non-PBA contracts. PBAs are also associated with incentive contracts over other contract types, when compared to non-PBA contracts. PBAs are associated with higher number of bidders and set aside contracts, compared to non-PBA contracts. The results presented in the study are descriptive and do not indicate casual relationships. This exploratory study examines PBA design and implementation, contributing to the body of knowledge relevant to the research and practice of procurement. Yet, additional research is needed to test causal relationships and investigate the associations explored in this study. Future study should include more robust primary data analysis in order to explore contract attributes beyond the measures available in FPDS-NG. A more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of performance-based contracts and performance incentives more broadly, can help to improve procurement practices in order to maximize contract performance. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program

AbstractContract incentives are designed to motivate contractor performance and to provide public managers with a powerful tool to achieve contract accountability. Our knowledge of contract incentives is rooted in contract design, yet as we move beyond contract specification and further into the contract lifecycle, we know little about why and how managers implement incentives. This study assesses public managers' use of contract incentives in practice and advances theory development. A typology of contract incentives is constructed to capture a comprehensive range of formal and informal incentives, and the factors that influence managerial use of incentives are identified. The findings shed light on the complexities of maintaining accountability in third‐party governance structures and the management techniques aimed at improving the performance of public agencies.

Governments continue to increase their reliance on private and nonprofit agents to deliver goods and services to citizens. Yet there is a dearth of scholarly research on the critical decisions made by public managers throughout the contract implementation process-decisions that can have a profound impact on the quality of services delivered to citizens and on the accountability of contractors to the public interest. This research addresses the accountability dynamics in local government contracting by analyzing the decisions public managers make to determine whether they sanction contractors for unsatisfactory performance. This study reports the results of a national survey of local government managers and is supplemented with pre- and postsurvey interview data. Although public managers have powerful tools available, especially in the form of sanctions, the results presented here indicate that several factors prohibit their execution-specifically the burdensome nature of the sanctioning process, willingness to use discretion, and the extent to which the organization is dependent on the poor-performing contractor. Understanding how and why managers use contract sanctions can elucidate both administrative decision making in the implementation process, and as importantly, the influence of this action on public accountability. Adapted from the source document.

Financial incentives are used throughout the public and private sectors to control costs, expedite projects, maximize quality, and encourage performance. Although federal agencies in the United States utilize incentive contracts, there is little research on the scope of their use or effectiveness. This study analyzes nearly 390,000 federal contracts across service acquisitions of varying complexity to determine whether incentive contracts differ in contract duration, cost, or technical performance when compared with other types of contracts. The results indicate that contracts appear to execute differently on these three dimensions based on the complexity of the acquired service. The findings provide a heightened understanding of the accountability dynamics in third-party implementation, particularly when financial incentives are used to motivate contractor performance.

AbstractThe authors use a survey experiment to examine how structural differences in governance arrangements affect citizens' notions of who is culpable for poor service quality. More specifically, two questions are investigated: (1) When things go wrong, do citizens attribute more blame to political actors if the provider of government services is a public agency or a private contractor? (2) Does the length of the accountability chain linking political actors to service providers influence citizens' attributions of blame? The authors hypothesize that provider sector and accountability chain length affect citizens' perceptions of political actors' control over service delivery, which, in turn, inform citizens' attributions of blame. Mixed support is found for this theory.