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POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVISTIC LEGAL THEORY The purpose of the paper is to explore the question whether the positivistic legal theory may be developed without any assumptions pertaining to political philosophy. The legal theory of H.L. Hart is examined. The author comes to the conclusion that Hart notwithstanding the declaration that his theory is purely descriptive adopts certain tacit evaluative assumptions, and, therefore does not maintain absolute neutrality vis-a-vis political values. Hart's assumption are, however, minimal and therefore uncontroversial. This causes that his theory is not able to propose asatisfactory explanation of the normativity of law. Various understandings of the role of alegal theory in such an explanation are discussed.

IS SYSTEMNESS A NECESSARY FEATURE OF LAW? This question is a metaphysical question, as it relates to the nature of law. The answer must be based on the conceptual analysis. The method of conceptual analysis applied by contemporary analytic theories of law may be interpreted as a "modest" conceptual analysis in the terminology of F. Jackson. The basis of such an analysis are platitudes about law, generally accepted in a given society and the purpose of analysis is the rational reconstruction of the folk theory of law. Using this method, the authors come to the conclusion that necessarily any rationally reconstructed folk theory of law must contain the claim that the law constitutes a system, at least in the weak sense of the word.

"Methodological and metaphilosophical disputes in the contemporary philosophy of law are very vivid. Basic issues remain controversial. The purpose of the book is to confront approaches of Anglo-Saxon and continental philosophy of law to the following topics: the purpose of legal philosophy, the role of disagreement in legal philosophy, methodology of legal philosophy (conceptual analysis) and normativity of law. We see those areas of legal metaphilosophy as drawing recently more and more attention in the literature. The authors of particular chapters are internationally recognised scholars rooted in various traditions: Anglo-Saxon (Gerald Postema, Dennis Patterson, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco); Southern-European (Riccardo Guastini, Manuel Atienza); Nordic (Torben Spaak); German (Ralf Poscher); and Central-European (Jan Woleński, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda). They represent different approaches and different backgrounds. The purpose of the volume is to contribute to the cross-cultural discussions of fundamental issues of philosophy of law."

This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI&Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, "Kripkenstein's" sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity of rules of interpretation, some formal approaches towards rules and normativity as well as the problem of defeasibility of rules. The aim of the book is to provide an interdisciplinary approach to an inquiry into the questions concerning rules, rule-following and normativity

This book focuses on the problems of rules, rule-following and normativity as discussed within the areas of analytic philosophy, linguistics, logic and legal theory. Divided into four parts, the volume covers topics in general analytic philosophy, analytic legal theory, legal interpretation and argumentation, logic as well as AI & Law area of research. It discusses, inter alia, "Kripkenstein's" sceptical argument against rule-following and normativity of meaning, the role of neuroscience in explaining the phenomenon of normativity, conventionalism in philosophy of law, normativity of rules of.