Suchergebnisse

<p>Zasadniczy problem badawczy zarysowany został wokół pytania o efektywność działań opozycji parlamentarnej w sytuacji konkurencji z homogeniczną większością parlamentarną. Odnosząca się do niego hipoteza badawcza zakłada, że skuteczność działań opozycji parlamentarnej w takich warunkach uzależniona jest od strategii stosowanych przez obydwie strony politycznego sporu. Strategie te zbudowane są zaś na dominującym sposobie postrzegania przeciwnika politycznego.</p>

The article is devoted to the level of cohesion of parliamentary factions in the first year of the activity of the 9th Sejm of the Republic of Poland. It was assumed that a high level of cohesion renders political factions the most important participants of political competition at the parliamentary level. Low faction cohesion, on the other hand, would result in a transfer of competition to non-formal parliamentary structure levels. Additionally, the hypothesis that the smaller the parliamentary faction is, the lower level of cohesion it represents was tested. In a small group, behaviours of so-called dissidents, i.e. MPs voting differently comparing to the majority of its members, are more visible than in large factions. The research problem was solved on the basis of an analysis of 2323 votes, for which a modified version of the agreement index of Simon Hix was used. It is founded on the assumption that MPs choose between not three, but four options ("yes", "no", "abstain" or not taking part in a vote).

The countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) relatively quickly have reached a level of development that allowed them to be classified as one of the consolidated democracies. This has been confirmed by the evaluations carried out by the best-known indices for measuring the quality of democracy. It is known, however, that the consolidation of democracy is a long-term process, taking place not only in the institutional dimension, but above all at the behavioural level, reflecting the state of public awareness. Consolidation is a meandering process and does not always end in success. What is happening in the countries of Central Europe at the end of the first decade and in the second decade of the 21st century is a sufficient reason to ask a question about the future of their democracies. Referring to the Nations in Transit index, one can notice an increasingly clear trend of weakening democratic development in the region. With this in mind, the article outlines four hypothetical scenarios concerning the future of Central European democracies. They are not necessarily inseparable, but merely show the potential consequences of the phenomena and processes observed. The article is primarily of expository and prognostic character.

Since 1990, the president of the Republic of Poland has been elected by direct popular vote. In this period, the position of the office of president has undergone significant change. Each consecutive legal act of a constitutional nature (the Small Constitution of 1992 and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997) imposed limitations on the range of competences (powers) of the president. Is it thus necessary to revise the current rules of how the head of state is elected? To help answer this question, an attempt was made to view the issue raised in the title of the paper from three perspectives: 1) systemic rationality, 2) political parties as the main political actors and 3) a citizen-based approach as reflected in the preferences and behaviours of the sovereign.

Transition, which is the starting point for any democratic change, in the Polish political context constituted a period of development of institutional solutions, which set the direction for the evolution of the political regime in sensu stricto in the years to come. An analysis of the relationship between the parliament, the president and the government requires that a reference be made to the traditional political regime models, that is parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi‑presidentialism. The functioning of either of these models assumes that a certain democratic minimum exists both in terms of a set of formal rules and political practice. Meanwhile, in the initial phase of the system change (from the Round Table to the first, fully competitive parliamentary elections in 1991), institutions characteristic for both democratic and authoritarian regimes functioned alongside each other. In these conditions, institutions restricted the political actors' freedom of action by creating the political framework. The period of democratic transition perfectly illustrates the influence of actors on the shaping of specific institutional solutions.

This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context of the 2014 European Parliament election in Poland. Most often the definition of principles of elections' equality comes down to emphasizing its two aspects: the formal one and the material one. The first of them refers to guaranteeing each person with the active voting right the same number of votes. The material aspect of the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same "voting power" to the election participants. Most briefly, it means that a given number of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same numerical strength. The main aim of this article is focus on the material aspect of implementing the principle of equality in EP elections. In the article will be emphasized three issues decisive for the specific features of the electoral system (electoral districts, election threshold and electoral formula), at the same time influencing the range of implementation of the material equality of elections. General findings will be confronted with empirical data, which will allow to formulate conclusions about the degree to which the European Parliament election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the principle of material equality.

Poland held its first ever popular presidential election at the end of 1990. Since then four such elections have been held i.e. in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In the meantime the position of the president gradually evolved hence giving rise to the question about which method for the election of the head of state is most "appropriate". However, this issue was not an object of political deliberation for the major Polish political parties of the last 20 years. Firstly, this resulted from the popularity of the presidential election within society, which was reflected in high turnouts (considering Polish reality). Secondly, especially until the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, no party wanted to run the risk of being accused of returning to the political transition solutions adopted at the Round Table. Thirdly, until the beginning of 2010, the competition for the office of president was "reserved" for charismatic leaders or party leaders. It was finally Donald Tusk, who decided not to contend for the presidential election of 2010 thus wanting to change the perception of the institution of president in the system of power and draw attention and emphasize the role and the importance of a government with a strong (normatively and factually) prime minister as the leader.

Analyzing the relationship between the legislative and executive power helps to understand that the modern democratic political regimes are usually described on the basis of three typical models: parliamentary, presidential and semipresidential. They are more or less differentiated internally, which naturally makes it difficult to conduct research. This is the effect of competition on the political institutions, which takes place between the political actors, seeking to create the most rational, from their perspective, institutional structure. As the result, these types of activeness are beginning to blur the boundaries between classical models of political regimes, and creates institutional arrangements eclectic, built on the basis of specific solutions for different models of democratic political regimes. Additionally we shouldn't remain indifferent to the changes in the sphere of noninstitutional determinants of the functioning of the various political regimes. The procedure of identifying general trends in the processes of governance in the modern world becomes possible to notify similarities in the functioning of the executive in the various models of democratic political regimes. The trend in strengthening the executive bodies, especially the bodies with single actors is against the traditional models of democratic political regimes. This also determines the subsequent changes, and one of the most important is the growing centralization of decision-making processes, coordinated and controlled by the chief executive.

Electoral systems are one of the most important instruments via which political actors shape national politics. For some groups they are seen as a source of future reward, while for others they lead to their demise, eliminating them from any right to decide about the politics of the state. Th ere is no system that is able to combine both guaranteed stability of power with a faithful refl ection of the political solutions sought aft er by the voters. For this reason it is all the more justifi ed to look at electoral systems through the prism of the interests of political parties, especially of those who have the necessary majority to see various projects adopted. Th e change of the Polish Senate's electoral system in 2011 is an excellent example of how the interests of political parties can override those of the voters.

Poland's National Security Council (Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, RBN) is defined in the country's Constitution as organ doradczy Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w zakresie wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego bezpieczeństwa państwa (officially translating into: "the advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and external security of the State"). Against that background, this article uses analysis of policy practice as it seeks to explain whether the NSC truly plays that role of advisory organ, or is more in the nature of a coordinating-and-consulting body. To address this research topic, three areas have been identified for broader and deeper consideration, i.e. the means of selecting Council Members, the frequency with which Sittings have been convened, and the subject matter addressed at those Sittings.