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Map of SFR Yugoslavia -- Introduction -- Taming the Balkan Gorbachev, 1987-1989 -- Yugoslavia's Cold War, 1988-1989 -- Challenges of democracy, 1990 -- To the brink and back, October 1990-April 1991 -- Descent to dissolution, March-June 1991 -- Summer of violence and divisions, June-September 1991 -- Diplomacy on the edge, September-November 1991 -- The end and the beginning, November 1991-April 1992 -- Conclusions

Where do politically activist football supporters come from? What are the social conditions under which they are successfully recruited and mobilised? This article answers those questions by analysing a unique dataset of more than 43,000 members of Our Hajduk – the association of supporters of the Croatian club Hajduk Split – as well as a host of data on the communities they live in. The analysis shows that Our Hajduk thrives in exactly the same areas where most other social, civil and political organisations thrive: among the more educated and more socio-economically successful. Most importantly, the analysis shows that the pattern of Our Hajduk membership closely follows the patterns of political affiliation and participation in Croatia's electoral arena and is guided by the opposition to political players who have dominated Croatian football and turned it into a social field marked by corruption and mismanagement.

Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia's relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to Zagreb's democratic shortcomings, but partly also due to competing visions of post-Cold War Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases rooted in Croatia's and Britain's conflicting policies during Yugoslavia's breakup and wars. Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity for the two countries to leave the burdens of their past behind, since Zagreb and London had similar preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Brexit changed everything. Croatia's future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration. ; Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia's relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to Zagreb's democratic shortcomings, but partly also due to competing visions of post-Cold War Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases rooted in Croatia's and Britain's conflicting policies during Yugoslavia's breakup and wars. Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity for the two countries to leave the burdens of their past behind, since Zagreb and London had similar preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Brexit changed everything. Croatia's future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration.

Could the Western foreign policy makers have done anything to prevent the violence accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia? The answer to that question largely depends on their level of awareness of what was happening in the South Slavic federation in the run-up to war. This article analyzes a string of newly declassified documents of the British Foreign Office related to the February 1991 visit of a high-level British political delegation to Yugoslavia, together with interviews with some of the meetings' protagonists. These declassified documents and interviews offer a unique snapshot in the development of the Yugoslav crisis and Britain's policy in the region. They give us a clear picture of the goals and strategies of the principal Yugoslav players and show us what the West knew about the true nature of the Yugoslav crisis and when. The article's conclusions are clear. Yugoslavia's breakup and impending violence did not require great foresight. Their cause was known well in advance because it was preannounced—it was the plan of the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević to impose a centralized Yugoslavia upon the other republics or, if that failed, to use force to create a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia's ruins. Crucially, British policy at the time did nothing to dissuade Milošević from his plan and likely contributed to his confidence in using violence to pursue the creation of a new and enlarged Serbian state.

This article examines the arguably most interesting pieces of evidence used during the trial of Slobodan Milošević at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia—more than two hundred recordings of intercepted conversations that took place in 1991 and 1992 between Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Dobrica Ćosić, and various other protagonists on the Serbian side of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Analysis of the intercepts presented in this article makes several important contributions to the interpretation of events in former Yugoslavia during that period. First, it identifies the ideological foundations of Milošević-led Serbian war campaigns in the political influence of Dobrica Ćosić and his platform of "unification of Serbs." Second, it contributes to the vigorous debate regarding the possible deal between Milošević and the Croatian president Franjo Tuđman for the division of BiH. It confirms that negotiations took place, but that Milošević and his associates had no intention of respecting any agreement and wanted the whole of BiH until at least late 1991. Third, it provides indications that Milošević held the position of the de facto commander-in-chief in the operations of the Yugoslav People's Army in Croatia and BiH. And fourth, it establishes that the two institutions of force Milošević had direct legal control over—Serbia's State Security Service and Ministry of Interior—were his principal means of control over Croatian and Bosnian Serbs and instruments in the aggression against BiH even after its international recognition.

Abstract
The execution of Covid-19 vaccination drives in former Yugoslavia's successor states has been disappointing. The rapidly evolving literature on the Covid-19 pandemic suggests the levels of support for vaccination are correlated with education, trust in public-health institutions, and exposure to the negative economic and health effects of the pandemic. The explanations of the political foundations of vaccination hesitancy, however, need better empirical grounding. We shed light on this subject by analyzing the results of a survey conducted on more than six thousand respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, as well as a combination of public-health, economic, and sociodemographic data across more than five hundred municipalities in Croatia. Most notably, we find the political sources of vaccination hesitancy to be strongly related to people's support for the ideas of political parties committed to nationalist populism.