Suchergebnisse

This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm's choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners' dilemma as the firm's optimal strategy.

We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogenous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear.

An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods than in others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent's reputation if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations can explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first 100 days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some periods of a president's term affect elections.

An official whose experience increases over time may overweight old information when making decisions. If the state of nature changes over time, the official's performance eventually worsens with experience. Though a new official may initially perform worse than his predecessor, maximizing average performance requires that officials are regularly replaced. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

An official whose experience increases over time may overweight old information when making decisions. If the state of nature changes over time, the official's performance eventually worsens with experience. Though a new official may initially perform worse than his predecessor, maximizing average performance requires that officials are regularly replaced.

Members of political parties may influence each other. For example, a liberal in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the party may become more liberal. Voters in a district who favor such effects may care about the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who affiliates with a party over an independent with the same position.

Members of political parties may influence each other. For example, a liberal in a party of moderates may moderate his views. At the same time, the moderates in the party may become more liberal. Voters in a district who favor such effects may care about the ideology of officeholders in other districts. They may therefore prefer a candidate who affiliates with a party over an independent with the same position. Adapted from the source document.

A person may vote for a candidate to please citizens who prefer the same candidate, and to anger citizens who dislike the candidate. Such behavior is consistent with high turnout (though any one vote is unlikely to be decisive), with strategic voting, and with candidates adopting divergent positions. Adapted from the source document.