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AbstractWe show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems. This negative relation, however, is not found in regulated firms (i.e., utilities). We contend that this is because regulation already helps alleviate agency conflicts and, hence, mitigates the role of leverage in controlling agency costs.

AbstractWe examine international bank expansions, which are classified as banking (scale related) or nonbanking (complementary) moves into developed or developing markets. The market responds favorably to expansions through joint ventures by U.S. banks, and insignificantly to expansions through acquisitions. Accounting and operating performances (for joint venture banks) and long‐period holding returns (for acquisitions) show improvement in the two years following the announcement. Systematic risk declines for the sample overall, for acquisitions, and for expansions into developing countries. In general, scale or developing expansions are better pursued through acquisitions, whereas complementary or developed expansions are best pursued through joint ventures.