Suchergebnisse

Abstract
After the parliamentary elections in 2014, the weakened legitimacy of the Hungarian government could be re-established through activism in migration issues. Fidesz-KDNP that won elections twice already highlighted migration as the main theme of governance from 2014 to 2018, suppressing every other topic on the political agenda. The position that was established for purposes of the Hungarian domestic situation and politics initially faced intense rejections all over Europe, but then garnered some supporters as well, mostly in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, and to a smaller extent among the right-wing and populist parties of Western Europe. The anti-refugee and populist approach caused significant success in the communication field to the subscribing parties and governments, and also legitimised Hungarian government's efforts that could mean it met the majority of the Hungarian society's expectations. The most essential question is that how can political science reshape its terms and thoughts on populism to understand this phenomenon better, moreover what are the reasons of populism and why is the populist propaganda such successful in Hungary and Eastern Europe.

General political, economic and moral crises began in Hungary in 2006, after the prime minister's speech about the real state of the Hungarian economy was delivered. Fidesz, the then largest opposition party refused any further cooperation with the government and started to attack the governing socialist‑liberal coalition. After four years of permanent campaign against the socialists, Fidesz won the elections in 2010 and started to rearrange the whole political and social system in Hungary. Parallel to that, the appearance of social movements in Hungary can clearly be understood as a reply to crisis phenomena, whether they are left‑leaning organisations, green‑ecological, critical of globalisation ("globcrit") or far‑right, fascistoid groups and networks. One part of the green‑ecologial movement was formed into a party and was named as Politics Can Be Different (LMP), but after 2010 other organizations appeared such as Szolidaritás, an organisation established with reference to the Polish example, with a trade union background, Milla (One Million for Press Freedom), 4K (Movement for the Fourth Republic) and HaHa (Students' Network), the Hungarian Two‑tailed Dog Party (MKKP) and the Hungarian Pirate Party.

As a result of permanent crises, changing political circumstances, rise of populism and overwhelming socio-cultural conflicts, recently liberal democracy is on the decline. This process strongly affects the civil sector, which in the 21st century is still considered one of the main defenders of democracy and human rights. Civil sector also performs a couple of functions that help them try to monitor the state (watchdog function), protect citizens, minorities, human rights, environment, animals etc. and provide a normative behavioural attitude. Nowadays in many countries the activities of civil organizations are restricted, displaced or terminated. Focusing on those countries where democratic backsliding process can be clearly observed, this study examines the background and forms of the process by which civils turned from partners to "enemies" in the last decade.

Abstract
The migration policies of the V4 countries present many similarities that seem to be the effect of congruent historical and economic determinants. During the migration crisis in 2015–2016, the Visegrad states partially coordinated their political communication using the same communication panels, which strongly impacted domestic political relations. The V4's approach was a refusal of the open-door policy promoted by Germany and Sweden, and the European Union. Our main findings are that the migration crisis strengthened the cohesion among V4 countries, although the source of this cohesion was clearly a populistic stance toward the possible implications of uncontrolled migration (migrants and refugees). This communication style and the resulting political tensions were reflected in the V4 states' resentment based on a sense of shared historical experiences rooted in Central European location and shared experience of the repercussions of communism. In this sense, a strong commitment to the idea of a sovereign nation-state, and a reluctance towards postmodern values are also important factors. This study charts the changes in V4 migration policy since 2015, highlighting the crucial developments in V4 countries' negotiations with the European Union. It also deals with the foreign and domestic effects of the migration crisis and the V4 states' discourse of migration, which was complemented by a debate on the future of the EU that became especially important in Hungary and Poland.

Water scarcity is already causing serious challenges nowadays and devastating water-related processes will certainly continue for decades to come. The emerging water crisis requires new political arrangements, new technological solutions and the development of new water supply chains. Among the possible political-diplomatic answers, water trade may be a viable option, as water abundant countries could distribute resources by commercializing their water surplus. Water trade, however, faces serious obstacles. Dependence of different countries on states that have water surplus, political leverage and the possible opportunity when external powers could control the essentially important human needs are all examples of potential risks. These threats hinder the development of interstate water trade cooperation and orient countries struggling with water shortages towards domestic solutions. This study attempts to examine the practice of water scarcity and water diplomacy, while also applies the Turkish experience as a case study for demonstrating constraints of water trade. The paper will hopefully shed light on the threats posed by global and regional water scarcity and draw attention to the opportunities and limitations of water commercialization. The aim of our study is to outline the issues related to the distribution and trade of water, furthermore to present the problems of water as a product. Our research focuses primarily on Turkey, which has also become involved in water trade, but the story still ended in failure.

This paper examines developments in Poland following the 2015 elections and in Hungary since 2010, which included the gradual destruction of democratic institutions, challenges to the rule of law, as well as to the system of checks and balances. The authors consider the Ziblatt–Levitsky model (2018) as a meaningful framework for the analysis of the way in which the power structure was reshaped and have based their research
on the classification set out in this model. Our objective is to present the political changes that took place in the two Central-Eastern-European countries during the last decade that resulted in the process under Article 7 being used for the first time in the history of the EU. The paper conclusion is that the path of de-democratization of Hungary and Poland is seen from the perspective of the EU and Council of Europe, as similar one. In actions
taken toward both countries, the EU concerns mostly the principle of the rule of law.

The co-existence between Hungarians and Islam has been considered balanced, until the spring of 2015 when a wave of migrants appeared in Europe. "Opening to the East", the foreign policy announced by the government in 2011 heralded a new chapter of cooperation with Arabic/Muslim countries, predominantly due to economic considerations. The migrant crisis turned government communication, as well as the stance of Jobbik, the largest opposition party, upside down. This paper discusses the unique phenomenon of what role the political debate about Islam and the construction of the temporary border barrier protecting the Hungarian national borders played in the competitive communication of the national-radical, pro-Muslim opposition Jobbik party (achieving a lead in the polls) and the centre-right governing parties Fidesz-kdnp which typically emphasise their Christian character.

This paper presents the analysis of the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election manifestos of populist parties in V4 countries as a contribution to the contemporary discussion on political populism. The elections always allow for an interesting comparative view of populist parties in the context of the V4. The aim of the study is to analyze the election campaign programs which populist parties operating in individual V4 countries presented for EP elections in 2019. The paper is conceived as a qualitative content analysis of the official election programs of relevant populist parties and other sources of their communication. As authors we strive to identify topics that have been framed as a problem or risk on behalf of the Central European populists and the method in which these topics have been interpreted in their programs. As we found, especially the so-called "immigration crisis" and the contemporary state of the European Union are seen as most problematic by majority of the populists. On the other hand, majority of these parties do not want some Central European version of Brexit – their rhetorical goal is rather to reform the Union.