Suchergebnisse

CGE = Computable General Equilibrium

Since the mid-1990s, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced an acceleration of economic growth that has produced rising incomes and faster human development. However, this growth contrasts with the continent's experience between 1975 and 1995, when it largely missed out on two decades of economic progress. This disparity between Africa's current experience and its history raises questions about the continent's development. Is there a turnaround in Africa's economy? Will growth persist?Africa at a Turning Point? is a collection of essays that analyzes three interrelated aspects of Africa's recent r

This paper re-examines the development implications of international migration focusing on two issues: how the costs and benefits of migration change over time, and the significance of South-South migration for development. First, the analysis finds that although greater migration could push down the wages of native workers of advanced countries in the short run, these wages eventually recover. This pattern would be mostly caused by the beneficial effect of additional labor on the real returns on capital and fostering faster capital formation. Additional South-North migration could favor capital income recipients and reduces labor income in host regions in the short run. In contrast, in sending countries, capital owners could experience lower incomes while wages rise. Globally, the welfare gains of new migrants could be expected to exceed the losses of old migrants by a wide margin. The remaining natives in sending countries could enjoy a net increase in remittances as well as an increase in labor income, although income from capital might decline. Second, in a hypothetical scenario with lower South-South migration, the implied losses of remittance income could lead to substantially lower welfare in developing countries. Although the wage differentials among developing countries tend to be smaller relative to their wage differentials with high-income countries, South-South migrants make substantial contributions to remittances.

This paper develops a dynamic, stochastic, general-equilibrium model to analyze and derive simple budget rules in the face of volatile public revenue from natural resources in a low-income country like Niger. The simulation results suggest three policy lessons or rules of thumb. When a resource price change is positive and temporary, the best strategy is to save the revenue windfall in a sovereign fund and use the interest income from the fund to raise citizens' consumption over time. This strategy is preferred to investing in public capital domestically, even when private investment benefits from an enhanced public capital stock. Domestic investment raises the prices of domestic goods, leaving less money for government to transfer to households; public investment is not 100 percent effective in raising output. In the presence of a negative temporary resource price change, however, the best strategy is to cut public investment. This strategy dominates other methods, such as trimming government transfers to households, which reduces consumption directly, or borrowing, which incurs an interest premium as debt rises. In the presence of persistent (positive and negative) shocks, the best strategy is a mix of public investment and saving abroad in a balanced regime that provides a natural insurance against both types of price shocks. The combination of interest income from the sovereign fund, transfers to households, and output growth brought about by public investment provides the best protective mechanism to smooth consumption over time in response to changing resource prices.

Abstract
Noting that developing countries may not have the administrative capacity to levy a "pure" carbon tax, we compare the impact of alternative energy taxes with that of a carbon tax in an economy with multiple distortions. We use a disaggregated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the South African economy and simulate a range of tax policies that reduce CO2 emissions by 15 percent. Consistent with a "first-best" economy, a carbon tax will have the lowest marginal cost of abatement. But the relationship between a tax on energy commodities and one on pollution-intensive commodities depends critically on other distortions in the system and on structural rigidities in the economy. We demonstrate that if South Africa were able to remove distortions in the labor market, the cost of carbon taxation would be negligible. We conclude that the welfare costs of taxing carbon emissions in developing countries depend more on other distortions than on the country's own carbon emissions.

If trade tensions between the United States and certain trading partners escalate into a full-blown trade war, what should developing countries do? Using a global, general-equilibrium model, this paper first simulates the effects of an increase in U.S. tariffs on imports from all regions to about 30 percent (the average non-Most Favored Nation tariff currently applied to imports from Cuba and the Democratic Republic of Korea) and retaliation in kind by major trading partners—the European Union, China, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. The paper then considers four possible responses by developing countries to this trade war: (i) join the trade war; (ii) do nothing; (iii) pursue regional trade agreements (RTAs) with all regions outside the United States; and (iv) option (iii) and unilaterally liberalize tariffs on imports from the United States. The results show that joining the trade war is the worst option for developing countries (twice as bad as doing nothing), while forming RTAs with non-U.S. regions and liberalizing tariffs on U.S. imports ("turning the other cheek") is the best. The reason is that a trade war between the United States and its major trading partners creates opportunities for developing countries to increase their exports to these markets. Liberalizing tariffs increases developing countries' competitiveness, enabling them to capitalize on these opportunities.