Suchergebnisse

Cover page -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- CONTENTS -- PLATES -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- I -- II -- III -- 1 IN MUSSOLINI'S SHADOW 1922-33 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- 2 FIRST DATE June 1934 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- 3 SECOND TIME AROUND September 1937 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- 4 SPRINGTIME FOR HITLER May 1938 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- VIII -- 5 ON THE ROAD TO WAR 1938-9 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- 6 POINT OF NO RETURN 1939-41 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- VIII -- IX -- 7 INTO THE ABYSS 1941-3 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- VIII -- IX -- X -- 8 ENDGAME 1943-5 -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- VI -- VII -- CONCLUSION -- ENDNOTES -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX.

A fresh treatment of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, revealing the close ties between Mussolini and Hitler and their regimes From 1934 until 1944 Mussolini met Hitler numerous times, and the two developed a relationship that deeply affected both countries. While Germany is generally regarded as the senior power, Christian Goeschel demonstrates just how much history has underrepresented Mussolini's influence on his German ally. In this highly readable book, Goeschel, a scholar of twentieth-century Germany and Italy, revisits all of Mussolini and Hitler's key meetings and asks how these meetings constructed a powerful image of a strong Fascist-Nazi relationship that still resonates with the general public. His portrait of Mussolini draws on sources ranging beyond political history to reveal a leader who, at times, shaped Hitler's decisions and was not the gullible buffoon he's often portrayed as. The first comprehensive study of the Mussolini-Hitler relationship, this book is a must-read for scholars and anyone interested in the history of European fascism, World War II, or political leadership.--

The Third Reich met its end in the spring of 1945 in an unparalleled wave of suicides. Goeschel analyses the Third Reich's self-destructiveness and the suicides of ordinary people and Nazis in Germany from 1918 until 1945, including the mass suicides of German Jews during the Holocaust

AbstractFrom 1934 until 1945, the Nazi regime celebrated the anniversary of January 30, 1933, the day of Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor. This article, based on unpublished and published documents from central and local Nazi and state institutions, asks how the Nazis choreographed these celebrations at home and abroad and how they fit into broader Nazi conceptualizations of history. Stage-managed celebrations etched January 30 into the historical consciousness of Germans as beginning of the Third Reich and were a crucial step toward the realization of the Volksgemeinschaft (national community), although the Nazi seizure of power was a process and cannot be pinpointed to a single date. Ambivalence characterized the festivities, reflecting the fact that the Nazis saw their coming to power as both revolutionary and restorative of the natural flow of German history. In the Nazi imaginary, this day was a conjuncture in history, separating the Nazi struggle for power from their triumphant mission to "make Germany great again" and create a racial utopia.

The tripartite pact, concluded by Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1940, sought to create a new global order. This article is part of a broader shift in scholarship, inspired by global and cultural history. Instead of revisiting the decision-making that led to the pact's conclusion, this article explores the pact through the dialectics of culture and power. Through an archive-based interpretation of the pact's signing and the celebrations of its anniversaries from 1941 until 1945 that involved ordinary people in Axis-dominated territories around the world, the central mechanisms of this global fascist alliance become clear. A performative diplomacy of power and unity held the alliance together. Style and substance were not mutually exclusive categories of tripartite politics; instead, 'real' and representational politics shaped each other. The pact was a concerted attempt by the three signatories to transform global political structures and supersede the purported global hegemony of the liberal democracies.

For many historians writing today, person-centred or biographical approaches constitute 'the shallow end of history', a field better left to amateur historians. However, since the 1990s, under the influence of cultural history and because of a growing dissatisfaction with structuralist approaches, some historians have become interested in finding alternative approaches towards the genre of political biography, partly inspired by the 'new cultural history' of the 1980s that prompted a return to the individual as a site for micro-history.
In this article, I explore from my perspective as a historian of modern Europe what can or cannot be gained from the study of foreign policy through a strong emphasis of leaders' biographies, an approach which political scientists and IR specialists such as Jack S. Levy have recently advocated. I shall focus on two of the most significant statesmen of the twentieth century, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, leaders of the world's first fascist dictatorships and allies during the Second World War. According to Fascist and Nazi propaganda, Mussolini and Hitler were charismatic leaders exclusively in charge of their countries and above all of foreign policy. The powerful propaganda image of the dictator in total control makes Mussolini and Hitler an ideal case study to rethink the biographical approach towards foreign policy analysis and to ask if and how a biographical approach can shed light on foreign policy more generally. In this way, the article goes some way towards provoking a fruitful dialogue between IR and History.

Too often histories of the concentration camps tend to be ignorant of the wider political context of nazi repression and control. This article tries to overcome this problem. Combining legal, social and political history, it contributes to a more thorough understanding of the changing relationship between the camps as places of extra-legal terror and the judiciary, between nazi terror and the law. It argues that the conflict between the judiciary and the SS was not a conflict between 'good' and 'evil', as existing accounts claim. Rather, it was a power struggle for jurisdiction over the camps. Concentration camp authorities covered up the murders of prisoners as suicides to prevent judicial investigations. This article also looks at actual suicides in the pre-war camps, to highlight individual inmates' reactions to life within the camps. The article concludes that the history of the concentration camps needs to be firmly integrated into the history of nazi terror and the Third Reich.