Suchergebnisse

AbstractStreet‐level organizations (SLOs) play a key, but understudied, political role in democratic governance as they are responsible for the direct‐delivery of public services that are vital to the functioning of the state. To discuss the political role of SLOs in general, this study begins by identifying four SLO roles, which are conceptualized here by distinguishing policy‐sphere versus politics‐sphere and "SLOs‐as‐takers" versus "SLOs‐as‐makers." SLOs' political role in a democratic backsliding and populism context is specified by distinguishing whether SLOs converge to, or diverge from, illiberal policies, and distinguishing reactive and proactive responses. Each of the four responses is elaborated by referring to how SLOs both influence, and are influenced by, populism and democratic backsliding. Shifting attention to the specific context of democratic erosion allows a more nuanced distinction between policy sectors and countries, as well as identifying the ways through which public service provision facilitates or inhibits democratic backsliding.

Noncompliance is most often understood in the public policy literature as a problem of implementation and enforcement. Yet, this perhaps normative focus misses the role of noncompliance as a source of policy change. To demonstrate this unexplored role, this study conceptualizes noncompliance and subsequent governmental responses as an interactive, ongoing process, in which noncompliance may gain social acceptance and governmental reaction changes over time. Manifestations of noncompliance in health (immunization refusal, needle exchange programs), education (homeschooling), policing (community police), drug use (decriminalization of marijuana) and urban services (community gardening) suggest that governmental reaction is a dynamic, developing process, constituting a series of responses influenced by social acceptance of noncompliance and by the latter's implications. Each response may take on one of four patterns of legitimization: embracement (legitimization), adaptation (reluctant legitimization), acceptance (implicit legitimization) and stricter enforcement (delegitimization). A more nuanced portrayal of the interaction between noncompliance and governmental reaction emphasizes a reciprocal relationship between policy makers and policy targets. Adapted from the source document.

Often portrayed as policymakers rather than policytakers, street-level bureaucrats play a key role in policy implementation. It is now well accepted that the implementation actions of street-level workers frequently result in outcomes that differ from those expected from formal policy. Although the adaptation of rules among street-level bureaucrats is well documented, its influence has been relatively understudied. Furthermore, the conceptualization of street-level divergence is relatively ambiguous. To explore the conditions under which divergence may contribute to a policy change, this study suggests a more-nuanced portrayal of street-level divergence, by referring to three analytical dimensions, namely, motivation, transparency, and collectivity. Data draw on street-level actions that are considered inconsistent with formal policy both among policy principals and among street-level workers, in three different policy sectors: education, health, and welfare. Findings suggest that transparent, collective, and other-serving divergence tends to trigger a policy change. A better understanding of the reciprocal relationships between street-level divergence and policy change may contribute to the coordination of the efforts of different governmental tiers as regards policymaking and the design of policy implementation. Adapted from the source document.

Following Hirschman's seminal Exit, Voice and Loyalty, an exit response to dissatisfaction with public services is often portrayed as a replacement of one service provider with another, depending on the availability of alternatives. This article enriches Hirschman's typology by conceptualising an 'entrepreneurial exit' response referring to citizens who exit proactively by creating a viable alternative themselves. The practical aspects of entrepreneurial exit are analysed based on five manifestations: planned homebirth, homeschooling, urban self‐defence groups, children with disabilities, and claim clubs in the American West. Whereas citizens' roles within the public service sphere are referred to as 'participators', 'customers', and 'co‐producers', entrepreneurial exit indicates the entrepreneurial role citizens may play. Similar to the additional forms of exit, entrepreneurial exit becomes meaningful if the newly introduced form of service gains social acceptance, especially when it reflects policy non‐compliance within which laymen are transformed into providers of professional services.

Individuals who attain a higher education, whereas both their parents did not, embody the realization of social mobility. They are referred to as first‐generation higher education students. Previous analyses had often portrayed them as succeeding despite their family background. This research suggests that although they face many challenges, their families are often facilitators of their success. In‐depth, semistructured interviews were used to collect data from Israeli first‐generation students (N= 50). We employed a grounded theory approach, and our analysis reveals that breaking the intergenerational cycle of educational level inheritance involves day‐to‐day family life that prioritizes education through nonmaterial resources. We conceptualized this investment of nonmaterial resources as family capital. A better understanding of this role is valuable for designing efficient policy.

AbstractPolicy implementation is a formative stage of the policy process. It determines policy's form and effect while also lying at the intersection of politics, policy, and the public. Policy implementation takes place within a given institutional setting and requires specific structure and organization to conduct it both of which allocate decision power and mint specific roles in the implementation process. Nevertheless, current implementation literature tends to overlook implementation arrangements as structures influencing, and influenced by, power. This special issue draws on various aspects of implementation arrangements to demonstrate the significant, yet underexplored, polity of implementation. To do so, this introduction begins by reviewing the conceptual frameworks available in the current implementation scholarship. This is followed by a discussion of the special issue's seven contributions. Finally, the conclusion proposes recommendations for conducting future research on the polity of implementation.

Policy implementation is a formative stage of the policy process. It determines policy's form and effect while also lying at the intersection of politics, policy, and the public. Policy implementation takes place within a given institutional setting and requires specific structure and organization to conduct it both of which allocate decision power and mint specific roles in the implementation process. Nevertheless, current implementation literature tends to overlook implementation arrangements as structures influencing, and influenced by, power. This special issue draws on various aspects of implementation arrangements to demonstrate the significant, yet underexplored, polity of implementation. To do so, this introduction begins by reviewing the conceptual frameworks available in the current implementation scholarship. This is followed by a discussion of the special issue's seven contributions. Finally, the conclusion proposes recommendations for conducting future research on the polity of implementation.

AbstractIn contrast to the well‐documented impacts of implementing performance management (PM) systems, the evolution of PM systems' design is understudied, despite the understanding that PM requires ongoing maintenance, continuing reconsideration, and constant adaption to local circumstances. This study employs a process perspective on PM by focusing on the four generations of the Israeli police PM system implemented from 1999 to 2016. Data are drawn from official documentation and interviews with various stakeholders who were involved in the system's re‐designs. PM evolution emerged as a decentralization process, during which Chiefs were gradually given more power, partially at the expense of top management power, through increased discretion, self‐learning features, enhanced understanding and decoupling of measurement–incentives. Shifting from "one size fits all" to a more "tailor‐made" approach, and from top‐down control to user management, PM decentralization exemplifies constructive efforts to bridge the well‐known gap between policy aims and outcomes in performance‐oriented reforms.