Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper tests Huntington's the Clash of Civilizations hypothesis evaluating the impact of civilizations on militarized interstate disputes. In particular, we investigate whether countries that belong to different civilizations tend to be more involved in conflict than countries that belong to the same civilization. We show that over the period of 1816-2001, dissimilarity in civilization in a dyad has no effect on conflict involvement. However, even after controlling for temporal dependence, and for geographic, political, military and economic factors, being part of different civilizations in the post-Cold War period brings about 63.6% higher probability of conflict than belonging to the same civilization, whereas this effect is insignificant during the Cold War.

Abstract
This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor's performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects.

AbstractIt is argued that crises open up a window of opportunity to implement policies that otherwise would not have the necessary political backing. We show that not only is the crises–reforms nexus unfounded in the data, but rather crises are associated with a reversal of liberalisation interventions depending on the institutional environment. We find that, in democratic countries, crises occurrences have no significant impact on liberalisation measures. On the contrary, after a crisis, autocracies reduce liberalisation in multiple economic sectors, which we interpret as the fear of regime change leading non-democratic rulers to please vested economic interests.