Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: Toward a Soviet Theory of National Liberation -- 1 Origins of National Liberation Movements -- 2 Composition, Leadership, and Organization of National Liberation Movements -- 3 Ideology of National Liberation Movements -- 4 Strategy and Tactics: The Means -- 5 Relations with the Soviet Union and the Socialist World -- Conclusions -- Part II: Soviet Policy Toward National Liberation Movements -- 6 Patterns of Soviet Behavior -- Index.

The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (1988) is a systematic comparison of Soviet theory about, and actual behaviour toward, movements for national liberation in the Third World. In this definitive study, Professor Golan demonstrates that Soviet behaviour toward such movements is consistent with Soviet theory as stated in the writings and speeches of high-level influential within the Party, military and academic communities. In so doing, she advances our understanding of the rules of thumb' that Soviet leaders appeared to follow in deciding whether and how to assist the varied types of anti-imperialist' and separatist movements in the developing world. The first part of the book provides a detailed analysis of the various schools of thought among Soviet writers concerning different aspects of national liberation movements, and the second part analyses actual Soviet behaviour toward numerous movements around the world.

1. Introduction -- 2. 1967-1968 failure -- 3. Breakthrough with Egypt -- 4. Failure on the Syrian track -- 5. Jordan again : failures and breakthrough -- 6. Oslo I : breakthrough and failure -- 7. Oslo II : Barak and Camp David -- 8. Olmert's near breakthroughs : Annapolis process and Syrian talks -- 9. Conclusions.

"Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement. From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general."--

"Examining the Israeli-Arab conflict as an "intractable conflict," Israeli Peacemaking since 1967 seeks to determine just which factors, or combination of factors, impacted on Israel's position in past peace-making efforts, possibly accounting for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement. From King Hussein's little known overtures immediately after the Six-Day War, through President Sadat's futile efforts to avoid war in the early 1970s, to repeated third-party-mediated talks with Syria, factors including deep-seated mistrust, leadership style, and domestic political spoilers contributed to failures even as public opinion and international circumstances may have been favourable. How these and other factors intervened, changed or were handled, allowing for the few breakthroughs (with Egypt and Jordan) or the near breakthrough of the Annapolis process with the Palestinians, provides not only an understanding of the past but possible keys for future Israeli-Arab peace efforts. Employing extensive use of archival material, as well as interviews and thorough research of available sources, this book provides insight on just which factors, or combination of factors, account for breakthroughs or failures to reach agreement; a framework useful for examining both the Israeli-Arab conflict and intractable conflicts in general."--

Oslo accords -- Camp David -- Clinton parameters -- Taba -- Mitchell-Tenet-Zinni recommendations-- Saudi initiative-Arab League resolution and UNSC resolution -- President Bush's Rose Garden speech -- The road map -- The Geneva accord -- Nusseibeh Ayalon- petition -- The disengagement plan -- US-Israel understandings: Bush and Weissglas letters

The failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict for many years
has often been attributed in significant part to the absence of trust in the
sincerity of the other side and, more specifically, to the recalcitrant nature
of the opponent. Analyses of past proposals and actual negotiations have
pointed out missed opportunities, possibly the result of misperceptions
or misunderstandings. Recent archival research, publications, and interviews
regarding the Israeli protagonists reveal that actual deception, as
distinct from 'misperception', may have been at play. The article examines
this phenomenon as it has appeared since 1967 in six instances of Israeli
government dealings with its own public and with the US or the international
community, even in recent months, due primarily to an unwillingness
to withdraw from the Occupied Territories or agree to enter serious
negotiations for ending the conflict with the Palestinians.

Abstract
Inasmuch as the 2015 Israeli elections brought to power a Netanyahu-led coalition even more ideologically opposed to the creation of a Palestinian state than the previous coalitions, the absence of political will to reach agreement would appear to prejudge the outcome of any future negotiations should they take place. For this reason, recommendations to improve American mediation efforts remain in the realm of theory, but nevertheless may provide useful suggestions for the more basic step of returning the sides to serious negotiations.

Asymmetry of power is an acknowledged phenomenon in negotiation, and there are a number of devices for dealing with it. Similarly, alternative dispute resolution seeks to neutralize asymmetry of power by using an interest-based model of cross-conflict collaboration, but research has indicated that asymmetry persists nonetheless. The role of gender in negotiation has been researched, and to a far lesser degree, also with regard to alternative dispute resolution. Some of the gender in negotiation research has introduced the element of asymmetry of power as well. Prompted by the highlighting of asymmetry in Israeli-Palestinian all-women alternative dispute resolution (cross-conflict collaboration), the present article seeks to determine the role of gender, comparing asymmetry in mixed groups with all-women's groups. A qualitative analysis, based on observations over decades of personal experience, finds only differences of degree rather than essence between predominantly-male mixed and all-women's groups regarding the effects of asymmetry. The major exception to this lies in the centrality accorded the phenomenon by women but not by men, possibly attributable to gender differences in group relations and also the feminist character of the all-female groups.