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Sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area hinges upon the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We analyse whether political events that worsen the SGP's credibility result in a shared default risk premium for all euro members, therefore leading to a joint deterioration of creditworthiness. We especially examine the decisions and statements of the Commission and the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers. Analysing daily data through the 1999–2005 period with an ARMA-GARCH model, we find the Commission plays a decisive role in affecting investor evaluations, where its credibility-strengthening decisions decrease volatility and statements signalling a weakening of fiscal credibility spark uncertainty on financial markets. Our results stress the importance of creating credible fiscal institutions that preserve sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area.

Sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area hinges upon the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We analyse whether political events that worsen the SGP's credibility result in a shared default risk premium for all euro members, therefore leading to a joint deterioration of creditworthiness. We especially examine the decisions and statements of the Commission and the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers. Analysing daily data through the 1999–2005 period with an ARMAGARCH model, we find the Commission plays a decisive role in affecting investor evaluations, where its credibility-strengthening decisions decrease volatility and statements signalling a weakening of fiscal credibility spark uncertainty on financial markets. Our results stress the importance of creating credible fiscal institutions that preserve sovereign creditworthiness within the euro area. ; peerReviewed

After neutering the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2005, recent developments pinpoint that financial markets considerably discriminate between qualities of European governmental borrowers. In this article we inquire whether and to what extent political statements and decisions within the realm of the Europe an Union (EU) have deteriorated the effectiveness of the SGP from financial markets' perspective. The SGP may represent a focal point in financial market actors' calculus regarding long-term public debt formation. Accordingly, any news – such as political rhetoric in context of the SGP – affects financial market actors' evaluation concerning governmental creditworthiness. We use financial market data to measure the influence that political events exert on governmental default risks. Using daily data for the EMU memberstates from 2002 to 2005 the analysis reveals that political rhetoric has considerably undermined the efficacy of the SGP. In turn, market forces have regained some more momentum. According policy implications are outlined.

AbstractAre overheating housing markets and rising interest rate risks becoming a breeding ground for yet another banking crisis? We assess these risks for the German case. We find that they are indeed building up and may very well form the basis for a new banking crisis – unless prevented through responsible banking decisions, supervisory guidance, and policy adjustments.

Haben die von der Finanzkrise betroffenen Nationalstaaten die auf internationaler Ebene ausgehandelten Regelungen übernommen? Oder haben sie im Gegenteil die europäische und die internationale Reformagenda bestimmt? Trägt die Politikentwicklung in einem politischen Mehrebenensystem zur internationalen Harmonisierung der Finanzmarktregulierung bei? Oder dominieren unterschiedliche nationale Interessen den Prozess? Eine international zusammengesetzte Gruppe namhafter Sozialwissenschaftler beleuchtet in diesem Buch das Zusammenspiel internationaler, europäischer und nationaler Entscheidungsprozesse bei der Reform der Finanzmarktregulierung.